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Multilateralism in Space:  
Opportunities and Challenges for Achieving Space Security 
 
Theresa Hitchens 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
 
Human activity in space has, from the dawn of 
the space age, been characterized by a “push 
me, pull you” dynamic between competition 
and cooperation. There is no doubt it was the 
Cold War rivalry between the United States 
and the then Soviet Union that drove initial 
efforts to breech the space frontier, and that 
military competition has long been, and 
continues to be, a central factor in states’ 
pursuit of space capabilities. At the same time, 
even during the height of tensions between the 
two superpowers, international cooperation in 
the space exploration and sciences was 
considered a high priority. Not only did the 
United States and the Soviet Union seek to 
cooperate with each other regarding human 
space flight, but they also reached out to other 
less-developed space players. 
 
This fragile balance between competitive 
pressures and cooperative benefits has helped 
to create the foundation for the rapid 
expansion of global space activities over the 
last 50 years that has greatly benefitted 
economic and social development around the 
world. There are now some 1,100 active 
spacecraft on orbit and more than 60 states 
and/or commercial entities owning and/or 
operating satellites.1 
 
However, the ever increasing usage of space 
by more and more actors is inevitably leading 
to pressures on the rather weak body of 
 
                                                
1James N. Miller, Testimony to the House Armed Services 
Committee Strategic Forces subcommittee, 16 March 2010, 
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/StratForces031610/ 
Miller_Testimony031610.pdf (accessed March 2010). 
international legal instruments and multilateral 
institutions that govern space activities – 
many of which sprang from the Cold War era 
and the efforts by the United States and Soviet 
Union to put boundaries around their military 
space race. For example, there is more and 
more competition for the limited resource of 
frequency spectrum, particularly for satellites 
in the coveted and ever more crowded 
geosynchronous (GEO) orbital belt.2 The past 
20 years have also seen an explosion in the 
use of space-related technologies for tactical 
military applications, such as weapons 
targeting and real-time imaging, creating 
potential geopolitical instability among major 
space players as each seeks to reduce its own 
vulnerabilities in space and exploit those of 
potential adversaries. 
 
Finally, the February 2009 collision between a 
working Iridium communications satellite and 
a defunct Russian Cosmos military satellite – 
the first-ever collision of two intact satellites 
that created a very large debris field – spurred 
concern among satellite owners, operators, 
and governments about the challenge of 
tracking, avoiding, mitigating, and removing 
uncontrolled space debris that threatens 
satellite operations.3 For all three of these 
 
2GEO is located at 36,000 km in altitude, where satellites 
essentially remain over the same spot on Earth allowing 
continuous broadcasting to fixed receiver sites. 
3See “Iridium 33 – Cosmos 2551 Collision” at 
http://www.agi.com/media-center/multimedia/current-events/ 
iridium-33-cosmos-2251-collision/default.aspx; and also see 
Orbital Debris Quarterly News, http://orbitaldebris.jsc. 
nasa.gov/newsletter/newsletter.html (both accessed May 
2010). 
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reasons, it is becoming important for 
multilateral cooperation to avoid harmful 
competition, accidents, and increased potential 
for conflict in space, which is legally 
enshrined as a global commons. This, in turn, 
increases the need for more attention to, and 
more focused work by, the three major 
multilateral institutions aimed at ensuring the 
global commons of space remains safe, 
secure, and available for the use of all: (1) the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS); (2) the 
International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU); and (3) the United Nations Conference 
on Disarmament (CD). 
 
This article will review the status of, 
opportunities for, and challenges to these three 
multilateral institutions. It will further 
examine the arguable need for better cross-
fertilization of effort among the three, given 
the interconnectivity of space activities in the 
civil, commercial, and military arenas, and the 
potential for competition and accidents to 




Foundations of Multilateralism 
 
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 
provides the basic foundation for international 
space law, and could be seen as the central 
pillar of the current multilateral institutional 
framework.4 OST was primarily negotiated in 
a bilateral back and forth between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, both of which 
submitted drafts to the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly in 1966, as a means of 
mitigating what both sides saw as a risky 
elevation of the nuclear arms race to space, 
and to quell growing fears of just such a 
                                                 
                                                
4For a brief history of the treaty negotiations, see Arms 
Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/ 
outerspace (accessed April 2010). 
nuclear space race among the international 
community.5 Most critically, the OST 
establishes space as a global commons “not 
subject to national appropriation by claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or 
by any other means.”6 It further prohibits the 
stationing of weapons of mass destruction in 
space or on celestial bodies; limits uses of the 
Moon and other celestial bodies to exclusively 
peaceful purposes; and forbids the 
establishment of military bases, the testing of 
weapons, and military maneuvers on the 
Moon and other celestial bodies. 
 
As of January 2009, 100 countries have 
ratified the OST and 26 others have signed, 
but not yet ratified.7 The OST is the basis for 
the four other international treaties governing 
space activities, all of which were developed 
and negotiated under the auspices of 
COPUOS. 
 
1. The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (Rescue Agreement), with 90 
ratifications, 24 signatures and one 
acceptance of rights and obligations as of 
January 2009. 
2. The 1972 Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (Liability Convention), with 87 
ratifications, 23 signatures and three 
 
5One should note that the negotiations took place in the 
aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, which itself gave added 
impetus to superpower efforts to control their nuclear 
competition. 
6Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
other Celestial Bodies (hereafter, Outer Space Treaty), 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html 
(accessed April 2010). 
7“Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its forty-eighth 
session in Vienna from 23 March to 3 April 2009,” 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_935 
E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
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acceptances of rights and obligations as of 
January 2009. 
3. The 1976 Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(Registration Convention), with 52 
ratifications, four signatures, and two 
acceptances of rights and obligations as of 
January 2009. 
4. The 1984 Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), with 
13 ratifications and four signatures as of 
January 2009. 
 
According to the UN Office of Outer Space 
Affairs (OOSA), which implements decisions 
made by COPUOS and the UN General 
Assembly on space issues, the legal principles 
enshrined in these five treaties (OST, Rescue 
Agreement, Liability Convention, Registration 
Convention, and Moon Agreement) include: 
…non-appropriation of outer space 
by any one country, arms control, the 
freedom of exploration, liability for 
damage caused by space objects, the 
safety and rescue of spacecraft and 
astronauts, the prevention of harmful 
interference with space activities and 
the environment, the notification and 
registration of space activities, 
scientific investigation and the 
exploitation of natural resources in 
outer space and the settlement of 
disputes. Each of the treaties lays 
great stress on the notion that the 
domain of outer space, the activities 
carried out therein and whatever 
benefits might accrue therefrom 
should be devoted to enhancing the 
well-being of all countries and 
humankind, and each includes 
elements elaborating the common 
idea of promoting international 
cooperation in outer space activities.8 
 
 
                                                 
                                                
8http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties. 
html (accessed April 2010). 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space 
 
As noted above, the body of international 
space law was negotiated under the auspices 
of COPUOS, which was established in 1959 
by the General Assembly to promote research, 
information sharing, and international 
cooperation in space; create cooperative space 
programs under UN auspices; and assume 
legal problems and issues surrounding the use 
of space.9 COPUOS is the only formal body 
empowered to negotiate new international 
space laws. There are 69 member states in 
COPUOS and a large number of non-
governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations are observers. COPUOS 
activities are centered in two subcommittees – 
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, 
and the Legal Subcommittee – which meet 
annually and report to the annual meeting of 
the full committee. The last COPUOS 
meetings were held 3-12 June 2009 and 9-18 
June 2010.10 Decisions within COPUOS are 
taken via voting by member states, although 
consensus is usually sought, and reported out 
to the General Assembly where those 
decisions are considered, and usually 
endorsed. 
 
Much of the work of COPUOS is dedicated to 
information sharing, education, and capacity 
building in developing countries. COPUOS 
oversees, for example, the work of the UN 
Program on Space Applications, implemented 
by OOSA and aimed at building capacity 
through international workshops, training 
courses, and pilot projects on issues, such as 
satellite navigation systems. The committee 
 
9Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 1472 (XIV), 
International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/gares/html/
gares_14_1472.html (accessed April 2010). 
10The committee’s report is available at http://www.oosa. 
unvienna.org/pdf/gadocs/A_64_20E.pdf (accessed April 
2010). 
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also oversees implementation of the 
recommendations emanating from 
UNISPACE III, a major international 
conference held from 19-30 July 1999 in 
Vienna, Austria with the goal of identifying 
and taking actions designed “to maximize 
opportunities for human development through 
the use of space science and technology and 
their applications.”11 COPUOS, under the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, 
continues to follow national, regional and 
multinational efforts to implement 
UNISPACE III’s Plan of Action on an annual 
basis. 
 
Similarly, the Scientific and Technical 
Committee follows progress reports of the UN 
Platform for Space-based Information for 
Disaster Management (UN-SPIDER). UN-
SPIDER, launched by the General Assembly 
in 2006, “to provide universal access to all 
countries and all relevant international and 
regional organizations to all types of space-
based information and services relevant to 
disaster management to support the full 
disaster management cycle.”12 UN-SPIDER 
implementation is supervised by OOSA, with 
input from several regional support offices 
and national focal points, who work with UN-
SPIDER staff “to strengthen national disaster 
management planning and policies, and 
implement specific national activities that 
incorporate space-based technology solutions 
in support of disaster management.”13 
                                                 
                                                
11“Draft Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space on the implementation of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (UNISPACE III),” UN General Assembly, 21 
November 2003, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c1/ 
AC105_C1_L272E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
12“Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Report on 
activities carried out in 2009 in the framework of the United 
Nations Platform on Space-based Information for Disaster 
and Emergency Response,” UN General Assembly, 23 
December 2009, paragraph 1, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/ 
pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_955E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
13Ibid, paragraph 10. 
While there has been a great deal of activity in 
this arena in recent years, a chronic shortage 
of funding – which although subsidized by the 
UN regular budget, is primarily provided by 
contributions of member states – is an ongoing 
constraint. It should be clear to states that such 
activities are necessary for ensuring the safety 
and security of space assets, as newcomers to 
the arena require 
assistance not 
only to most 
efficiently benefit 
from the use of 
space, but also to 
avoid harmful 
impact on others. 
In addition, “buy-
in” to best 
practices is 
required by all 
spacefaring states, 
as the physics of 
space cannot be 
avoided, and 
inevitably mean 
that what any one 
actor does in 
space has the 
potential to affect all others, whether 
positively or negatively. 
…implementation 
of the voluntary 
guidelines for the 
mitigation of 
space debris at 











COPUOS also has been relatively active, and 
relatively successful if at a slow pace, in 
studying emerging technical issues and 
making recommendations for how states 
might address these problems. The most 
recent success was the development of a set of 
voluntary guidelines for space debris 
mitigation adopted in 2007, based on technical 
recommendations developed by the Inter-
Agency Debris Coordinating Committee 
(IADC)14 and subsequently endorsed by the 
 
 
14The IADC – comprised of the space agencies of China, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine and the 
United States, plus the European Space Agency – was 
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General Assembly in January 2008.15 The 
accord is a significant achievement for space 
security, especially regarding Article 4, which 
pledges nations not to deliberately create long-
lived debris.16 In its most recent report, the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee agreed 
that “implementation of the voluntary 
guidelines for the mitigation of space debris at 
the national level would increase mutual 
understanding on acceptable activities in 
space, thus enhancing stability in space and 
decreasing the likelihood of friction and 
conflict.”17 
 
That said, the process took seven years and the 
guidelines that resulted are less technically 
specific than those recommended by the 
IADC (as some states objected to measures 
that would be more costly), are voluntary, lack 
any elaboration of how they are to be 
implemented, and contain loopholes related to 
national security. All this leads to questions 
about whether states will adopt them and how 
strictly they will be adhered to. While there 
has been some discussion in COPUOS about 
further strengthening the guidelines, and 
having the Legal Subcommittee consider how 
they might be translated into a legally binding 
mechanism, there has been no agreement to 
proceed. 
                                                 
 
                                                
established in 1993 as a mechanism for space agencies to 
exchange information. 
15UN General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/62/217, 10 
January 2008, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/rares/ 
ARES_62_217E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
16Gerard Brachet, “Long-term Sustainability of Space 
Activities,” Annex, p.131, “Security in Space: The Next 
Generation – Conference Report, 31 March-1April 2008, UN 
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2008, 
http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=363 
(accessed April 2010). 
17“Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its 
forty-sixth session, held in Vienna from 9 to 20 February 
2009,” Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN 
General Assembly, 6 March 2009, p.13, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_933 
E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
However, continued consideration of methods 
to combat space debris is likely to take place 
at the Scientific and Technical Committee 
through a new agenda item, “long-term 
sustainability of outer space activities.” At its 
18 February 2010 meeting, the subcommittee 
established a new working group on the issue. 
According to the agreement, the working 
group should: 
…examine the long-term 
sustainability of outer space activities 
in all its aspects, consistent with the 
peaceful uses of outer space, and 
avail itself of the progress made 
within existing entities, including but 
not limited to the other working 
groups of the Subcommittee, the 
Conference on Disarmament, the 
International Telecommunication 
Union, the Inter-Agency Space 
Debris Coordination Committee, the 
International Organization for 
Standardization, the World 
Meteorological Organization and the 
International Space Environment 
Service. The Subcommittee agreed 
that the Working Group should avoid 
duplicating the work being done 
within those bodies and instead 
identify areas of concern for the long-
term sustainability of outer space 
activities that are not covered by 
them. [The Subcommittee also agreed 
that the Working Group should 
consider organizing an exchange of 
information with the commercial 
space industry to understand the 
views of that community.]18 
 
This agreement is significant for several 
reasons. First, it for the first time recognizes 
the need for COPUOS to liaise more closely 
with the CD and the ITU on issues related to 
space safety and security of the future 
environment. For years, there have been set in 
 
18“Addendum, Draft Report of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee on its forty-seventh session, held in Vienna 
from 8-19 February 2010,” Committee for the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, UN General Assembly, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/limited/c1/AC105_C1_L3 
04Add3E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
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place rather artificial boundaries among the 
three UN bodies, both for political reasons and 
out of competition among the various 
bureaucracies. There is now a growing 
appreciation among diplomats dealing with 
the space portfolio that the emerging 
challenges to the safe and equitable use of 
space are interlinked, and that attempting to 
separate the civil, military and commercial 
realms of space activities is largely futile. 
Further, there is also a growing appreciation 
of the need to link efforts in the political 
sphere to activities of the technical community 
– given the highly technical nature of space 
operations. Since the 1970s, the numerous UN 
bodies that are active in peacetime space 
applications – ranging from ITU to the UN 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) – have meet 
annually for the Interagency Meeting on Outer 
Space Activities, with the last meeting held at 
ITU headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland on 
10-12 March 2010. Results of the meetings, 
which are coordinated by OOSA, are reported 
annually to COPUOS.19 The goal is to ensure 
that all these UN bodies are, in particular, 
working to apply space technology to meet 
human development goals and to minimize 
duplication. Interestingly, this group does not 
include the CD. The result is the effective 
isolation of the political decision-makers 
charged with efforts to protect space security 
from potential conflict from those within the 
UN system who have the most hands-on 
knowledge about the need for sustained access 
to space systems, and the most knowledge 
about how space can be, and cannot be, 
utilized and how best to ensure safe space 
operations. 
 
Second, the subcommittee agreed to charge 
the working group with considering new 
measures to enhance the sustainability of 
                                                 
                                                19See http://www.uncosa.unvienna.org/uncosa/iamos/index. 
html (accessed April 2010). 
space activities and a possible set of “best 
practice guidelines.”20 Based on the 
discussions so far, these guidelines are likely 
to fall under the rubric of “space traffic 
management” – that is processes, procedures, 
and new regulations for how spacecraft are 
launched, operated and disposed of at the end 
of their working lifetimes. While the need for 
a space traffic management regime has for 
many years been a topic for scientific, 
industry, and academic organizations, the 
issue has not been widely addressed in the 
political or legal realm. It is clear that given 
the increased usage of space and the growing 
problems of orbital crowding and debris, 
space operations – like international air travel 
– will soon require more robust and accepted 
rule sets to avoid 
accidents and 
collisions, as well 
as dampen drivers 
for conflict in the 
case of such 
incidents. One 
example of the 
growing recogni-
tion of the need 
for better 
processes is the 
decision in 2010 
by OOSA and the 
ITU to exchange, 
for the first time, 
data on satellite 
positions – which OOSA monitors through the 
UN Registry of Space Objects and the ITU 
through its Master International Frequency 
Register, which registers radio frequency 
transponders rather than actual satellites. A 
key problem with the UN Registry is failure 
by many states to actually register their 
satellites, especially military or intelligence 
…the emerging 
challenges to the 
safe and 
equitable use of 
space are 
interlinked, and 
that attempting to 
separate the civil, 
military and 
commercial 
realms of space 
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gathering satellites.21 By contrast, almost all 
states register the transponders on those 
satellites with the ITU. Thus harmonization of 
the two lists is a step toward a better picture of 
what exactly is in space, which is in turn a 
necessary foundation for ensuring both 
sustainability and security in space.22 
 
And while COPUOS limits itself to addressing 
the “peaceful uses” of space and avoids any 
discussion of military space, it is obvious that 
a key factor in 
ensuring the long-
term sustainability of 
space for peaceful 
purposes will be 
avoiding military 
conflict in space. 
Indeed, if COPUOS 
is able to formulate a 
set of “best practice 
guidelines” for space 
operations, those 
guidelines are almost 
inevitably going to 
include provisions for 
data sharing, which 
could serve as transparency and confidence-
building measures (TCBMs) for international 
security. It is already the case that the 
increased interest of the international 
community in TCBMs, also confidence and 
security-building measures (CSBMs),23 has 
led to considerable discussion of whether 
efforts to build such a regime, whether 
voluntary or legally binding, should be 
undertaken in COPUOS, the CD, by both, or 
by neither. What is certain is that there is 
                                                 
r in what forum or fora. 
                                                
21Jonathan McDowell, “The United Nations Registry of Space 
Objects,” http://www.planet4589.org/space/un/un_desc.html 
(accessed April 2010). 
22Theresa Hitchens, “Future Security in Space: Charting a 
Cooperative Course,” Center for Defense Information, 
Washington, DC, September 2004, pp.63-67. 
23The terms of art are slightly different and hold different 
political connotations for different states. 
growing interest in confidence-building, 
witnessed by the near universal support since 
2005 for a Russian-sponsored General 
Assembly resolution calling on states to make 
concrete proposals for new space-related 
TCBMs – the United States and Israel were 
the only hold-outs. Under the new 
administration of President Barak Obama, the 
long-standing U.S. opposition to multilateral 
action has waned, and it is likely that the 
United States will support some forward 








there has also 
been an 




Thus, the long-term sustainability work within 
COPUOS could serve the dual purpose of 
building much-needed bridges between the 
key multilateral institutions (as well as with 
the technical community and industry) 
assigned with international space governance, 
and opening an alternative pathway to long-
stalled efforts to address the problem of 
growing military tensions in, and the potential 
weaponization of, space. 
 
In addition, at the June 2009 meeting, 
COPUOS Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee agreed to launch ad-hoc 
working groups on a new initiative by the 
current chair, Ambassador Ciro Arévelo of 
Colombia: “Toward a UN Space Policy.”24 
The initiative is designed to both better 
coordinate the some 25 UN bodies responsible 
for some aspect of space to improve UN 
governance, and to improve how the UN uses 
space applications including building 
capabilities in emerging space states. A key 
goal of the overall initiative is to raise 
awareness, both within the UN and among 
member states, of the value of space to 
humanitarian and development goals – which 
 
24“Toward a UN Space Policy: An initiative of the Chairman 
of the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fifty-
seventh Session, 3 June 2009, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/ 
limited/l/AC105_2009_CRP12E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
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in turn could promote cooperative behavior in 
space and to dampen risk of conflict. 
 
If the COPUOS Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee can be said to have made 
reasonable, if slow, progress over recent years, 
the picture is less positive in the Legal 
Subcommittee. The Legal Subcommittee for 
decades has continued to debate basic 
questions for international space law, such as 
delineating where outer space begins and how 
to define a launching state, which is necessary 
for assigning liability. Further, no substantial 
legal accords have emanated from COPUOS 
since the formation of the OST Regime in the 
1960s and 1970s. Even the most recent 
accomplishment of COPUOS, the Moon 
Agreement, has little validity with only 13 
ratifications of which there are no space 
powers.25 
 
It is somewhat ironic that the most progress in 
setting multilateral 
legal accords was 
made during the 
Cold War period, 
but perhaps also 
understandable in 
that the treaties 
crafted at that time 
were essentially 
based on bilateral 
understandings 
between the United 
States and then 
Soviet Union about 
how to protect their 
best interests in 
space. At best, the 
Legal Subcommittee has served as a forum for 
                                                 
                                                
25The 13 states include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, 
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, and Uruguay. France and India, 
which are space powers, have signed, but have not ratified. 
Space power as used in the context here is a state that 
possesses indigenous capabilities to access orbital space. 
exchange of information about national 
implementation of current treaties. For 
example, at its most recent meeting in June 
2009, the subcommittee established a new 
Working Group on National Legislation 
Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space.26 At worst, it has done nothing 
more than serve as a platform for states to 
assert competing political views – the real 
problems in the subcommittee are not 
questions of law, but those of politics. 
 
COPUOS has a mixed record in contributing 
toward multilateral action to achieve space 
security. Nevertheless, there is a recent 
resurrection of interest in establishing new 
forms of space governance, even if voluntary, 







China to include 
terrestrial-based 




essence be a 
signal about 
China’s “good 
faith” on efforts 
to prevent space 
weaponization…
 
The ITU is the progeny of the International 
Telegraph Union, begun in 1865 to coordinate 
cross-border usage of the telegraph. While 
certain portions of the radio-frequency (RF) 
spectrum can be shared, fundamentally there 
is only so much room for users to operate – 
thus, telecommunications systems based on 
RF are regulated by national and international 
processes designed to prevent interference. 
The RF spectrum and satellite orbital slots are 
considered limited natural resources that all 
states have equal rights to use. Each state 
manages use of the RF spectrum within its 
borders, but international coordination is 
required when RF signals cross borders, as is 
the case for all satellites. The ITU began 
coordinating space radio-communications in 
1963, and is comprised of governments who 
 
26“Report of the Legal Subcommittee,” paragraph 10c, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_935 
E.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
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join as member states as well as industry 
groups who join either as “sector members” or 
“associates” and may participate in ITU 
activities, but do not have voting rights.27 
There are 191 member states and more than 
700 sector and associate members.28 The legal 
framework for the ITU was established in 
1992 with the signing of the Constitution of 
the International Telecommunication Union, 
which entered into force in 1994 as a legally 
binding treaty based on the major principles of 
efficient use of and equitable access to the 
spectrum and orbits. Among other things, the 
constitution empowers the ITU to: 
a) effect allocation of bands of the 
radio-frequency spectrum, the 
allotment of radio frequencies and the 
registration of radio-frequency 
assignments and, for space services, 
of any associated orbital position in 
the geostationary-satellite orbit or of 
any associated characteristics of 
satellites in other orbits, in order to 
avoid harmful interference between 
radio stations of different countries; 
b) coordinate efforts to eliminate 
harmful interference between radio 
stations of different countries and to 
improve the use made of the radio-
frequency spectrum for radio-
communication services and of the 
geostationary-satellite and other 
satellite orbits; 
c) facilitate the worldwide standard-
ization of telecommunications, with a 
satisfactory quality of service; 
d) foster international cooperation 
and solidarity in the delivery of 
technical assistance to the developing 
countries and the creation, 
development and improvement of 
telecommunication equipment and 
networks in developing countries by 
every means at its disposal, including 
through its participation in the 
relevant programmes of the United 
                                                 
                                                
27ITU, see http://www.itu.int/net/about/membership.aspx 
(accessed April 2010). 
28Ibid. 
Nations and the use of its own 
resources, as appropriate...29 
 
Member states of the ITU are bound to abide 
by the provisions of the Constitution of the 
International Telecommunication Union, as 
well as the “Administrative Regulations” that 
govern use of the spectrum, operations of 
telecommunications facilities, and 
coordination to avoid harmful interference 
with other operators. The specific regulations 
that govern spectrum and orbital band usage – 
with comprise procedures for frequency 
notification, coordination and registration of 
transponders, primarily aimed at avoiding 
harmful interference – are contained in the 
Radio Regulations, which are administered by 
the ITU Radiocommunication Sector and the 
Radiocommunication Bureau.30 Notably, the 
constitution exempts military installations, 
although states are urged to comply with the 
rules “so far as possible,” especially with the 
requirements for providing assistance in case 
of distress and the avoidance of harmful 
interference.31 That said, most states comply, 
including their military satellites and receiving 
facilities, if for no other reason than to 
establish legitimate rights for frequency 
allocations and orbital slots.32 While the ITU 
system is a legal framework, the organization 
has no enforcement powers, and member 




29“Constitution of the ITU, Chapter I, Basic Provisions,” 
http://www.itu.int/net/about/basic-texts/constitution/chapteri. 
aspx (accessed April 2010). 
30“Radiocommunication Sector,” ITU, http://www.itu.int/ 
net/about/itu-r.aspx (accessed April 2010). 
31“Constitution of the ITU, Chapter VII, Special Provisions 
for Radio, Article 48,” ITU, http://www.itu.int/net/ 
about/basic-texts/constitution/chaptervii.aspx (accessed April 
2010). 
32Tim Bonds and et. al., “Employing Commercial Satellite 
Communications: Wideband Investment Options for DOD,” 
Project Air Force, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., 2000, p.15, 
see http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1192 (accessed 
April 2010). 
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Top-level policy, including possible revisions 
to the Constitution of the International 
Telecommunication Union, financial plans and 
strategy, including plans for providing 
technical assistance to developing countries 
and setting equipment standards, are made by 
ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences, which are 
held every four years. The next 
Plenipotentiary Conference will be held in 
Guadalajara, Mexico on 4-22 October 2010.33 
 
World Radiocommunication Conferences 
(WRCs) are normally held every two to three 
years, but in recent years the intervals have 
stretched to four years. The WRCs are set to 
review and revise the Radio Regulations and 
the Table of Frequency Allocations, which 
identify what portions of the spectrum can be 
used by specific types of systems (such as 
mobile telecommunications or broadcast 
television), including allocating or reallocating 
frequencies for uses by new technologies.34 At 
the last WRC, held 22 October to 16 
November 2007, an agreement was reached on 
assigning certain frequencies for international 
mobile communications.35 The next WRC is 
set for 23 January to 17 February 2012. 
 
The two formal meetings essentially serve as 
fora for resolving disputes about spectrum and 
slot allocations, rules, regulations and 
technical standards. Each country gets one 
vote at the Plenipotentiary and WRC 
conferences, although in practice geographic 
regions usually coordinate their voting. 
According to ITU officials, however, every 
effort is made at such meetings to obtain 
consensus. 
                                                 
                                                
33See ITU, http://www.itu.int/plenipotentiary/2010/index.html 
(accessed April 2010). 
34See ITU, http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/index.asp?category= 
conferences&rlink=wrc&lang=en (accessed April 2010). 
35“ITU World Radiocommunication Conference concludes 
after four weeks: International treaty sets future course for 
wireless,” ITU Press Release, 16 November 2007, 
http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2007/36.html 
(accessed April 2010). 
The process for allocating spectrum and an 
orbital slot to an individual user is complex, 
and can take a decade to resolve. Essentially, a 
government must apply to the ITU for the 
rights to use certain frequency bands and 
orbital slots before launching a new satellite or 
satellite network in any orbital plane, as well 
as Earth stations for communications with 
satellites and terrestrial stations within a 
certain area of an Earth station. Governments 
must apply even when the satellite owner and 
operator is a private company; most 
governments also include the majority of their 
military satellites in the ITU process. 
Assignments are given on a first-come, first-
serve basis – provided that the proposed 
system will comply with the existing Table of 
Frequency Allocations and that no other user 
nation objects. A state can object if the 
proposed satellite’s operations will interfere 
with the use of the same frequency bands by 
users within its borders.36 
 
According to a background paper on spectrum 
and orbit coordination procedures by the ITU 
Radiocommunication Bureau,37 the procedure 
for application has three stages: (1) advance 
publication; (2) coordination; and (3) 
notification. The coordination process is a 
formal regulatory obligation on all parties, and 
the results confer rights and obligations on all 
– and failure by a potentially affected 
government to respond to the coordination 
process within four months after publication 
of the request is considered acceptance of the 
new allocation. Once the coordination process, 
which is complex and differs for different 
types of systems, is completed, the applying 
government must follow a set of procedures 
for notification and registration of its new 
assignments in the Master International 
 
36“Frequently Asked Questions,” ITU, http://www.itu.int/ 
ITU-R/terrestrial/faq/index.html#g005 (accessed April 2010). 
37This background paper was provided to the author thorough 
personal correspondence with the ITU Radiocommunication 
Bureau. 
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Frequency Register that lists all ITU approved 
allocations. However, governments are 
obliged to bring the system into operation no 
later than seven years following the advance 
publication; failure to do so may cause the 
applicant to lose the allocation. 
 
While the ITU system is complex, it has been 
successful in managing use of the limited 
resources of spectrum and orbital slots on a 
multilateral basis – also, due to the fact that 
owners and operators are aware that avoiding 
interference is in their own interests. One 
critical key in the success of the ITU has been 
the practice of reserving some frequency 
allocations for new users from the developing 
world, which has lessened, although not 
totally eliminated, concerns about 
perpetuating the digital divide between 
developed and developing states – given that a 
majority of the satellites in operation are 
owned and operated by governments or 
companies registered in the developed world, 
and that owners and operators do their best to 
hang onto RF and slot allocations as long as 
possible by piecemeal replacement of their 
satellite networks.38 
 
However, satellite operators and ITU officials 
say that in recent years there has been a trend 
of more incidences of interference – including 
deliberate interference – as spectrum and 
orbital crowding has grown. The ITU defines 
interference as: “The effect of unwanted 
energy due to one or a combination of 
emissions, radiations, or inductions upon 
reception in a radiocommunication system, 
manifested by any performance degradation, 
misinterpretation, or loss of information, 
which could be extracted in the absence of 
                                                 
                                                
38For background on this issue, see: “Report on WRC-03 
(Geneva, 9-June-4July 2003),” 29 July 2003, European 
Radiocommunication Office website, http://www.ero.dk/wrc-
03 (accessed April 2010). 
such unwanted energy.”39 It defines “harmful” 
interference as that “which endangers the 
functioning of a radionavigation service or 
other safety services or seriously degrades, 
obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a 
radiocommunication service operating in 
accordance” with the Radio Regulations.40 
 
The first step in resolving interference issues 
is for the parties involved to engage in 
bilateral negotiations, and if the incident is 
considered serious enough, the affected party 
can alert the ITU. If bilateral discussions are 
unsuccessful, the affected party can ask for the 
assistance of the ITU Radiocommunication 
Bureau in resolving the problem. However, 
the ITU has no power to force the offending 
party to stop the interference – it can only 
arbitrate. While ITU officials say in most 
cases a simple inquiry by the ITU usually 
causes the offending party to find ways to 
resolve the situation, in the case of deliberate 
interference because of political issues, there 
is not much recourse. According to an official 
at the ITU Radiocommunications Bureau, at 
the World Radiocommunication Seminar held 
in Geneva 8-12 December 2008, there were 69 
cases of harmful interference reported to the 
ITU in 2008, 11 of which involved space 
services and 58 of which involved terrestrial 
services.41 
 
While most satellite interference is caused by 
technical issues or operator error, there has 
also been an increase in acts of deliberate 
interference, such as jamming of satellite 
broadcasts. The most recent incident involved 
Iranian jamming of European satellite 
 




41Ben Ba, “Harmful Interference,” Document 
WRS08/PRES/39-E, World Radiocommunications Seminar, 
8-12 December 2008, Geneva (available on ITU website only 
for ITU members.) 
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broadcasts, especially those of Eutelsat 
Communications headquartered in France. 
The jamming began in earnest in December 
2009 and worsened until 11 February 2010, 
the anniversary of the Iranian revolution, 
when according to a report in Reuters, some 
70 Eutelsat radio and television programs 
were being jammed.42 In January 2010, French 
officials asked the ITU to step in on the 
matter, particularly in the case of jamming of 
BBC World Television Persian language 
broadcasts, which are carried by Eutelsat.43 
However, despite ITU efforts at intervention, 
the Iranian jamming is continuing, according 
to ITU officials. Indeed, the European Union 
(EU) at a 23 March 2010, meeting of Foreign 
Ministers called on Iran to stop the jamming, 
and pledged to take action if the Iranian 
government failed to respond – although, 
exactly what action was not defined.44 On 26 
March 2010, the ITU’s radio regulations board 
– in a first for the organization – issued a 
public exhortation to Iran to stop the jamming. 
“In this case there is evidence that there is a 
deliberate attempt to block the satellite 
transmissions and so they are saying this 
should be stopped. This is prohibited under 
the regulations.”45 Iran has not admitted the 
                                                 
 
                                                
42Luke Baker, “EU ready to act on Iran satellite jamming – 
draft,” 19 March 2010, Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/ 
thenews/newsdesk/LDE62I13N.htm (accessed April 2010). 
43Peter B. de Selding, “France Seeks ITU Help To Halt 
Satellite Signal Jamming By Iran,” Space News, 8 January 
2010, http://www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/100108-
france-seeks-itu-signal-jamming-iran.html (accessed April 
2010). 
44“EU slams Iran’s jamming of satellite signals as 
‘unacceptable’,” DW-World.DE Deutsche Welle, 23 March 
2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5377813,00.html 
(accessed April 2010). According to a Reuters report, 
retaliation could include sanctions, such as blocking exports 
or Eutelsat’s blocking Iranian broadcasts in retaliation. See 
Luke Baker, “EU ready to act on Iran satellite jamming – 
draft,” 19 March 2010, Reuters, http://www.alertnet. 
org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE62I13N.htm (accessed April 
2010). 
45Stephanie Nebehay, “UN tells Iran to end satellite 
jamming,” Reuters, 26 March 2010, www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSTRE62P21G20100326; and Luke Baker, “EU 
ready to act on Iran satellite jamming – draft,” 19 March 
jamming, and has responded to all concerns 
by saying that it is investigating the matter. 
 
Two other longstanding disputes that have 
remained unresolved as well, despite ITU 
intervention, involve Cuban allegations of 
deliberate U.S. government jamming of radio 
and television broadcasts from Cuba, and 
interference with Slovenian broadcasts by 
Italian broadcasters who, according to 
Slovenian charges, are using uncoordinated 
frequencies.46 Discussions on both issues are 
apparently continuing. 
 
There is a concern among many in the satellite 
industry that if instances of deliberate, or 
wilfully ignored, 
interference are 
not resolved, nor 
punished, more 
actors might be 
tempted to 
violate the ITU 
rules – leading to 
a breakdown of 
the system. A 
breakdown of the 
ITU regulatory 
system would, in 
the end, do no 
operator any 
good – as a break out of “interference wars” 
would result in large-scale broadcast outages. 
Eutelsat, in its 2010 report to the COPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee, raised this issue with 
regard to the Iranian jamming: “This matter 
could affect the credibility in general of 
satellites by posing a threat to the secure 
Although progress 
in the CD is not 
plausible for the 
foreseeable 
future, there is a 
growing possibility 
that diplomats at 
the conference 
will take up the 





2010, Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ 
LDE62I13N.htm (both accessed April 2010). 
46See Peter B. de Selding, “France Seeks ITU Help To Halt 
Satellite Signal Jamming By Iran,” Space News, 8 January 
2010, http://www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/100108-
france-seeks-itu-signal-jamming-iran.html (accessed April 
2010). 
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transmission of programmes by satellites” and 
asked the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee to 
look into the issue as a violation by Iran of the 
Outer Space Treaty.47 
 
 
Conference on Disarmament 
 
The Geneva-based Conference on 
Disarmament was established by the General 
Assembly in 1979 as the only multinational 
forum dedicated to the negotiation of arms 
control and disarmament treaties and 
agreements, and currently has 65 member 
states and about 40 observer states. It meets in 
three annual sessions starting in January, and 
takes decisions – including on procedural 
issues such as a program of work – by 
consensus. The CD has been debating the 
question of “Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space (PAROS) since 1985, when an 
ad-hoc committee was formed – by consensus 
– to examine the issue. This committee was 
disbanded in 1994, and since then, discussions 
of PAROS have taken place in the CD on an 
informal basis.48 
 
Even though the United States was one of the 
key counties that called for the development 
of the CD ad-hoc committee, the chief 
naysayer on any formal activity regarding 
PAROS has been the United States, which in 
the past has simply rejected the need for any 
new space arms control agreements. As Karen 
House, U.S. delegate to the 63rd Session of the 
UN General Assembly, told the First 
                                                 
                                                47“Report on the activities of Eutelsat IGO to the forty-ninth 
session of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2010), European 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
Intergovernmental Organization (Eutelsat IGO), 
http://sz0129.wc.mail.comcast.net/service/home/~/Eutelsat%2
0Igo%20statement%20to%20COPUOS%20LSC.pdf?auth=co
&loc=en_US&id=304020&part=2 (accessed April 2010). 
48See “Outer Space Background and History,” 
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/osbackground.  
html (accessed April 2010). 
Committee (the GA committee dedicated to 
disarmament issues) on 20 October 2008: 
“There is much rhetoric about the prevention 
of an arms race in outer space. For nearly 
three decades, the United States has 
consistently pointed out that it is not possible 
to define the nature of a space-based weapon. 
The United States also believes it is not 
possible to develop an effectively verifiable 
agreement for banning either space-based 
weapons or terrestrial-based anti-satellite 
(ASAT) systems.”49 
 
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
primary “movers” behind the PAROS agenda 
at the CD have been China and Russia, which 
long have been concerned by U.S. interest in 
space-based missile defense – a program that 
both nations view as a threat to their nuclear 
deterrence capabilities. On 27 June 2002, 
Russia and China introduced into the CD a 
joint working paper, “Possible Elements for a 
Future International Legal Agreement on the 
Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in 
Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force 
Against Outer Space Objects.”50 The paper 
noted that there was an increasing threat of 
“armed confrontation and combatant 
activities” in space, and it further stated: 
“Only a treaty-based prohibition of the 
deployment of weapons in outer space and the 
prevention of the threat or use of force against 
outer space objects can eliminate the emerging 
threat of an arms race in outer space and 
ensure the security for outer space assets of all 
countries, which is an essential condition for 
the maintenance of world peace.”51 
 
49Karen E. House, “United States Public Delegate to the 63rd 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Delivered 
in the Debate on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) of the 
General Assembly’s First Committee, 20 October 2008, Arms 
Control Update, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on 
Disarmament, Geneva, http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/ 
updates/1020OuterSpace.html (accessed April 2010). 
50See “CD,” http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/ 
speeches02/chiruswp_062702cd.html (accessed April 2010). 
51Ibid. 
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Between 2002 and 2008, Russia and China 
submitted a number of “non-papers” on 
various issues related to PAROS, although the 
CD itself was, and continues to remain, 
deadlocked over its proposed agenda of work, 
which also covers nuclear disarmament and 
the potential negotiation of a treaty on fissile 
materials – as states with different priorities 
insisted on linking activities on one agenda 
item with those on another, resulting in a long-
standing lack of consensus as to just what the 
CD ought to be discussing and negotiating. On 
12 February 2008, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov, on behalf of Russia and China, 
formally presented the CD with a draft treaty: 
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of 
Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), 
and called for the immediate launch of CD 
negotiations based on the draft.52 Russia and 
China also called on CD members to make 
comments based on the draft as a foundation 
for future discussions. 
 
The United States administration of George 
W. Bush objected to the draft treaty – the 
administration rejected in principle 
multilateral treaties and pursued a policy of 
“space control,” including the development of 
offensive space capabilities. In particular, the 
United States criticized the draft treaty text for 
failing to bar development, testing, and 
deployment of ground-based ASATs.53 The 
United States national security community had 
been challenged in January 2007 by China’s 
successful testing of a kinetic energy, hit-to-
kill, ASAT based on a ground-based rocket on 
                                                 
                                                
52PPWT, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/ 
1session/Feb12%20Draft%20PPWT.pdf (accessed April 
2010). 
53Karen E. House, “United States Public Delegate to the 63rd 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Delivered 
in the Debate on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) of the 
General Assembly’s First Committee, 20 October 2008, Arms 
Control Update, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on 
Disarmament, Geneva, http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/ 
updates/1020OuterSpace.html (accessed April 2010). 
one of its own aging weather satellites. The 
Chinese test, while breaking no new technical 
ground – indeed, both the United States and 
Russia tested ASAT systems in the 1980s – 
did violate the norm of self-restraint on testing 
of such weapons, created a large and 
dangerous debris field that will continue to 
threaten satellite operations for decades, and 
elicited widespread concern about the renewed 
potential for a space arms race. In the United 
States, in particular, it hardened the attitudes 
of those in national security policy-making 
circles arguing for “space control” programs. 
“Space is no longer a sanctuary,” said then-
Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne. 
“This change is seismic in nature.”54 
 
While the substance of U.S. concerns with the 
PPWT did not change with the 2008 election 
of President Barak Obama, the new 
administration came into power with a much 
different view than the previous one on the 
value of multilateral diplomacy and fora. In 
part, this new American flexibility helped 
underpin the 29 May 2009 agreement to a 
formal program of work (CD/1864) – for the 
first time in more than a decade – which 
included a decision to establish a working 
group on PAROS “to discuss substantively, 
without limitation, all issues…”55 While 
Russia and China expressed regret that the 
breakthrough decision did not call for formal 
PAROS negotiations, they did not insist on 
linking the discussions to formal negotiations; 
the lack of linkage to treaty negotiations was 
exactly the reason that the United States could 
sign on. 
 
However, this new consensus at the CD to 
move forward with a work program shattered 
almost immediately after it was reached. 
 
54Michael Sirak, “Air Force Leadership: Chinese ASAT Test 
Marked Turning Point; Space No Longer Sanctuary,” Defense 
Daily, 12 February 2007. 
55See CD, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/ 
papers09/2session/CD1864.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
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Pakistan, reversing its decision to go along 
with the program’s mandate for the launch of 
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty, played out the rest of the CD’s 2009 
session with a variety of procedural objections 
to implementing the agreement.56 At the 
beginning of the CD’s January 2010 session, it 
became even more clear that Pakistan had no 
intentions of allowing treaty negotiations to go 
forward due to concerns in the Pakistan 
military about somehow bridging the gap 
between its nuclear arsenal and that of India – 
concerns that were exacerbated by the 2008 
agreement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to 
endorse a civil nuclear cooperation agreement 
between the United States and India..57 The 
CD remains at a standstill with no resolution 
in sight, despite the pressure for achieving 
some measure of success at the review 
conference of the foundational Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 
importance of fissile material negotiations to 
forwarding the NPT goals. 
 
Still, it is by no means clear that discussions 
within the CD would result in the near-term or 
medium-term establishment of negotiations on 
PAROS or the PPWT. First of all, while the 
Obama campaign signaled support for an 
eventual space weapons treaty, the 
administration’s stance has shifted 
considerably over the last year toward a more 
cautious approach and, according to American 
insiders, there is a serious debate within the 
administration on what, if any, multilateral 
agreements for space security should be 
pursued. Led by the Department of Defense 
(DOD), a review of U.S. national security 
                                                 
                                                
56Jonathan Lynn, “Geneva nuclear arms talks fail to overcome 
block,” Reuters, 31 August 2009, http://in.reuters.com/ 
article/worldNews/idINIndia-42108520090831 (accessed 
April 2010). 
57Eric Auner, “Pakistan Raises New Issues at Stalled CD,” 
Arms Control Today, March 2010, http://www.armscontrol. 
org/act/2010_03/CDStalled (accessed April 2010). 
space posture was begun in May 2009.58 In 
July 2009, the National Security Council 
began a review of U.S. National Space Policy, 
last revised by the Bush administration in 
2006.59 The space 
posture review 
originally was 
slated to be 
finished by 1 
February 2010, 
but in January 
stalled and will 
now not likely be 
completed until 
year end or even 
the beginning of 
2011. While 
Pentagon officials 
cited the need to 
wait for the new 
National Space Policy before formally 
deciding on a national space posture – which 
would outline what space systems would be 
pursued by DOD, the Air Force, and the 
intelligence community – U.S. officials 
familiar with the internal discussions also 
noted that fierce infighting between the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and 
DOD on responsibility and budgeting for 










obstacle… is the 
desire to obtain 
consensus. 
 
The National Space Policy review was 
originally given a deadline of 1 October 
 
58Andrea Shalal-Esa, “U.S. harvesting canceled satellites for 
future uses,” Reuters, 11 May 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/domesticNews/idUSTRE54A6HY20090511 (accessed 
April 2010). 
59Frank Morring, “U.S. Space Policy Review Underway,” 




(accessed April 2010). 
60John T. Bennett, “Flournoy Confirms Space Posture Review 
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2009,61 and then was delayed until December 
2009, and as of today remains unfinished. 
While the review is expected to call for a 
renewed emphasis on multilateral cooperation 
in space, there is little evidence that U.S. 
agreement to PAROS negotiations on a space 
weapons ban will be forthcoming, due to 
ongoing concerns about the verifiability of 
such a treaty. At the October 2009 session of 
the General Assembly First Committee, 
Garold Larson, then acting head of the United 
States mission to the CD, said: “In 
consultation with allies, the Obama 
administration is currently in the process of 
assessing U.S. space policy, programs, and 
options for international cooperation in space 
as a part of a comprehensive review of space 
policy. This review of space cooperation 
options includes a “blank slate” analysis of the 
feasibility and desirability of options for 
effectively verifiable arms control measures 
that enhance the national security interests of 
the United States and its allies.”62 
 
Second of all, despite China’s strong 
diplomacy surrounding the need for a PPWT, 
it remains unclear whether the Chinese 
government would be willing to trade-off 
ASAT development capabilities in exchange 
for a space-based weapons ban. However, 
Chinese diplomats over the last few months 
have shifted their rhetoric to insist that an 
ASAT ban could be considered in future 
negotiations on the PPWT. 
 
The Pentagon’s 2009 annual report to 
Congress on Chinese military power, released 
in late March 2009, stated that: “China is 
                                                 
                                                
61Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, President Orders Sweeping 
Policy Review,” 5 July 2009, Res Communis, 
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2009/07/05/president-
orders-sweeping-u-s-policy-review (accessed April 2010). 
62Amy Klamper, “Obama Space Policy to Emphasize 




developing the ability to attack an adversary’s 
space assets. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
documents emphasize “destroying, damaging, 
and interfering with the enemy’s 
reconnaissance/ observation and 
communication satellites,” suggesting that 
such systems, as well as navigation and early 
warning satellites, could be among initial 
targets of attack to “blind and deafen the 
enemy.” The same PLA analysis of U.S. and 
Coalition military operations also states that 
“destroying or capturing satellites and other 
sensors… will deprive the opponents of 
initiatives on the battlefield and [make it 
difficult] for them to bring their precision 
guided weapons into full play.”63 
 
Concomitantly, willingness by China to 
include terrestrial-based ASATs in any 
discussions or negotiations would in essence 
be a signal about China’s “good faith” on 
efforts to prevent space weaponization – in 
that while it is not certain that the United 
States would under any 
circumstances agree to 
negotiations of a space-
based weapons ban, it is 
certain that the United 
States would not enter 
such negotiations without 
the inclusion of terrestrial-
based ASATs. In addition, 
India – with an eye to 
rival China – has been 
sending signals that it too 
is working to develop 
ASAT capabilities. At a 
January 2010 meeting of 
Indian scientists, the director general of 
India’s Defense Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO) said that India is 












63“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s 
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U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov 
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“working to ensure space security and to 
protect our satellites. At the same time, we are 
also working on how to deny the enemy 
access to its space assets.”64 
 
Many Indian experts now believe that India 
would not be willing to negotiate any space 
weapons treaty until it has successfully 
demonstrated ASAT technologies. India’s 
political and military elites, these experts say, 
never reconciled themselves with the fact that 
India’s failure to conduct a nuclear test prior 
to the 1968 NPT accord demoted India to a 
“have not” status, and are determined not to 
make the same mistake again. “If and when 
globally negotiated restraints are placed on 
such strategic defensive systems or 
technologies – perhaps restraints of some sort 
of ASAT testing, hit-to-kill technologies –
India will already have crossed the technical 
threshold in that regard, and 
acknowledgement of such status [will be] 
grand-fathered into any such future 
agreement.”65 Indeed, according to Indian 
diplomats, the thinking in India is that efforts 
toward PAROS have been superseded by 
events, and that any international accords will 
need to focus instead on managing the already 
on-going ASAT arms race – and the time for a 
treaty negotiation is nowhere near mature. 
Needless to say, development by India of 
ASATs would, in turn, almost assure similar 
efforts by Pakistan – and thus mitigate any 
support of a weapons ban treaty. And 
certainly, if India resists near-term moves to 
launch the PAROS talks, Pakistan will also. 
 
Although progress in the CD is not plausible 
for the foreseeable future, there is a growing 
possibility that diplomats at the conference 
will take up the issue of “soft law” regarding 
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65Ibid. 
space activities and norms in other fora. In 
particular, Russia and the United States are 
moving closer toward mutually embracing an 
effort to push the UN General Assembly to 
more formally take up the creation of TCBMs 
under a so-called Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) that would report to the 
Secretary General, according to Russian and 
American diplomats who have been involved 
in recent bilateral talks on the issue of space. 
The renewed interest in bilateral space 
cooperation, including improved sharing of 
orbital positioning data, stems largely from the 
collision of an Iridium communications 
satellite with a defunct Cosmos satellite in 
February 2009 mentioned earlier. 
 
Every year since 2005, Russia has been the 
key sponsor of a General Assembly 
Resolution calling for the development of 
TCBMs. The latest version of the resolution 
was adopted at the First Committee meeting in 
October 2009 – and was significant because 
the voting marked a change of U.S. policy 
under the Obama administration. Rather than 
voting against the resolution, as the United 
States did during the Bush administration, the 
United States abstained.66 The resolution 
invites all UN nations to submit concrete 
proposals to the Secretary General and 
instructs the Secretary General to compile a 
report containing all the proposals for the 
October 2010 meeting of the First Committee. 
 
Russia has further proposed that future 
TCBMs could be developed under three 
categories: (1) measures aimed at enhancing 
more transparency of space programs; (2) 
measures aimed at expansion of information 
on space objects in orbits; and (3) measures 
related to the rules of conduct during space 
 
66“Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer 
space activities,” UN General Assembly, First Committee, 
Sixty-fourth Session, 16 October 2010, 
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com09/ 
res/L40.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
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activities.67 More specifically, the Russian 
proposal, which was submitted to the CD in a 
14 August 2009 letter from Ambassador 
Valery Loshchinin, calls for: 
1. Exchange of information on: 
-the main directions of the states’ 
outer space policy; 
-major outer space research and use 
programs; 
-orbital parameters of outer space 
objects. 
2. Demonstrations: 
-experts visits, including visits to 
space launch sites, flight command 
and control centers and other objects 
of outer space infrastructure on a 
voluntary basis; 
-invitation of observers to launches of 
spacecraft on a voluntary basis; 
-demonstration of rocket and space 
technologies. 
3. Notifications of: 
-the planned spacecraft launch; 
-the scheduled spacecraft maneuvers 
which may result in dangerous 
proximity to spacecraft of other 
states; 
-the beginning of descent from orbit 
of unguided outer space objects and 
the predicted impact areas on Earth; 
-the return from orbit into atmosphere 
of a guided spacecraft; 
-the return of a spacecraft with a 
nuclear source of power on board, in 
case of malfunction and danger of 
radioactive materials descent to Earth. 
4. Consultations: 
-to clarify the provided information 
on outer space research and use 
programs; 
-on ambiguous situations, as well as 
other issues of concern; 
-to discuss the implementation of the 
agreed TCBMs in outer space 
activities. 
                                                                                                 
67“Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer 
Space Activities and the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space,” Permanent Mission of the Russian 
Federation to the UN Office and Other International 
Organizations in Geneva, http://www.geneva.mid.ru/ 
disarm/d-01.html (accessed April 2010). 
5. Thematic workshops: 
-on various outer space research and 
use issues, organized on bilateral and 
multilateral basis, with the 
participation of scientists, diplomats, 
military and technical experts.68 
 
U.S. diplomats state an interest in the 
development of TCBMs on a voluntary basis, 
and the United States and Russia are 
conversing about the potential for convening a 
GGE. The question for the United States will 
be ensuring that the GGE, in its terms of 
reference, does not directly link the 
development of TCBMs with negotiations of a 
PAROS treaty or the PPWT. 
 
As China is traditionally a co-sponsor of the 
UN General Assembly resolution on TCBMs, 
and as all of the member states of the EU 
voted for the latest version, it is likely that if 
the United States and Russia agree on a GGE 
that such a group will be established via a 
resolution at the October 2010 First 
Committee meeting, which would imply it 
could start work in early 2011. 
 
Meanwhile, the First Committee at the 2009 
meeting also endorsed the draft “Code of 
Conduct on Outer Space Activities” adopted 
by the EU Council of Ministers in 2008.69 The 
proposed code, which was presented to the 
CD in 2009, in effect would be another 
approach to TCBMs by establishing best 
practice guidelines for space activities and 
pledging signatories to certain norms of 
behavior. In particular, the draft code, which 
would be voluntary, would pledge signatories 
to: “refrain from any intentional action which 
will or might bring about, directly or 




ILE/cd-1874.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
69Carol Naughton, “United Nations First Committee 2009, 
Keeping Space Peaceful,” http://www.acronym.org.uk/ 
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space objects unless such action is conducted 
to reduce the creation of outer space debris 
and/or justified by imperative safety 
considerations.”70 
 
During the course of 2009, the EU consulted 
with a number of non-EU states, including the 
United States about the content of the draft 
code, and is now in 
the process of re-
drafting the text. 
According to 
European diplomats 
and experts, the 
hope is that a new 
version can be 
adopted during the 
second half of 2010 
under the Belgian 
EU presidency and 
then opened for 
signature by other states – perhaps, via 
COPUOS or through the UN General 
Assembly, albeit the code is envisioned as a 
free-standing accord along the model of the 
Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles 
rather than a COPUOS or CD initiative. 
 
Canada also has developed an initiative for 
confidence-building measures, which has been 
proposed to the CD as an alternative to the 
Chinese-Russian PPWT. Submitted to the CD 
as a working paper on 29 March 2009, and 
codified as a CD document on 5 June 2009, 
the Canadian proposal envisions “a 
declaration of soft legal principles” that would 
in effect provide a middle ground between the 
EU draft code and the PPWT.71 Accordingly, 
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Canada has suggested that the proposal could 
be adopted either as a voluntary code or as a 
legally binding treaty. The key provision of 
the Canadian proposal would be a 
commitment by states “not to test or use a 
weapon against any satellite so as to damage 
or destroy it,” as well as establish a ban on the 
placement of weapons in space.72 Canada 
elaborated on its proposal in a statement to the 
First Committee in October 2009, noting that 
in addition to the two above proposed 
commitments, states should also agree not to 
use a satellite as a weapon.73 
The fact 
remains that 
what any one 
actor does in 
space has the 
potential to 








Efforts at multilateral approaches toward 
developing new regulations and legal 
measures to ensure the sustained, safe, and 
secure use of space remain difficult. The 
critical obstacle for all three of the major 
institutional frameworks – COPUOS, ITU, 
and CD – on space governance is the desire to 
obtain consensus. The CD is particularly 
unable to reach agreements by the fact that 
consensus is required, even for procedural 
matters – a fact that is aggravated by the 
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nuclear disarmament, space security, and 
conventional disarmament issues, each having 
a different priority for different states. 
 
From the struggles in all three fora, it is clear 
that there is a widespread reluctance among 
states to enact new legal restraints on space 
activities in any domain. Indeed, some states 
seem intent on avoiding the legal 
responsibilities that they arguably already 
have accepted. Thus, the development of any 
new treaty in the near-term is unlikely – 
whether it is designed to establish safety 
measures or arms control for space. 
 
On the other hand, it is apparent that there is a 
gathering impetus for “soft law” action to 
mitigate the twin problems of space safety and 
security. This movement can be attributed to 
the fact that over the last decade more states 
have become “vested” in space, and thus now, 
understand the need for cooperative behavior 
in what is a “commons” environment. This 
momentum could be furthered by the push by 
the COPUOS Chairman to develop a UN 
space policy.74 Such a policy could serve to 
build a better appreciation among UN 
organizations and Member States about the 
criticality of space operations to human 
security and development, and to increase 
space capacity in the developing world. A UN 
space policy could serve as yet another driver 
toward more urgent action to protect space 
assets and avoid conflict that could endanger 
the space environment for peaceful uses. 
 
This advent of “soft law” approaches for space 
should not be surprising, in that the same 
phenomena took place in humankind’s 
exploitation of the seas and the air. For 
example, in the maritime arena, the United 
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States and Soviet Union, in 1972, signed the 
Incidents at Sea Agreement to set “rules of the 
road” for the actions of military ships and 
aircraft on the high seas so as to avoid 
accidents and accidental conflict.75 This 
bilateral confidence-building agreement – 
which is not a treaty, and thus should be seen 
as an instrument of soft law – was aimed at 
applying, and amending, the Convention on 
International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea also promulgated in 1972 – 
although, based on an earlier 1960 agreement 
on collision avoidance – by the International 
Maritime Organization for civil ships on the 
high seas.76 The Incidents at Sea Agreement, 
which still stands, includes, for example, a 
prohibition on simulated attacks, as well as 
basic navigational operations, such as 
maintaining distance when conducting 
surveillance operations on ships of the other 
party.77 In addition, military-to-military 
meetings were prescribed to discuss any 
incidents that did occur or concerns of either 
party. The original U.S.-Soviet agreement has 
been replicated by other states on bilateral and 
multilateral bases since that time. 
 
In the arena of air operations, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was 
created in 1944 under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation signed in 
Chicago, and known as the Chicago 
Convention,78 in order to establish 
 
75Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on or over the High 
Seas (Incidents at Sea Agreement). See Federation of 
American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/ 
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76Convention on International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea, International Maritime Organization, 
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Aviation Organization (ICAO), http://www.icao.int/cgi/ 
goto_m.pl?/icao/en/chicago_conf/intro.html (accessed April 
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international air routes and harmonize a set of 
technical rules, including setting standards for 
flight worthiness and air traffic control 
procedures.79 ICAO was established as a 
specialized agency of the UN Economic and 
Social Council. The convention was based on 
many of the principles enshrined in the 1919 
Paris Convention on Aerial Navigation, 
agreed by 27 countries in the wake of World 
War I, including the concept of sovereign 
airspace and rights to peaceful overflights.80 
The Chicago Convention further granted each 
state the right to prevent, for military reasons, 
foreign aircraft from flying over certain 
delineated airspace; outlaws foreign aircraft 
carrying weapons, i.e., military aircraft, from 
flying over national territory; and allows states 
to prohibit photographic aerial reconnaissance 
over their territory.81 The United States was 
the key state pushing for a new aviation 
convention, as both a way to incentivize trade 
in the post World War II era, and restore 
peace and security in Europe.82 There are now 
190 States signed as “contracting parties” to 
the Chicago Convention and that participate in 
ICAO activities. 
 
Given developments in sea and air domains, 
there is cause for optimism about the near-
term to mid-term development of a body of 
voluntary, and perhaps regulatory, rules for 
best practices, procedures, and behavior in 
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space activities. In particular, the development 
of norms – through codes of conduct – for the 
use of space could lay the groundwork for 
more robust efforts to reduce risks and avoid 
conflict. Given that 
a trend toward an 






be a top priority for 
the established 
spacefaring states. 
It would therefore be incorrect to assert that 
the continued failure of the international 
community to find new legal pathways for 
space governance and conflict prevention 
means that the current multilateral institutions 
themselves are failures. While progress along 
these lines remains slow, there is progress 








are not a luxury, 
but a necessity.
 
There also is a growing recognition that there 
is a requirement for the three multilateral 
space governance bodies to work more closely 
together, to avoid duplication and working at 
cross purposes. For one thing, lack of 
coordination among COPUOS, ITU, and CD 
have made it relatively easy for states to 
practice “venue shopping” as a means of 
preventing undesired actions. For example, 
during the George W. Bush presidency, the 
United States insisted that any discussions of 
transparency and confidence-building 
measures be restricted to COPUOS, which has 
no remit over military space assets, in order to 
ensure no constraints were developed on its 
military space program, and that there was no 
opening for a “slippery slope” in the 
discussions toward PAROS. Likewise, Iran is 
now insisting that the Eutelsat interference 
issue remain inside ITU – which is largely 
made up of technical specialists and where 
 
24   Theresa Hitchens/Multilateralism in Space: Opportunities and Challenges for Achieving Space Security 
 
there are no mechanisms for enforcement – 
rather than brought to the COPUOS for 
discussion, which is more of a political body, 
and where the issue could be raised of a 
possible legal violation by Iran of its 
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty as 
well as the ITU Constitution. 
 
However, it is becoming clearer to spacefaring 
states that it is impossible, and indeed, 
dangerous to attempt to create artificial 
barriers between civil, commercial, and 
military uses of space – in that all space assets 
share the same vulnerabilities and are 
fundamentally constrained by the laws of 
physics. As Canada noted in its October 2009 
statement to the First Committee, there is a: 
...growing importance of renewed 
efforts of UN institutions engaged in 
the “governance structure” of space, 
such as the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), to 
collaborate more effectively in 
addressing cross-cutting issues 
affecting the continued utilisation of 
outer space for peaceful purposes.83 
 
It will be particularly important for the two 
bodies, COPUOS and ITU, to work more 
closely together as the GEO belt becomes 
more crowded, and if COPUOS begins to 
discuss “best practice guidelines” for 
operations in GEO – as the ITU already has 
developed a body of standards. It would be, at 
the least, a waste of time for COPUOS to 
attempt to “reinvent the wheel,” and at worst, 
a problem for satellite operators if COPUOS 
attempts to override or unravel current 
practice under ITU regulations. There is some 
reason for concern, in that during the late 
1990s, COPUOS and the ITU argued over 
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defining the GEO belt – although, COPUOS’s 
Legal Subcommittee had not established a 
definition, many delegations questioned the 
ITU’s legal capacity to define GEO orbits for 
regulations.84 One sign that COPUOS 
members are aware of the need for 
coordination came in the February 2010 report 
of the Science and Technical Subcommittee, 
which recognized the need for communication 
with the ITU and other organizations and the 
avoidance of duplication. 
 
In addition, an effort to merge data from the 
ITU’s frequency registry and the UN registry 
of space objects managed by OOSA could 
serve as a first step toward developing an 
international data base of orbital positions that 
will be critical not only for developing any 
variant of a space traffic management regime, 
but potentially for verifying any future space 
arms control agreement. It is unlikely that the 
international community will be satisfied with 
continuing to rely on space surveillance data 
provided by the United States military, if for 
no other reason than political suspicion. 
 
Canada and Russia, as key players in the space 
security debate, are at the forefront of the 
growing push for better coordination between 
COPUOS and the CD in pursuit of TCBMs. 
Again, it is sensible that the two bodies 
establish better processes for sharing 
information and for cooperative efforts, given 
that any future TCBMs will by necessity 
affect the conduct of civil, commercial, and 
military space activities alike. 
 
Further, in any future PAROS negotiations, 
experts from COPUOS, and OOSA, and the 
ITU could be useful in helping to elucidate 
technical aspects of treaty proposals, 
 
84Ingo Baumann, “Diversification of Space Law,” in Space 
Law: current problems and perspectives for future regulation, 
Marietta Benko and Kai-Uwe Shrogel, eds., Essential Air and 
Space Law 2 (Eleven International Publishing, the 
Netherlands, 2005), p. 50. 
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particularly regarding verification. There is 
precedent within the CD for experts from 
specialized multilateral agencies to informally 
assist with forwarding arms control talks; for 
example, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency has been routinely interacting with the 
CD and member state delegations to explain 
how its nuclear safeguards regime might be 
translated into verification procedures for a 
future Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. There 
has been, by comparison, almost no 
interaction between the CD and COPUOS and 
ITU on any basis – even for basic information 
exchange about the activities of the latter two 
bodies that might have impact on CD 
deliberations.85 The fact remains that what any 
one actor does in space has the potential to 
affect all others, whether positively or 
negatively. This fact alone should make it 
abundantly clear that integrated multilateral 
approaches to space security are not a luxury, 
but a necessity. 
 
 
85COPUOS officials could help in educating CD diplomats, 
who are from foreign ministries and have little specialized 
knowledge about space activities, about the importance of 
protecting and sustaining the peaceful uses of space; and ITU 
officials could be similarly useful in explaining technical 
problems of avoiding RF interference, as well as helping to 
identify what technical data could be useful for both TCBMs 
and any form of a PAROS treaty. 
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As complex security threats are increasing the 
need for international cooperation on Earth, 
the growing number of actors in space 
increasingly demands collaboration in space 
and security. This need is intensified by the 
unique environmental attributes of space. For 
example, debris from space assets can orbit 
the Earth for years, rendering large areas of 
orbital space unusable. Moreover, as space 
becomes more crowded, the lack of 
comprehensive international governance 
amplifies the chance of mishaps above Earth. 
 
This paper examines and considers the 
prospects for space and security cooperation 
between the United States and Europe. It 
carries out this inquiry by focusing on 
different European approaches in this area. 
This issue is explored because the transatlantic 
partnership, with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) as its institutional 
cornerstone, remains a durable and robust 
alliance. Also, the United States and Europe 
share many of the same values and interests 
over a long history of cooperation, and their 
partnership forms the core of multilateral 
endeavors. Furthermore, in the past 60 years, 
international cooperation and integration has 
taken place in Europe. More recently, Europe 
has become an emerging player in space and 
security through some innovative initiatives, 
and the European Union (EU) is playing a role 
in space as a result of the Lisbon Treaty.1 
 
 
                                                1Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon or Lisbon Treaty), signed 13 
December 2007, and entered into force 1 December 2009, 
Transatlantic cooperation is necessary for 
addressing security challenges on Earth and it 
will be a crucial foundation for international 
cooperation in space and security. However, 
U.S. policy makers and space experts must 
understand how processes in Europe over the 
past 60 years have shaped what it is today. 
This insight can help provide realistic 
expectations of the direction Europe is 
heading in space and security. 
 
This paper offers such a forecast. It begins by 
examining the historical development of 
alternative European and Atlantic security 
structures, thereby spelling out the principles 
and preferences that guide Europe in 
international relations. The paper then 
discusses current developments in European 
space and security cooperation before 
assessing the prospects for transatlantic 
cooperation in this area. Finally, the paper 
concludes with several policy 
recommendations for enhancing transatlantic 
cooperation in space and security. 
 
 
Terms and Definitions 
 
The term “space and security” refers broadly 
to the safety of human assets in space, such as 
satellites and spacecraft, and has two different 
dimensions. One aspect involves the threat to 
space assets posed by human-made space 
debris, space weather, Near-Earth Objects 
 
 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (accessed June 
2010). 
28 Michael Searway/European Approaches to Space and Security: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation 
 
(NEOs), accidental collisions with other space 
assets, and unintentional radio interference. 
The other aspect involves the threat posed by 
intentional human disruption, such as radio 
jamming, anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) 
launched from Earth, and potential space-
based weapons. A wide view of space and 
security addresses both of these hazards, and 
draws on concepts developed in international 
forums. The United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space 
(COPUOS), for 
example, seeks 
to ensure the 
“long-term 
sustainability” 
of outer space 
activities by 
mitigating both 
the human and 
environmental 
risks of space 
operations. The 
draft EU Code of Conduct, discussed further 
below, aims to “enhance the safety, security, 
and predictability of outer space activities for 
all” by establishing norms for human activities 
in space.2 
 
“Space weapons,” in this paper, refers to 
destructive weapons in space that can attack 
targets on Earth, in the air, or in space. These 
might include space-based missiles, lasers, or 
a space fighter plane. Under this definition, no 
space weapons have been deployed yet. 
Although the term is broad, it is not all-
encompassing. For example, the United States 
and China have already used missiles to 
destroy their own satellites in space, but these 
weapons were not designed explicitly to 
                                                 
                                                
2Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for outer 
space activities (General Secretariat, Council of the European 
Union, 17 December 2008), http://www.stimson.org/ 
space/pdf/EU_Code_of_Conduct.pdf (accessed June 2010). 
damage space objects nor were they deployed 
in space. Furthermore, the Space Shuttle or 
even satellites could hypothetically be used as 
“weapons” to collide with and disrupt other 
space assets. These all-inclusive definitions 
would imply that the deployment of space 
weapons has already occurred, and is not used 
in this paper. 
 
Space weapon issues are chiefly addressed by 
the Outer Space Treaty (OST)3 and the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD). The OST 
establishes, among other principles, that space 
shall be used “for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries.” Regarding weapons, 
the OST declares that states shall not “place in 
orbit around the Earth any objects carrying 
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such 
weapons in outer space in any other manner.” 
It does not, however, ban the deployment of 
conventional weapons in space – the “space 
weapons” mentioned above. Efforts to legally 
ban space weapons have taken place since 
1985, with little progress, in the CD, which 
was established by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1979 to deal with a wide range of 
multilateral disarmament issues. Most 
recently, the CD has discussed a draft Treaty 
on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force 
against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which 
would ban the deployment of weapons of any 
kind in space.4 
Europe has 
become an 
emerging player in 
space and 
security… and the 
European Union is 
playing a role in 
space as a result 
of the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
 
An adequate discussion of “space and 
security” also needs to look at what Europe is 
 
3Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
other Celestial Bodies, United Nations Office of Outer Space 
Affairs, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/ 
outerspt.html (accessed June 2010). 
4Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (Conference on Disarmament, 
2009). 
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doing in this area. Within this context, and in 
addition to the safety of human assets in 
space, space and security refers to the use of 
space and space assets for security purposes 
on Earth. Thus far, space assets have been 
primarily used as force enhancers and 
strategic enablers. For example, orbital 
satellites make possible a range of capabilities 
for security forces, including precision-guided 
weapons, integrated communications, and 
accurate navigation. Satellites can provide 
intelligence on changes in terrain and weather, 
as well as enemy movements and operations. 
Space and security, as used herein, does not 
refer to hypothetical force application from 
space. Space weapons, if they were deployed, 
could be used to attack targets on Earth for 
security purposes, just as they could, in 
theory, be used in space to protect assets from 
enemies. As mentioned above, this paper does 
not maintain that space weapons have been 
deployed. Thus, force application could only 
be a theoretical aspect of space and security 
and is not covered herein. 
 
Space and security issues are also tied to the 
concept of “militarization” in space. In this 
paper, militarization refers to military control 
of space assets for military purposes. For 
example, the United States military has 
deployed satellites for the purposes of force 
enhancement mentioned above. Thus, the 
United States has militarized space, although 
it has not deployed space weapons. However, 
this concept is often complicated by dual-use 
systems, which are space assets that can serve 
multiple purposes. For example, Global 
Positioning System (GPS) can help military 
units navigate hostile terrain and help civilian 
motorists navigate the Los Angeles freeway 
system. Communications satellites can serve 
both cell phone companies and security forces, 
while satellite imagery can help plan a 
military assault or construction of a city. 
Spacecraft can be used to explore space or, 
hypothetically, to attack other space assets or 
targets on Earth. Hence, the key aspect of 




another term that 
can have multiple 
meanings. Here, 
it refers to the 
region of Europe, 
as well as the 
sovereign states 
and institutions 
that exist therein. 
The EU is an 
organization of 
27 member 
states. It is 
essentially supra-
national and 
intergovernmental in economic issues, and 
intergovernmental in political and security 
issues. Within the EU, there are various 
institutions with different responsibilities, 
while member state governments retain their 
national sovereignty. The European Space 
Agency (ESA) is an intergovernmental 
organization of 18 member states, two of 
which are not in the EU, which seeks to 
coordinate and develop the space capabilities 
of its members. This paper differentiates 
between the EU, the various EU institutions, 
ESA, and the member states that are in each 
organization. These actors are increasingly 
seeking to cooperate on space and security 
issues, as illustrated by the Structured 
Dialogue that was established in 2007. This 
dialogue brings together EU institutions with 
space responsibilities, including the European 
Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), ESA, and 















                                                 
5Space and Security (European Commission/European Space 
Agency, Joint Secretariat Paper, 2010). 
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For clarity, this paper considers Europe to fall 
within the borders of the Structured Dialogue, 
meaning states within the EU and ESA. Thus, 
developments and initiatives happening on a 
European level are meant to incorporate the 
Dialogue’s participants. Debates over future 
EU membership, among others, indicate that 
Europe is an arbitrary term. Other countries, 
particularly those on the eastern boundaries of 
Europe, can legitimately claim to be 
European. Turkey, for example, is a member 
of NATO and a major contributor to the 
region’s security. However, the Structured 
Dialogue involves the key actors in space and 
security initiatives in the region, and thus, 
delineates Europe in this paper. 
 
 
Development of European and Atlantic 
Security Structures 
 
At the end of the Second World War in 1945, 
Europe lay devastated. The battles of the 
preceding six years were more mobile and 
destructive than anything the world had seen 
before. Millions of soldiers and citizens alike 
had been lost to conflict and the privations of 
war, and the cities, infrastructures, and 
economies of Europe had been shattered. 
Moreover, a threat still loomed in the east. 
The Soviet Union, one of the victorious Allied 
powers in the war, represented an ideological 
rival to the United States and its allies. More 
importantly, the Soviet Union commanded a 
vast number of military forces, which were 
now positioned within striking distance of 
Western Europe. 
 
Europe’s leaders realized they needed a new 
way to ensure the security of their states. A 
military commitment from the United States 
was considered essential, and leaders on both 
sides of the Atlantic agreed that they needed 
to pool their limited resources in a collective 
defensive effort. Moreover, the new speed and 
destructiveness of war made an integrated 
military approach necessary, because only 
standing forces backed by plans for joint 
action could hope to be militarily effective. In 
particular, U.S. officials “favored an 
integrated approach because it offered the 
promise of combining the relatively small 
armed forces of the European allies within a 
larger collective effort that would make more 
efficient use of the Europeans’ resources, but 
without jeopardizing economic recovery in 
Europe. The Europeans welcomed an 
integrated approach because it offered the 
prospect of a permanent claim on American 
resources.”6 
 
Thus, NATO was formed in April 1949. It 
originally consisted of 10 European states in 
addition to the United States and Canada. 
Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty states 
that an attack against one of the members in 
Europe or North America is an attack against 
them all; each member, in coordination with 
the others, will take whatever action it deems 
necessary to restore and maintain security in 
the North Atlantic area.7 The treaty also 
establishes a council to oversee NATO, as 
well as goals of collective defense and the 
preservation of peace and security. 
 
NATO was not the only European institution 
created following World War II. In addition to 
the Soviet threat, there were residual fears in 
Europe, especially in France, over a rearmed 
Germany. Accordingly, the French pushed for 
the creation of a European Defence 
Community (EDC), which would help ensure 
that German rearmament would be structurally 
controlled. The EDC was developed alongside 
the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), which was designed to control the 
war-making capacity of Germany. The logic 
                                                 
6Wallace Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
7The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 
(accessed June 2010). 
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behind these organizations was that “binding 
the countries of Europe closely together in 
integrated institutions would make war 
impossible between them.”8 Defense was thus 
being used as a mechanism to advance 
integration; there were also debates taking 
place about developing a European political 
community. 
 
The EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952 with 
the support of the United States, which saw 
the “EDC as 
essential to give 





from joining the 
treaty, mainly 
because they still 
felt they had a 
broad range of 
national interests 
and were hesitant 
to become 
involved in a 
supranational organization on the European 
continent. The United States did not press the 
issue for fear of delaying the EDC. However, 
there were doubts as to whether France could 
manage Germany by itself. Consequently, the 
French rejected the EDC treaty when it was 
seen to lack firm commitments from Britain 
and the United States. The treaty’s failure 
raised uncertainties about the political will 
within Europe to contribute to the common 
defense. Most significantly, the lack of 
European unity threatened to reduce the 
United States commitment to the continent, 
which was partly predicated on a European 
                                                 
lective good.10 
                                                8G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the 
Crossroads (Westview Press, 1998). 
9Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A 
History, (Macmillan, 1980). 
willingness to join together and contribute to 
their col
 
In order to preserve the United States presence 
and facilitate controls on German rearmament, 
Britain arranged a series of agreements that 
created the Western European Union (WEU) 
in 1954. The WEU was formed from the 
Western Union, itself a defensive alliance 
founded in 1948 between France, Britain, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
Germany and Italy became members of the 
new organization; Britain also pledged several 
divisions and a Tactical Air Force to the 
continent. Unlike the supranational EDC, the 
WEU was an intergovernmental actor; it 
functioned as a “facilitating mechanism” to 
enable NATO to play the leading defense role 
in Europe. Instead of deterring an external 
threat, the WEU served as a “reconciler of 
differences between allies.”11 
As the European 
Union begins to 
deploy space 





expressed the need 




To some states, like Britain, the formation of 
the WEU showed the inability of European 
states to agree on a defense structure without 
U.S. guidance. In economic matters, however, 
European integration continued from the 
foundations of the ECSC. In 1957, the Treaty 
of Rome established the European Economic 
Community (EEC), an organization of six 
European states designed to foster economic 
cooperation and integration. Six additional 
states later joined the EEC, including Great 
Britain. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht was 
signed by the EEC’s members, creating the 
EU from the original organization. Maastricht 
established three pillars of the EU. The first 
was the European Community, which 
incorporated the EEC and dealt with economic 
matters. The common market of the EEC 
became the EU single market, which 
facilitates the free flow of goods, capital, 
 
10G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the 
Crossroads (Westview Press, 1998), p. 8. 
11Ibid., p. 9. 
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people, and services within the EU. This 
single market also acts as a customs union, 
which applies a common external tariff on all 
goods entering the market. In 2002, twelve of 
the EU’s member states began using a 
common currency, the euro, essentially 
completing a 45 year long process of 
economic integration. 
 
In the first pillar, the EU acted as a 
supranational body; its decisions were binding 
on its member states and did not always 
require unanimity. The Council of the EU, 
which brings 
together the 
ministers of each 
member state, had 
the ultimate 
authority in these 
legislative areas, 
as it did in all 





the heads of state from each EU member, is 
the highest configuration of the council and 
the EU’s ultimate decision making body. 
However, the European Commission had the 
responsibility for proposing legislation in 
economic areas, and the council gave it 
primary responsibility for implementing 
legislation. The commission is made up of 27 
commissioners, one from each member state, 
who are supposed to act independently on 
behalf of the EU as a whole. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty’s second pillar was the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
and the third was Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). In 
these areas, the council had ultimate 
responsibility for all decisions. In contrast 
with the first pillar, these pillars were 
intergovernmental; decisions required 
unanimity and were not binding on member 
states. The CFSP and PJCC were designed to 
coordinate the policies of the EU’s member 
states, aligning them as closely as possible, 
while allowing for national autonomy over 
sensitive security matters. The CFSP included 
the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), which was created to harmonize EU 
military and defense policies. 
 
As with nascent European security structures 
in the 1940s and 1950s, the development of 
the ESDP has been marked by tension 
between collective security and national 
sovereignty. Furthermore, there has been a 
divide within the EU about the ideal direction 
of the ESDP. Some states, led by France, have 
wanted to build-up the ESDP as an 
independent European alternative to NATO. 
Other states, led by Great Britain, have 
preferred to develop the ESDP within the 
transatlantic framework of NATO. In an 
attempt to address some of the institutional 
and jurisdictional questions of the EU-NATO 
relationship, the Berlin-plus agreement of 
2003 enables the EU to use NATO structures, 
mechanisms, and assets to execute military 
operations if NATO declines to act.12 
The development 
of European SSA 
capabilities has 
been viewed as 






Some European security missions are carried 
out by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which 
evolved from the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE 
began in 1975, when 35 heads of state from 
North America and Europe, including General 
Secretary Brezhnev from the Soviet Union, 
met and signed the “Final Act,” which 
included ten normative principles to guide 
international relations. These principles 
included the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
nonintervention in internal affairs, respect for 
                                                 
12Gulnur Aybet, “The European Security and Defense Policy: 
Capabilities and Institutions,” in Yannis Stivachtis, ed., The 
State of European Integration (Ashgate Publishing, 2007). 
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human rights, and fulfillment of obligations 
under international law.13 The CSCE 
consequently established a link between the 
political-military aspects and the human 
dimensions of security. It also developed 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the 
realm of military security, and called for 
cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural, 
and educational fields. 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the heads of state of the CSCE met in 1992. 
The original intent of the leaders was mainly 
to create temporary, ad-hoc missions to deal 
with conflicts as they arose. However, by this 
time, the CSCE had become the “principal 
venue for negotiating, verifying, and 
discussing the enforcement of the major non-
nuclear arms control measures on the Eurasian 
continent.”14 It had also developed a broad set 
of instruments for use in conflict management 
throughout the territory of its member states in 
Eurasia. Thus, at the 1994 Budapest Summit, 
the CSCE became the OSCE, a fully 
institutionalized regional security 
organization. While the OSCE developed a 
permanent secretariat, it remained a political 
organization, which was thought to be more 
flexible than a collective, legal institution. The 
Budapest Summit also produced a Code of 
Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of 
Security, which created a regional normative 
framework for all aspects of military activity, 
including civil-military relations and the 
conduct of warfare.15 
 
Although it has limited resources and is often 
overlooked, especially in the United States, 
the OSCE has managed to persist and 
accomplish a number of objectives due to 
several unique attributes. The OSCE 
                                                 
                                                
13P. Terrence Hopmann, Building Security in Post-Cold War 
Eurasia: The OSCE and US Foreign Policy (United States 
Institute of Peace, 1999). 
14Ibid., p. 12. 
15Ibid., p. 14. 
responded more directly than other European 
security institutions to the specific threats that 
emerged with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, such as ethno-political conflict and 
violence as states divided along ethnic lines. 
Now consisting of 56 members, it is the only 
pan-European security organization with 
universal membership.16 The OSCE’s greatest 
assets include its ability to strengthen 
democratic institutions in transitional 
societies, thus alleviating potential conflicts, 
and its capacity to respond rapidly to crises. 
 
Nevertheless, NATO remains the chief 
military and defense institution in Europe, 
with responsibility for the continent’s 
territorial defense. 
It continues to 
exist 60 years 
after its creation, 
and 20 years after 
the demise of the 
Soviet Union, the 
main security 
threat that prompted its formation. NATO has 
endured, and will continue to endure, because 
it is an alliance of liberal democracies that 
contains self-healing tendencies. First, there is 
an attraction felt by democracies to working 
closely with each other; moreover, the internal 
workings of democracies enhance their 
suitability as long-term allies, both due to their 
emphasis on consultation and cooperation, and 
their continual changeover of political 
leaders.17 Thus, NATO’s member states have 
managed to work through various crises 
without breaking up the alliance. While some 
observers claim that the current NATO 
mission in Afghanistan is a critical test for its 
future existence, it will probably only 
determine whether or not NATO will carry out 






has been limited. 
 
16Ibid., P. 5. 
17Wallace Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 294. 
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After its creation, the WEU also remained 
involved in European security issues in three 
ways: as a channel of intra-European 
communication and conflict resolution, as part 
of the debate about U.S. leadership on the 
continent, and as an element in the evolution 
of European integration.18 In June 1992, at the 
Hotel Petersberg in Germany, the WEU laid 
out three types of security tasks it planned to 
undertake: humanitarian operations, 
peacekeeping, and the employment of combat 
forces in crisis management.19 These 
“Petersberg Tasks” were adopted by the new 
ESDP in 1997. 
Shortly after, 
the WEU began 
to transfer its 
capabilities and 
functions to the 
EU. After the 
Lisbon Treaty 
entered into 
force on 1 
December 2009, 
the member states of the WEU collectively 
decided to close the organization. WEU 
activities are planned to cease by June 2011. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty marks another major step 
forward in EU integration. It is designed to 
streamline some of the decision-making 
processes in the EU and to give the EU greater 
coherence and capabilities, especially in 
international relations. This development has 
been partly motivated by the EU’s relative 
weakness in foreign and military affairs. 
While the EU is an economic power rivaling 
the United States, it remains far behind its 
transatlantic partner in defense capabilities. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, qualified majority 
voting (QMV) has been extended to 40 policy 
                                                 
                                                
18G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the 
Crossroads (Westview Press, 1998), p. 10. 
19Petersberg Declaration, Part II (Council of Ministers, 
Western European Union, 1992). 
areas, meaning the Council of the EU and 
European Council can make decisions without 
unanimity. The rule of “co-decision” has 
become the regular legislative procedure. This 
puts the European Parliament on equal footing 
with the European Council for most 
legislation areas, notably including the budget. 
The parliament is the only directly-elected EU 
institution, and it is intended to represent the 
citizens of the member states. The European 
Commission remains the only EU institution 
that can initiate proposals for legislation. In 
addition, its Vice-President serves as the High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and chairs the foreign 
affairs configuration of the Council of the EU. 
Furthermore, the ESDP has become the 
Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), which establishes the principle of 
enhanced cooperation for groups of states that 
want to collaborate on security issues. 
Autonomy in national defense decisions is 
kept intact, however.20 Notably, the CSDP 
takes on both a civil and a military dimension, 
recognizing the importance of a broad-based 
approach to today’s security issues.21 
There continues 
to be a major 
capabilities gap 
between the 
United States and 
Europe, both in 
general defense 
and in space. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty makes a number of other 
changes as well. Significantly, it officially 
establishes space as an area of shared 
competence between national governments 
and the EU institutions in Brussels. Space is 
also one of the new areas covered by QMV, as 
well as co-decision. Specifically, the treaty 
states that the EU “may promote joint 
initiatives, support research and technological 
development, and coordinate the efforts 
needed for the exploration and exploitation of 
 
20“The Treaty of Lisbon,” EurActiv Network, 29 January 
2010, http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/treaty-lisbon/ 
article-163412 (accessed March 2010); and Your Guide to the 
Lisbon Treaty (Directorate-General for Communication, 
European Commission, 2009). 
21Pierre Lemoine, “Civil-military approach: A blank page,” 
Europolitics, 17 November 2009. 
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space.” It may also establish “any appropriate 
relations” with the ESA. 22 
 
In practice, there remain many questions over 
how the Lisbon Treaty will impact EU affairs. 
Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High 
Representative, is still struggling to set up the 
EU’s new diplomatic corps, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). In doing so, 
she must manage the demands of the council’s 
external relations department, the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for 
External Relations, and the member states’ 
diplomatic services for positions and 
influence.23 In addition, the European 
Parliament is seeking to ensure that it has 
adequate oversight of the EEAS. Furthermore, 
the Lisbon 
Treaty has not 









is elected for renewable terms of two-and-a-
half years. The President chairs EU summits, 
although ministerial meetings continue to be 
chaired by the country holding the six-month 
rotating EU presidency.24 The President of the 
European Commission, who heads and 
represents that institution, is another key 
decision maker, in addition to the leaders from 
all 27 member states. In the ongoing crisis in 
the euro zone, these leaders have struggled to 
organize a unified EU response, and it is 
unclear who will do so in the future. Finally, it 
is not yet certain how the Lisbon Treaty 
                                                 
                                                22Treaty of Lisbon, Article 142, http://europa.eu/lisbon_ 
treaty/index_en.htm (accessed June 2010). 
23“Implementing the Lisbon Treaty: how does Europe tie up 
the loose ends,” Burson-Marsteller Insight, 2010. 
24Ibid. 
affects the implementation of EU legislation. 
Due to rules which give it more oversight, the 
European Parliament may become more 
willing to delegate implementation to the 
European Commission. At the same time, the 
parliament will have more work to do in 
examining measures drafted by the 
commission, and will probably spend much 
more time scrutinizing the implementation of 
EU policy and law.25 
 
 
European Space and Security 
Cooperation 
 
European cooperation in space has reflected 
the broader process of European integration, 
although it has largely taken place outside the 
formal EU framework until recently. 
Realizing that national projects would not be 
able to compete with the United States and the 
Soviet Union, European scientists in the 1950s 
and 1960s pressed their governments to 
establish organizations for space cooperation. 
Originally, there were two European space 
organizations – the European Launch 
Development Organisation (ELDO) and the 
European Space Research Organisation 
(ESRO). ELDO and ESRO were merged in 
1975 to form ESA, which is now an 
intergovernmental organization of 18 member 
states, two of which, Norway and Switzerland, 
are not EU members. The ESA Charter states 
that its purpose is “to provide for, and to 
promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, 
cooperation among European States in space 
research and technology and their space 
applications, with a view to their being used 
for scientific purposes and for operational 
space applications systems.”26 
… there is an 
interoperability 
problem between 
U.S. and European 
forces, which 






26European Space Agency, 14 June 2007, http://www.esa. 
int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEMSN26LARE_0.html 
(accessed November 2009). 
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In recent years, ESA officials have commonly 
interpreted “peaceful purposes” somewhat 
loosely, allowing for non-aggressive activities, 
such as military-support architectures and 
peacemaking missions.27 This interpretation 
has enabled EU-
ESA cooperation 
in security areas. 
The first ever 
European Space 
Policy (ESP), 
released in 2007, 
is a joint 
document of the 
European Commission and the Director 
General of ESA; it was compiled in 
consultation with the member states of both 
organizations and other interested 
stakeholders. The ESP states that “Europe 
needs an effective space policy to enable it to 
exert global leadership in selected policy areas 
in accordance with European interests and 
values.” Among other objectives, its strategic 
mission seeks “to meet Europe’s security and 
defence needs in regard to space.” The ESP 
also stresses the need for establishing a 
European Space Program and coordinating 
national and European level space activities, 
increasing synergy between defense and civil 
space programs and technologies, and 
developing a joint international relations 
strategy in space. For specific applications, the 
ESP lists satellite navigation, Earth 
observation, satellite communications, and 
security and defense. In the last area, it notes 
that “space system needs for planning and 
conducting civilian and military crisis 
management operations overlap.” While 
“military capability will continue within the 
remit of Member States… Sharing and 
                                                 
                                                
27Agnieszka Lukaszczyk, Laurence Nardon and Ray 
Williamson, “Towards Greater Security in Outer Space: Some 
Recommendations,” Assessing the Current Dynamics of 
Space Security (French Institute of International Relations and 
Secure World Foundation, 2009), http://www.swfound. 
org/siteadmin/images/files/file_384.pdf (accessed June 2010). 
pooling the resources of civilian and military 
space programmes, drawing on multiple use 
technology and common standards, would 
allow more cost-effective solutions.” 
Furthermore, the ESP states that the EU will 
lead in “identifying and bringing together user 
needs” and setting policy objectives, while the 
ESA will primarily develop space 
technologies and systems.28 
… Europe 
generally prefers 
to use “soft power” 
in international 
politics… as 
opposed to hard 
military power. 
 
Michael Taverna accordingly observes there is 
“growing pressure within the EU to harness 
space for bolstering security and defense 
capabilities, combined with a trend among EU 
states toward greater military space 
cooperation.”29 The military use of space 
remains a sensitive issue, however. Several 
EU and ESA member states have their own 
military space programs and national leaders 
have been reluctant to establish similar 
programs at the European level.30 This 
hesitance reflects the desire of member states 
to retain control over their defense policies 
and military programs, which has complicated 
the development of the CSDP. 
 
Instead, ESA has been asked by the European 
Council, Commission, and Parliament to 
develop dual-use systems that can fulfill 
security functions. A European Parliament 
resolution of 2008, for example, calls for 
encouraging “synergies between civilian and 
security developments in the field of space.”31 
Highlighting the contentiousness of this area, 
the Parliament’s own press release on the 
 
28European Space Policy, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Commission, 
European Parliament, 2007. 
29Michael Taverna, “Aggregating Space-Based Security and 
Defense,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 October 
2009. 
30Peter de Selding, “European Parliament Calls for Civil-
Military Space Collaboration,” Space News, 21 November 
2008; and Taylor Dinerman. “ESA: The Odd Man Out.” The 
Space Review, 1 December 2008, http://www.thespacereview. 
com/article/1260/1 (accessed June 2010). 
31European Space Policy: How to bring space down to earth, 
European Parliament Resolution, 2008. 
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resolution proclaimed that the “Parliament 
emphasizes that the use of space must serve 
exclusively non-military purposes, rejecting 
any direct or indirect military use.”32 At the 
same time, it maintained that “uses made of 
Galileo, EGNOS [European Geostationary 
Navigation Overlay Service] and GMES 
[Global Monitoring for Environment and 
Security] by any military users must be 
consistent with the principle that these are 
civilian systems under civilian control.” The 
confused nature of this statement implies 
parliament approval of using space assets for 
security purposes, despite its assurance that 
EU space programs will not be militarized. 
 
The Galileo and GMES projects are two key 
examples of dual-use systems at the European 
level. Galileo, when active, will provide 
navigation services similar to GPS. Its two 
primary contributors are the European 
Commission’s Transportation Directorate and 
ESA. Galileo will provide services of several 
different qualities; most notably, the Public 
Regulated Service (PRS) will provide data for 
users, mainly governmental, who require 
service continuity and completely secure 
access. The Galileo Supervisory Authority 
(GSA) has been created to oversee the project 
and prevent any hostile or unauthorized use of 
its services. Thus, while it remains under 
civilian control, Galileo’s security functions 
are unambiguous. 
 
Similarly, GMES has evolved from an 
observational system to monitor 
environmental security to one that monitors 
environment and security. A working group of 
2002, made up of representatives from 11 EU 
member states, determined that GMES could 
address four areas of European security: 
environmental and technological crisis 
                                                 
                                                
32Peter de Selding, “European Parliament Calls for Civil-
Military Space Collaboration,” Space News, 21 November 
2008. 
prevention and rapid reaction, conflict 
prevention and treaty verification, Petersberg 
mission support, and European border 
surveillance.33 GMES is also a joint initiative 
between the EU and ESA. 
 
Other space and security initiatives are also 
underway, both at the European level and 
between smaller groups of states. The EU 
Satellite Centre, which originally belonged to 
the WEU, supports CSDP decision-making 
through analysis of satellite imagery, although 
this imagery has mostly been purchased from 
commercial providers. The European Defence 
Agency (EDA), 
created in 2004 
to support and 
sustain ESDP 
capabilities, is 
also active in 
assuring that the 
next generation 
of military, or 
dual-use reconnaissance, satellites is built as a 
network rather than independently. Six 
countries, including France and Germany, 
have already formed a group to design the 
Multinational Space-Based Imaging System 
(MUSIS) to assure that future reconnaissance 
systems can be used by all members. These 
states are also working on a Common 
Operational Requirement, known by its 
French acronym BOC, with the ambition to 
start “a high-level cooperation process aiming 
at solidifying, and possibly guaranteeing, 
longer-term multilateral military space 
cooperation.”34 BOC is indicative of a bottom-
up approach to space and security in Europe, 
… space and 
security is an area 





33Xavier Pasco, A European Approach to Space Security 
(Center for International and Security Studies at the 
University of Maryland, 2006). 
34Ibid., p. 20. 
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as opposed to one originating from the EU 
institutions.35 
 
As the EU begins to deploy space assets for an 
increasing number of security-related 
functions, European officials and space 
experts have expressed the need for measures 
to protect those systems. A panel of space and 
security experts organized by the European 
Commission noted that Europe “needs to 
consider the range of protection measures 
needed to ensure successful operation of both 
civil and military satellite systems, including 
defensive anti-jam countermeasures. Part of 
the requirement for protection of assets 
includes the ability to monitor what is 
happening in space in order to ensure that we 
understand whence might originate sources of 
potential threat.”36 
 
A broadly based conference in October of 
2009 on the “The Ambitions of Europe in 
Space,” which included remarks from 
President Barroso of the European 
Commission and Director General Dordain of 
ESA, reached similar conclusions. The 
conference proceedings state that European 
“space assets and infrastructure are 
indispensible for our economy and security, 
and we need to protect them.”37 To help 
achieve this goal, ESA is developing a space 
situational awareness (SSA) system, which 
will provide services in three main areas: 
surveillance and tracking of objects in orbit, 
monitoring of space weather, and detection of 
NEOs. SSA will provide “rapid and precise 
information to satellite operators, and to a 
wide range of civil, industrial, and 
                                                 
                                                
35This may prove to be useful due to the sensitive nature of 
military cooperation on space issues, particularly at the EU 
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36Mike Dillon (rapporteur), Report of the Panel of Experts on 
Space and Security, European Commission, 2005. 
37“The Ambitions of Europe in Space,” Ambitions of Europe 
in Space Conference. 2009. 
government users.” 38 A meeting of June 2009 
involving the commission, the council, and 
EU member states with relevant space 
surveillance capabilities concluded that SSA 
“should be based on a distributed, multilayer 
network approach. It should build on existing 
European and national capabilities and 
assets.”39 Notably, SSA is the first European 
space initiative to consider dual-use 
dimensions from the outset. ESA will gather 
civilian SSA user requirements and design the 
technical architecture of a potential European 
capacity, and the EDA is currently drafting 
military requirements for the system.40 
 
The development of European SSA 
capabilities has been viewed as an important 
first step toward protecting European space 
assets. Within European circles, there has 
been no discussion of deploying 
countermeasures against potential human 
threats in space, such as space weapons. 
Instead, the EU has been seeking to ensure 
space and security largely through diplomatic 
efforts and establishing rules of the road. In 
December 2008, the European Council 
adopted a draft Code of Conduct for outer 
space activities. The Code emphasizes three 
principles to guide an approach to space and 
security: freedom of access to space for all for 
peaceful purposes, preservation of the security 
and integrity of space objects in orbit, and due 
consideration for the legitimate defense 
interests of states.41 It also refers to 
transparency and confidence-building 
 
38European Space Agency, ESA’s space hazard programme 
profiled online, 18 May 2010, http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/ 
SEMVLPT889G_2.html (accessed May 2010). 
39European Commission / European Space Agency, Space 
and Security, Joint Secretariat Paper, 2010. 
40European Commission / European Space Agency, General 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Spanish 
Presidency, “Conclusions of the Co-Chairs,” Conference on 
Space and Security, 2010. 
41Council of the European Union, Draft Council conclusions 
on the draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, 
General Secretariat, European Council, 2008. 
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measures, similar to past arms control 
agreements, which are designed to alleviate 
anxieties over the potential deployment of 
weapons in space. The council is using the 
draft code as a basis for consultations with 
other countries. 
 
Although the code strongly affirms the 
principle of no harmful interference against 
space objects, it does not explicitly mention 
weapons in space, and notably allows for the 
consideration of national defense interests. 
While this may partly be due to difficulties in 
defining space weapons, the code also seems 
designed to be acceptable to a wide range of 
states, including the United States. It is a 
realistic alternative to a binding legal 
document against space weapons, which has 
proven to be complicated and difficult to 
negotiate due to political resistance and 
technical complexities. While the code is 
inherently incapable of preventing deployment 
of space weapons by itself, it is an important 
diplomatic initiative in the debate over space 
and security. 
 
A March 2010 conference on space and 
security brought together policy makers from 
several organizations, including ESA member 
states, the EU, and the EDA. The conference 
re-affirmed the “relevance of space to security 
users as a tool with the potential to address 
specific needs, in particular that of timely 
response.” Echoing earlier proposals, 
recommendations were made on how GMES 
could support environmental protection 
efforts, border and maritime surveillance, and 
the work of the nascent EEAS. The 
conference raised the importance of SSA for 
space and security, but also noted “the 
complexity of integrating both civil and 
military requirements.” Its conclusions stated 
that the “EU Council and European 
Commission, together with potential SSA 
contributors, will have to define the 
governance model and the related data policy 
for an operational European SSA system.” In 
addition, the conference highlighted the 
importance of national assets as components 
of European space systems. The conference 
conclusions referenced the ESP in stressing a 
need for the EU, ESA, and their member 
states to “increase synergies between their 




Implications for Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Space and Security 
 
Thus far, transatlantic cooperation in space 
and security areas has been limited. For 
example, NATO forces have been mostly 
reliant on U.S. space assets, while EU forces – 
and many member state forces – have lacked 
many of the technological benefits of space 
systems. Yet, there has been some 
cooperation, as well as discussion on future 
joint endeavors. NATO has developed allied 
space-based telecommunications through a 
program called NATO Satcom Post-2000. 
This program will ideally define how future 
cooperation between allied information 
systems will work, and establish common 
technical standards. Establishing Satcom was 
difficult, however, as NATO governments had 
trouble agreeing on their choice of wave 
frequencies – the United States wanted a high-
frequency standard, while most of the other 
members preferred one with a lower 
capacity.43 
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U.S. defense officials have also expressed 
openness to cooperating on SSA.44 One U.S. 
official of the Department of Defense asserted 
that “any endeavor by Europe to enhance 














that the United 
States hosted a 
U.S.-ESA workshop in June 2008 that 
addressed transatlantic cooperation on SSA.45 
Discussions between U.S. and European 
officials on possible SSA data sharing have 
been ongoing, and have sought to address 
evolving SSA security policy concerns.46 At a 
conference hosted by the New Defence 
Agenda, Gilles Maquet of Eurospace 
identified early warning systems as another 
area for potential cooperation.47 Karl von 
Wogau, a member of the European 
Parliament, made a similar proposal in a 
parliament resolution: “EU and NATO are 
urged to launch a [strategic] dialogue on space 
                                                 
                                                
44Aviation Week & Space Technology of 19 January 2009, 
noted that reports had surfaced that the United States was 
putting pressure on Europe to sidetrack or change SSA 
projects in Europe. This report was confirmed as well by 
ESA’s Director General Dordain through personal 
correspondence with the author. 
45Michael Taverna, “ESA plans quick kickoff for space 
situational awareness and other programs, despite alleged 
U.S. pressure,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 
January 2009. 
46“Conversation with Ken Hodgkins,” Aerospace America, 
July-August 2009, pp. 16-19. 
47John Chapman, Space and Security in Europe (New 
Defence Agenda, 2004). 
policy and missile defence, especially on 
complementarity and interoperability of 
systems for satellite communications, space 
surveillance, and early warning of ballistic 
missiles, as well as the protection of European 
forces by a theatre missile defence system.”48 
… technical 
coordination, as well 
as rules of the 





could be a driver in 
this kind of 
development. 
 
Despite talk of future collaboration, as well as 
a long history of working together in many 
areas, there are several issues which pose 
challenges to U.S.-European cooperation in 
space and security. There continues to be a 
major capabilities gap between the United 
States and Europe, both in general defense and 
in space. In 2009, the United States spent 
$43.5 billion on military space, where the 
Department of Defense’s space budget was 
$26.5 billion, and the budgets for the National 
Reconnaissance Office and National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency were $15 
billion and $2 billion respectively.49 In 
contrast, it is estimated that Europe as a whole 
spends between $750 million to $1.4 billion 
annually on military space.50 Europe’s more 
limited military space budget severely restricts 
Europe’s ability to acquire advanced military 
space assets. 
 
The ongoing crisis in the euro zone will likely 
complicate this situation. In early May, the EU 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
funded a massive loan package to rescue 
Greece from bankruptcy. A few days later, 
they established a mechanism worth around 
€750 billion to rescue failing EU member 
states in the future. The measures were 
unpopular in Germany, which was the biggest 
contributor to the funds. At the same time, 
states throughout Europe began to implement 
 
48Karl von Wogau, On the Contribution of Space Assets to 
ESDP, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, 
2008. 
49The Space Report 2010 (Space Foundation, 2010). 
50Futron, “INTEL: Global Military Space,” MilSat Magazine, 
September 2009. 
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austerity programs to reduce their debts.51 
Moreover, the expanded powers of the 
European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty 
should make the EU more accountable to its 
citizens, although recent voter turnout for 
parliament elections has been low. Faced with 
potential cuts in other areas, like social 
welfare, European citizens are unlikely to 
support additional security space spending, at 
the European or national levels. 
 
Due to these budgetary limitations, there is an 
interoperability problem between U.S. and 
European forces, which hampers space and 
security cooperation. John Sheldon notes that 
the United States “is hardly going to rein back 
its continued exploitation of military space in 
order to ensure that European allies can 
operate effectively alongside it.”52 
Interoperability problems were also cited by 
several of the experts at the New Defence 
Agenda conference mentioned above. 
Additionally, a report to the ESA Director 
General, commonly known as the “Wise Men 
Report,” stated that increased space and 
security investment would establish Europe’s 
“credentials both as a credible alternative to 
the United States for the world and as a 
credible partner for cooperation with the 
United States.”53 
 
While improved European space capabilities 
are essential for increased cooperation with 
the United States, they could also fuel calls for 
greater European autonomy in space and 
security. This paradox is more complex than 
the capabilities gap itself, and is tied to a 
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53Carl Bildt, Jean Peyrelevade, and Lothar Spath, Towards a 
Space Agency for the European Union, Report to the ESA 
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deeper transatlantic divide. The call for 
European autonomy has typically been led by 
France; France has advocated a stronger 
CSDP as an alternative to the United States 
and NATO. Former French President Jacques 
Chirac argued that unless Europe develops its 
own satellite capabilities, it will remain little 
more than a “vassal” of the United States.54 
The desire for space independence has led to 
some European-level initiatives, such as 
Galileo and the nascent SSA systems. And, 
“Europe can no longer assume a fortuitous 
coincidence of interest with the USA” and 
needs to develop its own capabilities. 
Moreover, the EU cannot be guaranteed 
access to member state systems “in support of 
possible or actual deployments of European 
multinational units or coalition forces under 
all circumstances.”55 To support the range of 
security functions it wants to carry out, the EU 
increasingly feels it should have constant, 
assured access to a variety of space assets. 
 
The debate over European autonomy is related 
to a deeper issue – the often differing attitudes 
of the United States and Europe towards both 
space policies and security policies. These 
differences stem from U.S. and European 
approaches to security after World War II. 
While the United States policed Europe and 
most of the world with military power, Europe 
focused on economic integration and 
development, and institution building. 
Alluding to this tradition, an ESA working 
group on Space and Human Security 
maintained that “a European space policy 
should encompass the European way of 
approaching security problems.”56 The 
 
54Daniel Keohane, “Introduction,” in Carl Bildt, Mike Dillon, 
Daniel Keohane, Xavier Pasco and Tomas Valasek, eds., 
Europe in Space (Centre for European Reform, 2004), 
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European way consists of several principles: 
effective multilateralism with an emphasis on 
strengthening the international order, 
institutions, and rule of law; promoting a 
stable international and regional environment 
for Europe; and cooperation with partners, 
both directly and through institutions. Thus, 
Europe generally 
prefers to use 
“soft power” in 
international 





political action – 
as opposed to 
hard military 
power. Europe 




issues, such as 
economic and 
environmental security, in contrast with the 
more traditional military approach, which has 
often been taken by the United States.57 
 
Although the election of President Obama has 
changed the tone of U.S. foreign policy to 
include multilateral approaches, the United 
States is the world’s superpower by all 
measures, especially military might. The 
United States also has a variety of 
commitments overseas, many of which it must 
fulfill unilaterally. Hence, the United States 
outlook on security is from the perspective of 
the world’s sole military superpower – it 
keeps the international community, and its 
                                                                                                 
57Wolfgang Rathgeber and Nina-Louisa Remuss, Space 
Security: A Formative Role and Principled Identity for 
Europe (European Space Policy Institute, 2009), 
http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/studies/espi%
20report%2016.pdf (accessed June 2010). 
homeland, safe by wielding this strength. 
Accordingly, “U.S. space technology is 
military oriented due to military strategy, 
which is increasingly based on the concept of 
information dominance, while European space 
technology is more civilian oriented and dual-
use.”58 Similarly, the United States’ vision of 
space is “increasingly dominated by military 
priorities, while the EU emphasizes the use of 
space technologies for disaster relief” and 
other humanitarian missions outlined by the 
Petersberg tasks, as well as civil security 
interests.59 
… the United 
States and Europe 








together take the 
lead on multilateral 
approaches in this 
area. 
 
Different transatlantic views of space and 
security have led to disputes over various 
initiatives, most notably the Galileo project. 
The United States was concerned that EU 
civilian control over the navigation system 
might lead to security vulnerabilities. In 
particular, defense officials worried that 
potential adversaries could utilize Galileo’s 
signals for attacks against U.S. and allied 
forces. U.S. apprehensions were alleviated 
when the EU established the GSA, which was 
tasked with regulating Galileo and preventing 
its unauthorized use. 
 
Hesitance in Europe to militarize space at the 
European, EU, or ESA levels has also led to 
different transatlantic approaches toward 
space and security. Proposals in France have 
advocated ensuring the protection of national 
capabilities and satellites, and continuing 
work on SSA. Eventually, initial systems 
would become more operational and more 
European, but would stop short of developing 
weapons to be used for space defense.60 At the 
same time, diplomatic efforts would ideally 
establish rules of the road to prevent the 
deployment of space weapons. Furthermore, at 
 
58Ibid. 
59Ibid., p. 46. 
60Philippe Henry. “The militarization and weaponization of 
space: Towards a European space deterrent,” Space Policy 
(May 2008): 61-66. 
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the New Defence Agenda conference, Jack 
Metthey of the European Commission noted 
that the EU focus is on security and not 
defense – in the view of the European 
Parliament, this rules out the possible 
militarization of space and use of offensive 
weapons.61 
 
While the United States has not displayed 
support for a binding legal treaty banning all 
space weapons, it has also shown self-restraint 
in deploying them. 
Concomitantly, the 
militarization of 
space will continue 
to accelerate in the 
United States. This 
could complicate 
future joint efforts 
between the United 
States and Europe, 
at least at the 
European level. As 
stated earlier, the 
space capabilities 
gap raises additional 
problems, leading 
Sheldon to conclude that transatlantic space 
cooperation will “probably be modest rather 
than grandiose.”62 
 
Despite these challenges, space and security is 
an area with potential for deeper transatlantic 
collaboration. As mentioned earlier, U.S. 
officials have shown interest in cooperating on 
SSA. SSA is the first European space 
initiative to be acknowledged as dual-use from 
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the beginning, and officials are working to 
determine how the military will use its 
capabilities. While specific questions remain 
as to how SSA will operate in Europe, an 
effective multilayer system could serve as a 
model for international cooperation leading to 
a global network. Further, the EU’s draft Code 
of Conduct is an innovative way to address the 
issue of space weapons outside the CD and 
would not impose any binding legal 
restrictions on U.S. space activities. 
 
In the past, Europe has developed institutions 
to constrain the use of force and ensure 
security. This tradition may lead the EU, along 
with its member states and ESA, to promote 
and develop multilateral initiatives for 
improving space and security. Some 
organizations and initiatives are already 
underway. The Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC), for 
example, was launched in 1993 to address the 
growing problem of space debris in Earth 
orbits. And, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulates 
the radio-frequency spectrum and satellite 
orbit resources to prevent harmful radio 
interference between countries. Nonetheless, 
there is still much room for international 
collaboration for space governance. For 
example, with an increasing number of actors 
aspiring for and reaching space, traffic 
management is a key potential area for 
multilateral cooperation. 
… the United 
States and 
Europe can set 










Xavier Pasco notes that technical 
coordination, as well as rules of the road, 
could eventually lead to some new space 
regime, which may govern the security 
dimensions of space.63 The EU could be a 
driver in this kind of development. Past 
European initiatives, such as the OSCE, have 
 
63Xavier Pasco, A European Approach to Space Security 
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focused on transparency, confidence-building, 
and international cooperation to ensure 
collective security, and will certainly inform 
future designs. The Lisbon Treaty, once it is 
fully implemented, could facilitate the EU’s 
role as a leader in international space and 
security cooperation. Indeed, the treaty was 
developed for this kind of purpose. The 
EEAS, in particular, was created to give the 
EU more strength and coherence in 
international affairs. Yet, battles over 
jurisdiction within the EU, especially between 
the EU institutions, must be resolved before 





Despite the challenges that complicate 
transatlantic space cooperation, the United 
States and Europe continue to be natural 
partners. They both face a number of complex 
security threats today, which will require 
international collaboration. Emerging security 
concerns in space are no different. The unique 
environmental attributes of space will 
increasingly demand multilateral approaches. 
Consequently, the United States and Europe 
must seek to address the problems that might 
hamper transatlantic cooperation in space and 
security, and together take the lead on 
multilateral approaches in this area. 
 
A high-level dialogue on space issues could be 
a useful step toward improved transatlantic 
cooperation. Transatlantic dialogues already 
exist on a range of other issues, and could 
serve as a model for space discussions. In 
2007, for example, the United States and the 
EU created the Transatlantic Economic 
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Council (TEC) to oversee the dismantling of 
transatlantic economic barriers. Key officials 
from the United States’ administration and the 
European Commission have been assigned to 
head the TEC, giving it focus and executive 
leadership. At the same time, exchanges have 
taken place between lower level officials on 
technical issues. An initiative like this for 
space could have tangible benefits. Yet, due to 
other concerns, like the ongoing financial 
crisis, there might not be enough political 
traction to launch such a dialogue at this time. 
The lack of clear leadership on space issues, in 
both the United States and Europe, presents 
another challenge. In the United States, a 
Senior Interagency Group for space within the 
National Security Council would help address 
this problem, and in the EU, a top adviser on 
space issues could be created under the new 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. 
 
The United States and Europe must also 
address issues of interoperability. For the EU, 
ESA, and their member states, this will require 
additional defense spending, especially for 
space and security budgets. Funding in this 
area in Europe will not be able to match the 
United States, even at the European level. 
Moreover, the euro zone crisis will make it 
difficult to increase allocations in the short-
term. Nonetheless, there is much room for 
improvement. The United States, in turn, must 
continue to be more open and encouraging 
towards European ambitions for space 
independence. Security concerns, such as 
those over Galileo, are legitimate, but need to 
be addressed through direct, conventional 
channels. Potential disagreements over space 
systems between NATO and the CSDP can be 
mitigated by determining when, where, and 
how each actor will operate. Fortunately, the 
Berlin plus agreement already models how 
NATO and the EU can share assets for 
security missions. This agreement should now 
be modified, or a new agreement should be 
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made, to determine how NATO and the EU 
will utilize their overlapping and 
complementary space systems. 
 
Finally, the draft EU Code of Conduct should 
be adopted by all spacefaring states in North 
America and Europe. The Code should also be 
extended to other major actors in space. This 
approach, focusing on rules of the road instead 
of binding treaties, is a practical way of 
addressing the interests of all parties involved. 
While it establishes principles of behavior that 
the EU would like to see normalized, it does 
not legally preclude the United States from 
taking any actions in space that it feels are 
necessary for security. Furthermore, the 
United States and the EU should consider 
what new multilateral space initiatives might 
be feasible and desirable, such as one that 
manages space traffic. Such endeavors could 
lead to improved coordination and cooperation 
in the future. Most importantly, they can 
provide a framework for the United States and 
the EU to work together in conjunction with 
other countries. Broad international 
collaboration will be increasingly important as 
states like China expand their space programs, 
and the United States and EU will be able to 
deal with these other actors more effectively 





The development of alternative European and 
transatlantic security structures after World 
War II established and reinforced several 
notions in Europe: a preference for institutions 
for constraining the use of force, the benefits 
of pooling resources, and the advantages of 
international cooperation. On the other hand, 
the history of European integration has also 
shown the difficulty of merging national 
defense structures. In space, Europe 
cooperates to a great extent. While Europe is 
increasingly developing dual-use systems for 
space and security, there continues to be great 
sensitivity over militarizing space at the 
European, EU, or ESA level. The European 
approach to space, as well as a gap in 
capabilities between the United States and 
Europe, raises challenges for transatlantic 
cooperation in space and security. 
 
Nonetheless, space and security is an area 
with potential for U.S.-European 
collaboration. What is more, some inventive 
space and security projects are slowly taking 
shape at the European level. If the EU can 
fully implement the Lisbon Treaty and 
increase its effectiveness in international 
politics, it could become a leader in 
multilateral initiatives in this area. The United 
States could, and should, support this type of 
role for Europe in space and security. 
Together, the United States and Europe can 
set the norms for future human activity 
beyond Earth’s atmosphere to ensure the 
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By launching its space probe to the Moon, 
Chandrayaan-1, on 22 October 2008, India 
joined the United States (U.S.), Japan, Europe, 
Russia, and China in this accomplishment. 
The principal goal of the probe was to conduct 
mapping of the lunar surface, and among the 
scientific payloads it carried two were from 
the United States and three from the European 
Space Agency (ESA). This was a unique 
mission as it was an attempt to map high-
resolution, 3-D topography of entire Moon, 
get mineral composition of surface, and 
investigate the availability of water and 
Helium-3. Chandrayaan-1 operated until 
August 2009, coming to an abrupt end after 
312 days, as opposed to the intended two 
years. Despite the setback, Chandrayaan-1 did 
achieve 95 percent of its planned objectives, 
and made the significant discovery of water 
ice molecules on the lunar surface.1 
groundwork for further space expeditions. It 
was a landmark project for the Indian Space 
Research Organization (ISRO), which had 
launched dozens of satellites since its 
founding in 1969, but had never before sent an 
object beyond Earth’s orbit. The Indian 
government has already approved the follow-
on Chandrayaan-2 mission, a collaborative 
venture with Russia. The data relayed by 
Chandrayaan-1 about the nature of Moon’s 
surface, will pave the way for the soft landing 
of the rover that Chandrayaan-2 is scheduled 
to take to the lunar surface. 
 
For India, the lunar probe is yet another 
testament to the progress it has made in the 
last few years as an economic and 
technological power. 
The mission is a sign 
of India’s growing 
strategic ambition, 
and an indication of 
the importance it 
gives to space 
exploration. The 
superpowers had dominated space for much of 
the space age, and now emerging powers, such 
as China and India, are joining them. Space 
accomplishments translate into greater 
technological standing and strategic clout, as 
well as an index of high-technology 
capability. Moreover, space is an important 
element of power projection and the lunar 
...India intends 






Chandrayaan-1 is a historic milestone for the 
Indian space program, aimed at laying the 
 
1See Chandrayaan, Lunar Mission by Indian Space Research 
Organization, see http://www.chandrayaan-i.com/index.php/ 
chandrayaan-1.html (accessed April 2010). Chandrayan-1 was 
placed into lunar orbit at an altitude of 100 kilometers. 
Though it did not complete its two years in orbit, it provided a 
large volume of data from its sensors, such as terrain mapping 
camera, hyper-spectral imager, and moon mineralogy mapper. 
The moon mineralogy mapper confirmed the existence of 
water ice on the Moon, and analysis of the data acquired 
detected more than 40 water ice-filled craters in the lunar 
north pole. 
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mission is part of an effort to assert Indian 
prowess in space. 
 
This paper examines the drivers of the Indian 
space program. Factors at the structural, 
domestic, and individual levels shaped the 
trajectory of the Indian space program. Their 
relative importance vis-à-vis each other 
influence Indian aspirations in the realm of 
space for both civil and military use. 
 
 
Evolution of the Indian Space Program 
 
The Indian space program started with 
launching of sounding rockets in 1963. At that 
time, the purpose was to focus on scientific 
investigations of the upper atmospheric and 
ionospheric phenomena above the 
geomagnetic equator. India’s first sounding 
rocket was launched with the help of the 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), which provided a 
Nike-Apache rocket along with other 
hardware and training aids. It took more than a 
decade’s time after this launch to put the first 
Indian satellite in Earth orbit. Aryabhatta was 
India’s first satellite, named after an Indian 
mathematician of the 5th century of the 
Common Era. It was launched with the help of 
the former Soviet Union on 19 April 1975 
from Kapustin Yar, a Russian rocket launch 
and development site.2 Since then, India 
demonstrated that it could send an indigenous 
satellite to orbit by using an indigenous 
rocket. This was the launch of satellite, Rohini 
1, with the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) 
from its own launch site located at Sriharikota 
on 18 July 1980. 
 
India’s space program started under the aegis 
of Department of Atomic Energy in 1962 with 
 
                                                
2The Soviet Union and India negotiated in August 1971 an 
agreement, signed on 10 May 1972, in regard to a joint effort 
to launch a satellite. 
creation of Indian National Committee for 
Space Research (INCOSPAR). The mandate 
to the committee was to oversee all aspects of 
space research in the country. Work began on 
the establishment of the Thumba Equatorial 
Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) in 1962. 
India’s former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
dedicated TERLS to the United Nations (UN) 
on 2 February 1968. On that occasion, 
INCOSPAR Chairman, Vikram Sarabhai, 
articulated India’s goal in space. He stated that 
India’s program is civilian, with a focus on the 
application of space technology as a tool for 
socioeconomic development of the country. 
The basic aim of India’s space program was 
described as a program capable of using space 
technologies in the vital areas of development, 
such as communications, meteorology, and 
natural resource management.3 
 
ISRO was formed under the Department of 
Atomic Energy in 1969, and was subsequently 
brought under the Department of Space in 
1972. A Space Commission was also 
established in 1972, which reports directly to 
the Prime Minister. The Department of Space 
along with ISRO operates four independent 
projects: (1) the Indian National Satellite 
Space Segment Project; (2) the National 
Natural Resource Management System 
(NNRMS); (3) the National Remote Sensing 
Agency (NRSA); and (4) the Physical 
Research Laboratory (PRL). The Department 
of Space sponsors research in various 
academic and research institutions under a 
program called RESPOND, the sponsored 
research. This program allows ISRO to 
interact with various educational institutes and 
outsource research efforts.4 
 
3U. Sankar, The Economics of India’s Space Programme 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.1-2. 
4India Space Program Research, India Department of Space, 
Science Advancement, http://www.indianchild.com/india_ 
space_research.htm, http://indianspacestation.com/index.php? 
view=article&catid=35:articles&id=106:respond-program-by-
isro&format=pdf (both accessed April 2010). 
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Presently, ISRO has various operating 
divisions throughout the country. These 
divisions deal with space systems, propulsion, 
communications, telemetry and tracking, 
research, space launch, and other facets of the 
space program. The major achievements of the 
space program have been in the area of the 
domestic design, production, and launching of 
remote sensing and communications satellites. 
Over the years, ISRO established a strong 
infrastructure for remote sensing and 
communications satellite systems with 
launcher autonomy. In 1992, ISRO established 
its commercial outlet, the Antrix Corporation.5 
This organization markets space and 
telecommunications products of ISRO. 
 
Initially, the Indian space program focused on 
experimental, low-capability projects that 
allowed Indian scientists to gain experience in 
the construction and operation of satellites and 
launch vehicles. ISRO built the Bhaskara 
Earth observation satellites, a communication 
satellite, the APPLE 
satellite, and 
conducted four test 
flights of the SLV-
III satellite launch 
vehicle between 
1979 and 1983.6 The 
Bhaskara satellites 
were launched with 
help from the former 
Soviet Union. Even 
though only two of 
the four test flights 
of SLV were successful, this program was 
followed by a more advanced program, the 
Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV). 
 
From the mid-1980s, India focused on more 
capable, mission specific systems. ISRO 
                                                 
                                                
5Antrix is a Sanskrit word meaning Space. 
6Dinshaw Mistry, “India’s Emerging Space Program”, Pacific 
Affairs 71:2 (Summer, 1998): 153. 
started designing and developing the Polar 
Orbiting Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), 
and its successor, the Geosynchronous 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). These 
launch vehicles were required to launch the 
indigenously developed Indian Remote 
Sensing (IRS) satellite, and a meteorology and 
telecommunications Indian National Satellite 
(INSAT). PSLV commenced its operational 
launches in 1997, and since then, it has been a 
reliable launch vehicle with ten consecutive 
successful flights through April 2007.7 On 2 
September 2007, India successfully launched 
an INSAT geostationary satellite with the 
GSLV. This launch proved India’s capabilities 
to put satellites weighing 2,500 kilograms (kg) 
into geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). The first 
two stages of GSLV I and II are derived from 
PSLV. 
 
ISRO is developing as well a more advanced 
GSLV version, GSLV III, which is an entirely 
new launch vehicle that is not derived from 
PSLV or previous GSLVs. In April 2002, the 
Indian government approved $520 million 
U.S. dollars for development of GSLV III 
with the capability to launch 4,500 kg satellite 
to geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO) with 
growth potential towards 5,000 kg payload 
capability.8 However, ISRO’s GSLV program 
suffered a setback in April 2010 with the 
failure of GSLV D3. This launch vehicle was 
carrying a communication satellite called 
GSAT-4 with a mass of 2,220 kg. The main 
feature of this mission was the employment of 
the first Indian made cryogenic engine. The 
failure of the cryogenic engine underlined that 
India will have to wait for a number of years 
to realize its dream of sending 5,000 kg of 













7Ibid. Also, see “ISRO Does an Italian Job,” Hindustan 
Times, 23 April 2007. 
8See ISRO, http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/ 
GSLVMARKIII/mark3.aspx (accessed April 2010). 
9“India’s ambitious quest to achieve total independence in 
cryogenic technology for launching satellite launch vehicles 
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The Indian space program has followed the 
path in space envisaged by Sarabhai in the 
1970s of socioeconomic applications for the 
country. Investments have revolved around 
remote sensing and multi-purpose application 
satellites, and related launching technologies. 
Yet today, India is looking beyond Sarabhai’s 
vision of harnessing space just for economic 
and social development. India’s lunar probe, 
Chandrayaan, and ISRO’s proposal to 
undertake human lunar missions are examples 
of how India seeks to expand upon its national 
space endeavors.10 Of note, is that during the 
1970s, Sarabhai argued that India does not 
have the fantasy of competing with the 
economically advanced nations in the 
exploration of the Moon, the planets, or to 
engage in human spaceflight. 
 
In addition to Chandrayaan, India has 
formulated a road map to send a human 
mission to the Moon by 2020. This added 
dimension of undertaking human space 
missions needs to be viewed not as a policy 
shift per say, but as a natural progression in 
developing space capabilities. India also plans 
to send satellites to study Mars. With the 
successful launch and mission of 
Chandrayaan, India, for the first time, has 
entered into an arena of deep space 
exploration. ISRO managed to keep the cost 
factor very low for this effort. It looks certain 
that this mission is not a “one-off mission,” 
and Indian investments in this area are likely 
to increase in the near future. As stated earlier, 
the Indian government approved a second 
robotic lunar mission, Chandrayaan-2, at a 
 
 
                                                suffered a setback with the indigenous cryogenic engine in a 
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-D3) failing 
to ignite and the vehicle tumbling into the sea.” See The 
Hindu, 15 April 2010, http://beta.thehindu.com/news/ 
national/article398070.ece?homepage=true (accessed April 
2010). 
10 K.S. Jayaraman, “India’s Space Agency Proposes Manned 
Spaceflight Programme,” Space News, 10 November 2006. 
cost of around $100 million U.S. dollars.11 
ISRO is planning to put its first Indian 
astronaut into orbit by 2014-2016, depending 
on whether the government approves ISRO’s 
budget needed for this effort (see Table 1 
below). 
 
At the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century, India’s satellite program is headed 
towards following a multi-pronged strategy. In 
addition to social causes, India intends to use 
space for planetary research and for economic 
purposes. To conduct all these activities, focus 
areas for Indian space efforts include: remote 
sensing, meteorology, communication, 




Military Space Program 
 
Sarabhai had articulated in the early 1970s 
that India’s space program is civilian in 
nature. Also, the development of the Indian 
civil space program was not born out of 
military programs, like ballistic missile 
programs. Rather, civil space efforts focused 
on satellite development and establishing 
satellite launch capabilities for civil 
purposes.12 
 
However, satellite technology, being 
inherently dual-use in nature, has applicability 
for military purposes. For example, a one 
meter (m) resolution Technology Experiment 
Satellite (TES) was launched by ISRO in 
2001. It was stated by the then ISRO 
Chairman, K. Kasturirangan, that the satellite 
was meant for “civilian use consistent with 
 
11P. Sunderrajan, “Cabinet clears Chandrayaan-2,” The Hindu, 
19 September 2008. 
12For an overview of recent trends in Indian Missile 
Capability, see Harsh V. Pant and Bharath Gopalaswami, 
“India’s Emerging Missile Capability: The Science and 
Politics of Agni-III,” Comparative Strategy 27:4 (August-
September 2008): 376-387. 
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our security concerns.”13 Such high resolution 
imagery has obvious military utility. In the 
recent past, India also launched Cartosat 1, 
Cartosat 2, and Cartosat 2A high resolution 
satellites with 2.5 m, 1 m, and 0.8 m 
resolutions respectively. These satellites are 
for cartographic purposes, as well as for urban 
and rural development. Such satellites offer 
India the capability of intelligence-gathering, 
keeping an “eye on the region surrounding the 
country. 
 
Geographically, India’s location at the base of 
continental Asia astride the Indian Ocean 
places it at a vantage point in relation to 
maritime trade. India has a strong stake in the 
security and stability of these waters since a 
large percent of Asian oil and gas supplies is 
shipped through the Indian Ocean.14 Presently, 
the security of such supplies depends on 
multilateral initiatives that have been 
sanctioned by the UN. Indian navy and cost-
guard play a role within the ambit of the UN 
Law of the Sea Convention. The use of space 
could clearly help India in this role. 
 
Indian armed forces understand the relevance 
of space technologies to address 21st century 
security threats. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is 
planning to integrate space-based applications 
into conventional strategies and operations. 
The IAF is already using space for 
telecommunications, reconnaissance, 
navigation, targeting, and other operations. 
The IAF is adopting a focused and fast-
tracked approach to harness space effectively 
to provide synergy with all facets of its 
                                                 
                                                
13See Joe Katzman, “India’s Emerging Military Satellite 
System,” 10 August 2005, http://www.windsofchange.net/ 
archives/007318.php (accessed April 2010). 
14From the lecture delivered by Shri M.M. Pallaum Raju, 
Minister of State for Defence, Government of India. See “P.C. 
Lal Memorial Lecture,” organized by the Air Force 
Association, 19 March 2007, New Delhi, India. 
operational roles.15 For the last few years, the 
IAF has been advocating and preparing for the 
establishment of a tri-service aerospace 
command to protect both the territorial and 
space assets of India. Today, India 
understands that many modern day defense 
options rely heavily on space-based sensors, 
and for better coordination and timely 
dissemination of surveillance, reconnaissance, 
and tracking information.16 
 
India has no policy towards weaponization of 
space, yet Indian armed forces require the 
assistance of the space assets to undertake 
various operations, in air, land, and sea. 
Keeping in view such military space 
requirements, particularly with the backdrop 
of the anti-satellite test conducted by China 
during January 2007, India has established a 
“Space Cell” under the command of the 
Integrated Defence Services (IDS) 
Headquarters. IDS acts as a single 
organization for integration among the armed 
forces, the Department of Space, and ISRO. 
India maintains that such a body is required 
due to “offensive counter space systems and 
an improved array of military space systems 
emerging in India’s neighborhood.”17 
 
 
Drivers of Indian Space Program 
 
Following below is a discussion of the main 
drivers that have influenced the trajectory of 
India’s space program. They can be broadly 
 
15D.C. Kumaria, “Leveraging Space Capabilities for India’s 
Defence”, Air Power Journal 1:2 (October-December 2006): 
86-87. 
16From the lecture delivered by Shri M.M. Pallaum Raju, 
Minister of State for Defence, Government of India. See “P.C. 
Lal Memorial Lecture,” organized by the Air Force 
Association, 19 March 2007, New Delhi, India. 
17See “Now, space cell to keep an eye on China’s plans,” The 
Times of India, 11June 2008, http://timesofindia. 
indiatimes.com/India/File_Now_space_cell_to_keep_an_eye_
on_Chinas_plans/articleshow/3118491.cms (accessed April 
2010). 
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examined under three levels: (1) structural, (2) 
domestic, and (3) individual. At the structural 
level, the changing global balance of power 
and growing competition among spacefaring 
states is analyzed’ at the domestic level, the 
economic and political factors, as well as the 
technological development and bureaucratic 
momentum shaping Indian space policy, are 
examined; and at the individual level, the role 
of key personalities in shaping the Indian 
space priorities is assessed. 
 
 
International Structural Factors 
 
With the recent rise in India’s economic and 
political power, India is more ambitious in 
defining its priorities in space than it has ever 
been in the past. India’s space policy is 
responding not only to India’s own attempt at 
emerging as a major global actor, but also to 
the space efforts of other powers. With other 
powers, such as China and Japan, deciding to 
explore the lunar surface with humans, India 
has also joined the “bandwagon.” India has a 
technologically sophisticated space program, 
which is now addressing the challenges of 
human spaceflight and exploration. Towards 
this end, India is cooperating with a number of 
states and U.S.-Indian space cooperation is 
beginning to grow substantially. 
 
India has only recently started the military 
dimension of its space program, and as the 
space race among major powers gains 
momentum, it will become pivotal for Indian 
military planners. With China viewing conflict 
in space as an integrated part of military 
operations, India is gradually coming to terms 
with the possibility of the weaponization of 
space.18 For long, the Indian government has 
                                                 
 
                                                
18For a detailed account of writings discussing China’s views 
of war in space as an integrated part of military operations, 
see Kevin Pollpeter, “The Chinese Vision of Space Military 
Operations” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: 
Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese 
resisted the demand of its military to establish 
an aerospace command by arguing that it did 
not want to trigger greater militarization of 
space or the possibility of arms race in space 
among regional powers. But gradually, India 
is realizing that whether it likes it or not, the 
military use of space is pervasive among 
world powers, and there is little India can do 
to stop it. Also, by supporting the already 
deployed U.S. missile defense system, India 
seems to have casted its vote towards the 
militarization, and perhaps weaponization, of 
space with the missile defense system being a 
first step towards an anti-satellite capability. 
 
India has a two-tiered missile defense system, 
the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for 
high altitude interception, and the Advanced 
Air Defence (AAD) 
Missile for lower 
altitude interception. 
Several successful 
tests for this system 
have already been 
conducted, and these 
systems will become 
operational in two to 
three years. Also, 





are readying a weapons system to neutralize 





only to India’s 
own attempt at 
emerging as a 
major global 
actor, but also 
to the space 
efforts of other 
powers. 
 
It was the Chinese test of an anti-satellite 
weapon (ASAT) in 2007 that led the Indian 
establishment to take more seriously the 
military uses of space. China successfully 
used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy 
 
 
People’s Liberation Army, James Mulvenon and David M. 
Finkelstein, eds. (CNA Corporation, December 2005). 
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one of its weather satellites. In effect, China 
demonstrated an effective ASAT capability 
comparable to the United States technology 
from the mid 1980s and Russian systems from 
about the same time. The test reinforced 
China’s status as a military space power; equal 
to the United States and Russia, but more 
significantly key U.S. space systems are now 
at risk in any future conflict with China.19 
 
As a consequence, suggestions are now being 
made that the United States should start 
investing in offensive counter-space 
capabilities.20 The 
Bush Administration 
tacitly asserted the 
United States right to 
space weapons and 
has continued to 
oppose the 
emergence of treaties 
or other measures 
restricting them. For 
the United States, 
any arms control 
regime in outer space 
would constrain its 
military options, and it wants to retain its 
military operational flexibility. 
 
In early 2008, the United States Navy’s 
missile interceptor successfully struck a dying 
spy satellite of the United States in LEO over 
the Pacific Ocean. With this missile strike, the 
United States categorically signaled that its 
missile defenses can be used to counter 
strategic ASATs. An interceptor designed for 
missile defense was used for the first time to 
attack a satellite, and as such, showcased how 
the emerging missile defense arsenal could be 
reprogrammed to counter an unexpected 
                                                 
19Ashley Tellis, “Punching the U. S. Military's "Soft Ribs": 
China's Anti-satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,” 
Carnegie Endowment, Policy Brief 51, June 2007. 
20Ashley Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival 
(Autumn 2007): 41-72. 
threat, which in this case was deadly rocket 
fuel aboard a dead satellite. This will no doubt 
strengthen the hands of the supporters of the 
missile defense system in which the United 
States has already made significant 
investments. This test was as a major success 
for the United States Missile Defense Agency, 
in so far as it amounted to an unprecedented 
use of components of the military’s missile 
defense system designed to shoot down hostile 
ballistic missiles in flight, not satellites. 
 
It is instructive that this strike by the United 
States came days after China and Russia 
proposed a global treaty banning weapons in 
space in the UN Conference on Disarmament, 
as well as rising Russian opposition to the 
United States placement of missile defense 
interceptors in Eastern Europe. The United 
States has opposed this treaty effort arguing 
that the proposed draft is largely directed at 
U.S. military technology, as it allows China 
and Russia to fire ground-based missiles into 
space or use satellites as weapons. There is 
also reluctance on the part of China and 
Russia on clearly defining a space weapon as 
they too want to keep their options flexible. 
It was the 
Chinese test of 
an anti-satellite 
weapon in 
2007 that led 
the Indian 
establishment 
to take more 
seriously the 
military uses of 
space. 
 
The Europeans are presenting their own 
challenge to U.S. supremacy in space. The 
first satellite in the European Union’s (EU’s) 
Galileo satellite navigation program was 
launched in 2005 rivaling the United States 
Global Positioning System (GPS). The Galileo 
project is a $4 billion U.S. dollar enterprise 
whereupon Europe hopes to end its reliance on 
the GPS system. Apart from demonstrating 
Europe’s technological prowess, Galileo’s 
launch also signaled European desire to 
enhance its own space capabilities, rather than 
depend on the United States. Not surprisingly, 
the United States military had been extremely 
critical of Galileo, calling it unnecessary and a 
potential security threat during wartime as its 
signals might interfere with next-generation 
GPS signals intended for use by the United 
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States military. Though this dispute was later 
resolved when the EU and the United States 
agreed to make Galileo compatible with GPS, 
it underlined the unease with which the United 
States views any attempt to challenge its 
supremacy in space. 
 
American plans to militarize space have come 
into sharp relief in recent years. In 2004, the 
United States Air Force issued a Counter 
Space Operations document that discussed 
both defensive and offensive counter space 
operations.21 Prior to this, in the 1996 Clinton 
Administration’s National Space Policy for 
example, a more pacific use of space was 
emphasized, including satellite support for 
military operations, arms control, and non-
proliferation pacts. Regardless, space 
capabilities provide vital support to American 
power projection. The United States military 
has invested enormous sums in the research, 
development, and procurement of satellites for 
intelligence-gathering, communications, and 
navigation, and that investment is widely 
regarded to great benefits for U.S. 
warfighting. 
 
The unilateral withdrawal of the United States 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
in 2002 and its pursuit of an open-ended 
ballistic missile defense program already point 
towards future U.S. plans to address the 
challenges of space as a new battlefield. In 
fact, a commission headed by the former U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had 
recommended in 2001 that the military should 
“ensure that the President will have the option 
to deploy weapons in space.”22 It is towards 
this end that the Pentagon launched the XSS-
 
                                                
21Counter Space Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 
2-2.1, 2 August 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ 
service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
22The report of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the 
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/toc.htm 
(accessed April 2010). 
11 orbital micro-satellite, which is designed to 
disturb other states’ military reconnaissance 
and communication satellites. 
 
Despite financial, technological, and 
diplomatic hurdles, U.S. efforts to gain space 
superiority will continue, and the rest of the 
world will have to find ways and means to 
respond to this challenge. It is in this broader 
global context that India, as a major space 
power, is trying to re-define its priorities in 
space. 
 
Since inception of its space program, India has 
been supported by the United States, erstwhile 
Russia and the European countries, in various 
areas, from providing launching facilities, to 
helping with technology transfer, and to 
sending astronauts to space. At the same time, 
the United States imposed sanctions on the 
Indian space program from 1987 to 2004 
because of subsequent change in U.S. policies 
due to India’s nuclear and missile posture.23 
 
Since 2004, the Indian space program is 
receiving support from all major space 
powers. The United States is likely to play the 
 
23The United States and India began space cooperation in the 
1960s with sounding rockets, which expanded to transfer of 
technology for launch vehicle development and sharing of 
satellite data. However, concerns about the global 
proliferation of ballistic missiles led the United States to 
establish the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 
1987 to coordinate national export licensing measures on 
missiles and related technology, including technology for 
space launch vehicles that might contribute to the 
development of military systems. MTCR targeted emerging 
missile programs, including those of India, and led to 
restrictions on U.S. technology transfers to India’s space 
launch vehicle programs. In 1992, U.S.-India space relations 
further deteriorated when the United States objected to an 
agreement between the Russia and India for the sale to India 
of cryogenic rocket engines and the technology to produce 
them. In 1998, the Indian nuclear tests led the Clinton 
Administration to impose sanctions, restrictive export 
licensing requirements, on ISRO and other Indian entities 
involved in space and missile programs. Since January 2004, 
U.S.-India space cooperation was re-established to facilitate 
greater commercial space cooperation, and cooperation in 
space exploration and the launching of satellites. 
Space and Defense, Summer 2010 55 
 
policy of using India to balance China in the 
region, and India is likely to exploit the 
situation.24 Already, India has collaborated 
with the United States for its first Moon 
mission, and the Manmohan Singh-Bush joint 
statement agreement of 18 July 2005 indicates 
that in the arena of space India-U.S. 
collaborations are likely to strengthen.25 
 
India’s has worked and is working with 
various members of ESA on a host of space 
issues. India is also engaging Russia on 
various space ventures, and the joint 
collaboration reached by both states on 
Chandrayaan-2 is a case in point. India is not 
collaborating with China in space; however, 
China has given certain encouraging signals to 
India towards collaboration. Wu Ji, identified 
as Director of the Center for Space Science 
and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, mentioned the possibility of space 
cooperation during his visit to India in 2006, 
while accompanying Chinese President Hu 
Jintao.26 Today, both states understand that 
collaboration could allow them to take 
advantage of existing capacity on both sides. 
Given the rivalry that animates Sino-Indian 
ties, and absent any near-term cooperation, 
India intends to match Chinese advances in 
space. 
 
                                                 
24On the changing regional balance of power in the Asia-
Pacific, see Harsh V. Pant, “The Emerging Balance of Power 
in the Asia-Pacific,” The Royal United Services Institute 
Journal 152:3 (June 2007). 
25See Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18 July 2005, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2005/07/20050718-6.html (accessed April 2010). For high-
technology and space, it was declared that the two countries 
will: provide for joint research and training; build closer ties 
in space exploration, satellite navigation, and launch, and in 
the commercial space arena through mechanisms, such as the 
United States-India Working Group on Civil Space 
Cooperation; and build on the strengthened nonproliferation 
commitments between the two states to remove Indian 
organizations from export control restrictions. 
26Bruce Einhorn, “Chindia - Cooperation in the Space Race?” 
Business Week, 21 November 2006. 
Domestic Factors 
 
ISRO has not faced problems in securing 
resources, and has tended to receive steady 
governmental support. This is one area where 
a “bottom-up” approach has been found in 
regard to the growth of the space program. It 
is ISRO that normally decides what projects to 
undertake and how to proceed. The 
government has so far been supportive of most 
of ISRO’s plans. The value of ISRO’s overall 
assets today is approximately $25 billion U.S. 
dollars.27 ISRO spends 85 percent of its $1 
billion U.S. dollar annual budget on 
development-related missions, and the 
remaining 15 percent on advanced research 
and development (R&D), and on missions, 
such as Chandrayaan. Table 1 highlights the 
distribution of funds. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Funds for the Indian Space Program. 
Source: ISRO, http://www.isro.org (accessed April 2010). 
Rupees in Crores [one Indian Rupee in Crores equals 











Technology 1668.37 2017.00 2611.52
Space 
Applications 284.46 299.77 375.28
Space 
Sciences 228.36 321.60 268.37
INSAT, 
Operational 376.77 573.57 404.81
Administration 430.70 78.15 414.09
Total 2988.66 3290.09 4074.07
 
A major limitation, which India’s space 
program is likely to face, is the availability of 
a trained workforce. This becomes evident 
from the fact that many young scientists 
recruited by ISRO are leaving jobs because of 
the much higher remuneration offered by 
                                                 
27K. Kasturirangan, “The Emerging World Space Order” in 
Space Security and Global Cooperation, Ajey Lele and 
Gunjan Singh, eds. (Academic Foundation: New Delhi, India 
2009), p. 33. 
 
56 Harsh V. Pan and Ajey Lele/India in Space: Factors Shaping the Indian Trajectory  
 
 
                                                
private companies. ISRO is not able to attract 
the best people from the Indian universities, 
and in the year 2006, more than 50 percent of 
newly inducted scientists left ISRO.28 Also, a 
major part of the existing aging workforce is 
likely to retire in years to come. ISRO expects 
to address this shortfall by outsourcing 
research and undertaking major recruitment 
drives to replenish the workforce. In order to 
find a long-term solution to this problem, 
ISRO has established an institute at 
Thiruvanandapuram, India for workforce 
training. However, these efforts will not 
address workforce issues completely. This is 
mainly because many India students are 
attracted to Information Technology as a 
profession for more than a decade, and the 
trend is likely to continue. Rocket scientists 
have limited options of joining government 
jobs, which do not offer attractive pay salaries. 
 
Apart from human resources, ISRO is not 
expected to face any major resources 
problems, like non-availability of materials 
required for hardware production.29 Though at 
present, India is not capable of integrated 
circuitry manufacturing. Yet, it is expected 
that India will overcome this deficiency, 





Since independence, India’s science and 
technology policies have more or less 
remained unchanged irrespective of the 
political ideology of the government in power. 
It needs to be emphasized that actually it is not 
the political party, but the political leadership 
that plays a significant role towards giving 
 
                                                
28In 2006, ISRO hired 354 new scientists, but 187 trained 
ones left the organization by 2007. See “ISRO bleeds as 
scientists leave,” The Times of India, 6 September 2007, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/ISRO_bleeds_as_sci
entists_leave/articleshow/2341361.cms (accessed April 2010). 
29Personal correspondence with ISRO scientists. 
support to new technologies. The history of 
various political parties in power shows that 
the programs of national importance, which 
have security implications, do not get 
entangled in party politics. India’s nuclear test 
in 1998, Pokhran II, exemplifies this. 
 
For the Indian space program, scientists and 
ISRO officials have largely shaped the 
trajectory and have been able to muster the 
requisite support from the government. The 
benefits of India’s space program are well 
demonstrated, and in view of this, it is 
unlikely that any 
major changes would 
take place in policies 
and budgetary support 
depending on the 
political party in 
power. However, 
some degree of 
dependence on the 
United States still 
exists and is likely to 
exist, and as such, the 
emergence of political 
tensions between India and the United States 
would have an effect on the Indian space 
program.30 











Other political issues facing the national space 
program include bureaucratic and 
programmatic factors. Successes in the space 
sector tend to be short-lived, and at times, 
failures are more highlighted. ISRO’s recent 
failure in regard to its commercial venture, the 
W2M satellite, could have some negative 
impact on its international reputation when it 
was trying to develop a niche for itself in the 
communications satellite field. Any more 
failures could bring in the bureaucratic 
cautiousness in this area. 
 
30It has not been clearly articulated by ISRO for obvious 
reasons; however, personal correspondence with ISRO 
scientists second this concern. 
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India’s space program is placed directly under 
the Prime Minister, and thus, is relatively free 
of bureaucratic delays despite programmatic 
issues that may 
arise. A broad look 
at the development 
of science and 
technology within 
the country in 
general, and the 





Organisation (DRDO) and ISRO, during last 
decade shows that political, bureaucratic, and 
financial support for projects are not 
problems. 
 
This observation is further reinforced by the 
facts that the technocrat community within 
India has established itself, and ISRO is a 
success story, which has brought prestige and 
foreign exchange to the country. Also, given 
indigenous capabilities for satellite and launch 
vehicle development, ISRO is unlikely to 
acquire any large-scale technology from other 
states, and hence, bureaucratic constraints, 
which usually exist in regard to technology 





Within next 20 years, technologies, like 
biotechnology, nanotechnology, and robotics 
and cognitive technology, are expected to 
revolutionalize the space sector. These 
technologies are expected to bring light 
weight materials to the space sector, which 
will largely impact the structural design of 
satellites and components. In addition, 
computing capabilities will increase in years 
to come, and power sources will be carrying 
more capacity with reduced mass. 
These technological factors could be viewed 
at two levels: indigenous development and 
transfer of technology. After the success of the 
India-U.S. nuclear deal, it is unlikely that 
transfer of technology could become a major 
issue in years to come.31 Apart from the 
United States, India is expected to have good 
relations in space with states like France, 
United Kingdom, Israel, and Russia. Current 
trends indicate that India’s future programs 
could constitute various joint projects, either 
at bilateral or multilateral levels. Many 
spacefaring nations are likely to prefer joint 
projects in years to come because of the cost 
factor and gestation period required for 
indigenous development of technology. On 
the other hand, technologies, which could 
have direct or indirect military relevance, are 
not shared in cooperative programs and 






likely to face, is 
the availability 




Individual Level Factors 
 
Science and technology leadership in India is 
driven by various key individuals. Vasant 
Sathe played a key role during the 1980s to 
bring color television to India; Rajiv Gandhi 
was instrumental for the information 
technology revolution; and Sam Pitrotoda for 
the revolution in communications. More 
specific to space, Homi Bhaba, Vikaram 
                                                 
31The United States Congress, on 1 October 2008, gave final 
approval to an agreement facilitating nuclear cooperation 
between the United States and India. The deal is seen as a 
watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect 
to international nonproliferation efforts. First introduced in 
the joint statement released by President Bush and Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 18 July 2005, the deal 
lifts a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with 
India. It provides U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear 
energy program, and expands U.S.-India cooperation in 
energy and satellite technology. For details on US-India 
civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement, see Harsh V. 
Pant, “The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process and Great 
Power Politics,” Asian Security 5:3 (September 2009):273-
295. 
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Sahrabhai, APJ Abdul Kalam, K. 
Kasturirangan, and Madhavan Nair played key 
roles towards providing science and 
technology leadership. 
 
Bhaba is regarded as a visionary in the field of 
science in modern India. He did pioneering 
work towards peaceful development of atomic 
energy. Bhabha established the Atomic 
Energy Commission of India in 1948. His 






from being a 
scientist, he 
was an able 
administrator 
and played a 
significant role 
towards developing a world class automatic 
energy research center in India. Bhaba was 
succeeded in 1966 by Vikram Sarabhai as the 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Known as father of Indian space program, 
Sarabhai was the first Chairman of 
INCOSPAR, which was created after Sputnik 
was launched into the space in 1957. Sarabhai 
established the first launching site in the 
country, TERLS. 
 
India’s 11th President, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, 
who assumed office on 25 July 2002, is a 
scientist. Before assuming the office of the 
President, he had held various scientific 
positions, and is often referred to as the 
“Missile Man of India” – he was the Project 
Director of India’s first indigenous SLV. He 
has a unique distinction of working both on 
India’s missile program and on India’s 
satellite program. Kalam also spearheaded the 
campaign of motivating children and young 
scientists to involve themselves in undertaking 
various scientific challenges. In many ways, 
Kalam succeeded in motivating an entire 
generation to look constructively towards 
issues of science and technology. 
 
Kasturirangan, presently a Member of 
Parliament, steered India’s space program for 
over nine years as Chairman of ISRO. He led 
various space programs successfully, 
including PSLV and in conceiving India’s 
Moon mission. Kasturirangan largely 
succeeded in placing India as a preeminent 
spacefaring nation. His successor, who 
recently retired, Madhavan Nair, played a 
significant role in developing ISRO’s future 
roadmap with plans for deep space missions 
and proposals to put an Indian on the Moon 
within a decade’s time. 
...the Indian space 
program is civilian 
in nature, and India 
is yet to articulate a 
strategic approach. 
This will make it 
difficult to reconcile 
civilian and military 





India’s lunar mission is a statement of the 
nation becoming more ambitious in defining 
its priorities in space, and in the coming years, 
the civilian aspects of the Indian space 
program can be expected to gather further 
momentum. The military aspects will also get 
greater attention of the government, in light of 
competition among spacefaring nations. Also, 
greater cooperation in space will emerge with 
the United States, Europe, and Japan, though 
with respect to China, the relationship will 
remain inherently competitive. 
 
India’s efforts in space will continue to be 
hampered by an absence of a coherent national 
space policy. This is the case because the 
Indian space program is civilian in nature, and 
India is yet to articulate a strategic approach. 
This will make it difficult to reconcile civilian 
and military priorities in space. The current 
roadmap of ISRO demonstrates firm resolve 
to move in a particular direction, yet India is 
taking only tentative steps in so far as the 
military dimension of its space policy is 
concerned. 
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Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the “father of space 
travel” wrote in 1911: “Earth is the cradle of 
humanity, but humanity cannot stay in the 
cradle forever.” The world is on the threshold 
of a new age of space exploration, as well as 
militarization of space, and possible 
weaponization of space. India, with its 
achievements in its own space program, is in a 
unique position to be a major player in the 
drama of space. The trajectory of India’s 
space efforts demonstrate that India is getting 
ready to use its space capabilities for not just 
expanded civil and commercial use, but also 
for force multiplication and power projection. 
 

                                                 
“Astronaut Envy?” 
The U.S. Military’s Quest for a Human Mission in Space 
 
Roger D. Launius 
National Air and Space Museum 
 
Before the beginning of the space age in 1957, 
the Department of Defense (DOD) of the 
United States sought to gain the mission and 
the technologies to carry out human 
operations in space. Even after 1958, when 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower made the 
decision to assign the human spaceflight 
mission to the newly created National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), DOD champions continued to argue 
for a role for military astronauts. The military 
pursued several flight projects in the 1960s, 
achieved flight status for military astronauts 
on classified missions on the Space Shuttle in 
the 1980s, and has continued to advocate a 
human military mission in space as the 
twentieth century came to an end. All this 
happened despite an exceptionally weak 
rationale for military astronauts in space. 
While the DOD commitment to human 
spaceflight has moderated in the post-cold war 
era, there remains some who seek this activity 
as a military mission. This essay reviews the 
history of the military quest for human 
spaceflight, and suggests that a human 
military presence in space will come as other 
humans settle beyond Earth as has long been 
the case in terrestrial exploration and 
settlement. It points to the continuing 
difficulty of developing a rationale for human 
spaceflight, a difficulty that has come to a 
head in the early twenty-first century as the 
Space Shuttle is retired and plans for future 
vehicles remain unclear. 
 
When the administration of President Barak 
Obama took office in January 2009, American 
human spaceflight efforts were at a 
crossroads. In the aftermath of the Columbia 
accident on 1 February 2004, the Bush 
administration had taken the decision that the 
venerable Space Shuttle, flown since 1981, 
had grown unsafe and needed replacement. It 
set 2010 as the date of shuttle retirement and 
directed NASA to pursue a follow-on 
technology. This would help create 
technologies necessary to return to the Moon 
and eventually travel to Mars.1 
 
The result was the Constellation program 
established in 2005 as an effort to use 
modified Space Shuttle hardware to go 
beyond Earth orbit, with the Moon as a target. 
By 2009, however, it had become highly 
uncertain whether that goal could be realized. 
The new administration realized that the 
Constellation program had run into 
technological and budgetary problems and 
took action to end it in February 2010.2 
 
In this context, the way forward for NASA’s 
human spaceflight efforts remains unclear. 
Moreover, the American military’s periodic 
enchantment with human spaceflight vehicles 
 
1Frank Sietzen Jr. and Keith L. Cowing, New Moon Rising: 
The Making of the Bush Space Vision (Apogee Books, 2004); 
Craig Cornelius, “Science in the National Vision for Space 
Exploration: Objectives and Constituencies of the ‘Discovery-
Driven’ Paradigm,” Space Policy 21 (February 2005): 41-48; 
Wendell Mendell, “The Vision for Human Spaceflight,” 
Space Policy 21 (February 2005): 7-10; and Thor Hogan, 
Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration 
Initiative (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2007-4410, 2007). 
2Office of Science and Technology Policy/National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Fact Sheet, “A Bold 
New Approach for Space Exploration and Discovery,” 1 
February 2010, copy in possession of author. 
62 Roger D. Launius/“Astronaut Envy?” The U.S. Military's Quest for a Human Mission in Space 
 
remains unsettled. The Air Force has proposed 
in the past that it pursue its own human 
spacecraft; and some on the fringe believe that 
it already has a capability that is unknown to 
the general public.3 How has the United States 
military viewed the human spaceflight mission 
since the origins of the space and its role in it? 
Has this changed over time and why? What 
possibilities for the future might exist for a 
human military presence in space? 
 
 
Origins of the Military 
Human Spaceflight Effort 
 
Well before the beginning of the space age, 
the DOD had angled for the mission of 
placing humans in space for tasks ranging 
from space-based reconnaissance, to 
navigation, to communications, and to early 
warning. Over time, especially as it has 
become increasingly obvious that the national 
security mission is effectively conducted by 
robotic spacecraft, it has come to be called, 
rather crassly, “astronaut envy.” Thus, in the 
early 1950s, Wernher von Braun, working for 
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in 
Huntsville, Alabama, proposed a massive 
space station with more than fifty military 
personnel aboard to undertake Earth 
observation for reconnaissance and as an 
orbiting battle station. Von Braun believed 
this could be used for nuclear missile strikes 
against the Soviet Union.4 He could not get 
                                                 
 
                                                3William B. Scott, “Two-Stage-to-Orbit ‘Blackstar’ System 
Shelved at Groom Lake?” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 5 March 2006, http://www.aviationweek.com/ 
aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/030606
p1.xml (accessed 19 February 2010).4Wernher von Braun, 
“Crossing the Last Frontier,” Collier’s, 22 March 1952, pp. 
24–29, 72–74; and Michael J. Neufeld, “Space Superiority: 
Wernher von Braun’s Campaign for a Nuclear-Armed Space 
Station, 1946–1956,” Space Policy 22 (February 2006): 52-
62. 
4Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Frontier,” Collier’s, 
22 March 1952, pp. 24–29, 72–74; and Michael J. Neufeld, 
“Space Superiority: Wernher von Braun’s Campaign for a 
anyone in authority in the Eisenhower 
administration to adopt his plan, though some 
senior officials in the DOD did see a role for 
military astronauts. 
 
After a series of studies and high level 
deliberations, in 1957 the United States Air 
Force (USAF) proposed the development of a 
piloted orbital proposal designated “Man-in-
Space Soonest” (MISS).5 Initially dismissed 
before the launch of Sputnik, afterwards Air 
Force leaders invited Edward Teller and other 
leading members of the 
scientific/technological elite to reconsider the 
issue of human spaceflight as a national 
security objective. Teller’s group concluded 
that the Air Force could place a human in orbit 
within two years, and urged the department 
pursue this goal. Teller understood, however, 
that there was essentially no military reason 
for undertaking this mission and chose not to 
tie his recommendation to any specific 
rationale, instead falling back on a belief that 
the first nation to do so would accrue national 
prestige and advance, in a general manner, 
science and technology.6 
 
Early in 1958, Lieutenant General Donald L. 
Putt, the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Development, informed Director of the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
(NACA), Hugh L. Dryden, that the Air Force 
intended to pursue “a research vehicle 
program having as its objective the earliest 
possible manned orbital flight, which will 
 
 
Nuclear-Armed Space Station, 1946–1956,” Space Policy 22 
(February 2006): 52-62. 
5The Man-in-Space-Soonest program called for a four-phase 
capsule orbital process, which would first use instruments, to 
be followed by primates, then a pilot, with the final objective 
of landing humans on the Moon. See David N. Spires, Beyond 
Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership (Air 
Force Space Command, 1997), p. 75. 
6Loyd S. Swenson, James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. 
Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-5201, 1966), pp.73–74. 
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contribute substantially and essentially to 
follow-on scientific and military space 
systems.” Putt asked Dryden to collaborate in 
this effort, but with the NACA as a decidedly 
junior partner.7 Even though Dryden agreed, 
by the end of the summer of 1958, Putt found 
the newly created NASA leading the human 
spaceflight effort for the United States, with 
the Air Force being the junior partner.8 
 
Throughout the first part of 1958, Air Force 
officials pressed for leadership of MISS. As 
the most experienced in developing space 
technology, the Air Force expected to lead any 
space program for the United States. 
Specifically, it believed hypersonic space 
planes and lunar bases would serve national 
security needs. To help make this a reality, the 
Air Force requested $133 million for the MISS 
program and secured approval by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.9 However, a series of 
disagreements between Air Force and NACA 
officials disturbed the picture. These 
difficulties reverberated all the way to the 
Office of the President, prompting a review of 
the roles of the two organizations.10 Hugh 
                                                 
 
                                                
7Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Development, to Hugh L. Dryden, NACA Director, 31 
January 1958, Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, 
Washington, DC. 
8NACA to USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, 
“Transmittal of Copies of Proposed Memorandum of 
Understanding between Air Force and NACA for joint 
NACA-Air Force Project for a Recoverable Manned Satellite 
Test Vehicle,” 11 April 1958, Folder #18674, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection. 
9The breakdown for this budget was aircraft and missiles—
$32M, support—$11.5M, construction—$2.5M, and R&D—
$87M. See Memorandum for ARPA Director, “Air Force 
Man-in-Space Program,” 19 March 1958, Folder #18674, 
NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
10Maurice H. Stans, Director, Bureau of the Budget, 
Memorandum for the President, “Responsibility for “Space” 
Programs,” 10 May 1958; Maxime A. Faget, NACA, 
Memorandum for Dr. Dryden, 5 June 1958; Clotaire Wood, 
Headquarters, NACA, Memorandum for files, “Tableing [sic] 
of Proposed Memorandum of Understanding Between Air 
Force and NACA For a Joint Project For a Recoverable 
Manned Satellite Test Vehicle,” 20 May 1958, with attached 
Memorandum, “Principles for the Conduct by the NACA and 
Dryden complained in July 1958 to the 
President’s Science Advisor, James R. Killian, 
about the lack of clarity on the part of the Air 
Force. He asserted: 
The current objective for a manned 
satellite program is the determination 
of man’s basic capability in a space 
environment as a prelude to the 
human exploration of space and to 
possible military applications of 
manned satellites. Although it is clear 
that both the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and the 
Department of Defense should 
cooperate in the conduct of the 
program, I feel that the responsibility 
for and the direction of the program 
should rest with NASA. 
 
He urged that the president state a clear 
division of responsibility between the two 
organizations on the human spaceflight 
mission.11 
 
As David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant 
have pointed out, the MISS program became 
derailed within the DOD because of funding 
concerns: 
Throughout the spring and summer of 
1958 the Air Force’s Air Research 
and Development Command had 
mounted an aggressive campaign to 
have ARPA [Advanced Research 
Projects Agency] convince 
administration officials to approve its 
Man-in-Space-Soonest development 
plan. But ARPA balked at the high 
cost, technical challenges, and 
uncertainties surrounding the future 
 
 
the Air Force of a Joint Project for a Recoverable Manned 
Satellite Vehicle,” 29 April 1958; and Donald A. Quarles, 
Secretary of Defense, to Maurice H. Stans, Director, Bureau 
of the Budget, 1 April 1958, Folder #18674. All in NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, 
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
11Hugh L. Dryden, Director, NACA, Memorandum for James 
R. Killian Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science 
and Technology, “Manned Satellite Program,” 19 July 1958; 
Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference Collection. 
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direction of the civilian space 
agency.12 
 
By the summer of 1958, political leaders in 
Washington viewed the human spaceflight 
mission more useful as an international 
prestige program than as a national security 
initiative. 
 
By the time that Dwight D. Eisenhower signed 
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 
1958 into law, he had decided to split the 
human space mission from military 
leadership, and he 
formally assigned 




MISS program was 
folded into what 
became Project 
Mercury. In early 
November 1958, 
the DOD acceded 
to the president’s 
desire that the 
human spaceflight 
program be a 
civilian effort under 
the management of 
NASA. For its part, 
NASA invited Air 
Force officials to 
appoint liaison 
personnel to the Mercury program office at 
Langley Research Center in Hampton, 
Virginia, and they did so.13 
                                                 
 
                                                
12David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, “…to the very 
limit of our ability…: Reflections on Forty Years of Civil-
Military Partnership in Space Launch,” in Roger D. Launius 
and Dennis R. Jenkins, eds., To Reach the High Frontier: A 
History of U.S Launch Vehicles (University Press of 
Kentucky, 2002), p. 475. 
13Memorandum for Dr. Silverstein, “Assignment of 
Responsibility for ABMA Participation in NASA Manned 
Satellite Project,” 12 November 1958; Abe Silverstein to Lt. 
The decision to make human spaceflight the 
sole responsibility of NASA, a very public 
non-military organization, proved prescient. It 
might even be considered a brilliant 
geopolitical decision, possible because of 
civilian leadership of the military, a 
foundational pillar of the American military. 
Eisenhower helped cement that pillar by this 
and other decisions helping to inexorably 
weave it into the military culture. 
 
By de-coupling it from the DOD, the president 
exponentially reduced the confrontational 
aspect of the space race in its most dramatic 
element. With NASA officially charged with 
the peaceful exploration of space, and with 
human spaceflight as a core element of that 
mission, a space race could exist without fear 
of national survival. Numerous international 
agreements stated this fundamental truth from 
the decisions of the United Nations (UN) in 
the latter 1950s to the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space in 1967.14 
The… objective 





capability in a 
space 
environment as 
a prelude to the 
human 
exploration of 






Regardless of who was to manage the human 
spaceflight program, American officials 
recognized that time was of the essence in 
undertaking the human space missions. The 
compelling nature of this aspect of the space 
race pushed NASA to pursue the Mercury 
orbital program. Roy Johnson, director of 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 
 
 
Gen. Roscoe C. Wilson, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Development, 20 November 1958; and Hugh, L. Dryden, 
Deputy Administrator, NASA, Memorandum for Dr. Eugene 
Emme for NASA Historical Files, “The “signed” Agreement 
of 11 April 1958, on a Recoverable Manned Satellite Test 
Vehicle,” 8 September 1965, Folder #18674. All in NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, 
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
14United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), 
adopted on 20 December 1961; Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, 27 January 
1967. 
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for the DOD, noted in September 1958 that 
competition with the Soviet Union precluded 
taking a cautious approach to human 
spaceflight and advocated additional funding 
to ensure its timely completion. As he wrote to 
the Secretary of Defense and the NASA 
Administrator: 
I am troubled, however, with respect 
to one of the projects in which there 
is general agreement that it should be 
a joint undertaking. This is the so-
called “Man-in-Space” project for 
which $10 million has been allocated 
to ARPA and $30 million to NASA. 
My concern over this project is due 
(1) to a firm conviction, backed by 
intelligence briefings, that the Soviets 
next spectacular effort in space will 
be to orbit a human, and (2) that the 
amount of $40 million for FY 1959 is 
woefully inadequate to compete with 
the Russian program. As you know 
our best estimates (based on some 12-
15 plans) were $100 to $150 million 
for an optimum FY 1959 program. 
 
I am convinced that the military and 
psychological impact on the United 
States and its Allies of a successful 
Soviet man-in-space “first” program 
would be far reaching and of great 
consequence. 
 
Because of this deep conviction, I feel 
that no time should be lost in 
launching an aggressive Man-in-
Space program and that we should be 
prepared if the situation warrants, to 
request supplemental appropriations 
of the Congress in January to pursue 
the program with the utmost 
urgency.15 
 
Johnson agreed to transfer a series of space 
projects from ARPA to NASA, establishing 
protocols for cooperating in the development 
                                                 
                                                
15Roy W. Johnson, Director, ARPA, DOD, Memorandum for 
the Administrator, NASA, “Man-in-Space Program,” 3 
September 1958, Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, 
Washington, D.C. 
of equipment that would be used in the human 
spaceflight program.16 
 
To aid in the conduct of this program, ARPA 
and NASA created a committee, the Joint 
Manned Satellite Panel, on 18 September 
1958. Holding its first meeting on 24 
September, this panel established goals and 
strategy. Chaired by NASA’s Robert Gilruth, 
but also including such key figures as Max 
Faget and George Low, the panel focused on a 
wide range of technical requirements. Under 
this panel’s auspices final specifications for 
the piloted capsule emerged in October 1958, 
as did procurement of both a modified 
Redstone, for suborbital flights, and Atlas 
boosters for orbital missions.17  
 
Through this process, NASA gained a firm 
grasp of what soon became known as the 
Mercury program. Between the creation of 
NASA in 1958 and 1963, a little less than five 
years, this first human space program was 
completed at a cost of $384 million. This may 
have been the best bargain ever in human 
spaceflight, in no small measure because its 
goals were uncomplicated. Although lagging 
behind the original schedule, NASA’s Mercury 
program succeeded in proving the possibility of 
safe human spaceflight and in demonstrating 
 
16Roy W. Johnson, Director, ARPA, DOD, Memorandum for 
the Administrator, NASA, “Man-in-Space Program, 19 
September 1958, with attached Memorandum of 
Understanding, “Principles for the Conduct by NASA and 
ARPA of a Joint Program for a Manned Orbital Vehicle,” 19 
September 1958, Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, 
Washington, D.C. 
17Minutes of Meetings, Panel for Manned Space Flight, 24, 30 
September, 1 October 1958; NASA, “Preliminary 
Specifications for Manned Satellite Capsule,” October 1958; 
and Paul E. Purser, Aeronautical Research Engineer, NASA, 
to Mr. R. R. Gilruth, NASA, “Procurement of Ballistic 
Missiles for use as Boosters in NASA Research Leading to 
Manned Space Flight,” 8 October 1958, with attached, “Letter 
of Intent to AOMC (ABMA), Draft of Technical Content,” 8 
October 1958, Folder #18674. All in NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA 
Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
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U.S. technological competence during its Cold 
War rivalry with the Soviet Union.  
 
At the conclusion of the Mercury effort, Walter 
C. Williams noted that “in the period of about 
45 months of activity, some 25 flights were 
made...” He then commented on what the 
United States learned in completing Mercury: 
I think we learned… about spacecraft 
technology and how a spacecraft 
should be built, what its systems 
should be, how they should perform, 
where the critical redundancies are 
required. I think we learned 
something about man-rating boosters, 
how to take a weapons system 
development and turn it into a 
manned transportation system. I 
think… we found primarily… that 
this was a matter of providing a 
malfunction detection system or an 
abort system, and, also, we found 
very careful attention to detail as far 
as quality control was concerned. I 
think that some of the less obvious 
things we learned – we learned how 
to plan these missions and this takes a 
lot of detail work, because it’s not 
only planning how it goes, but how it 
doesn’t go, and the abort cases and 
the emergency cases always took a lot 
more effort than the planned 
missions... We learned what is 
important in training crews for 
missions of this type. When the crew-
training program was laid down, the 
program had to cover the entire 
gamut because we weren’t quite sure 
exactly what these people needed to 
carry out the missions. I think we 
have a much better focus on this now. 
We learned how to control these 
flights in real time. This was a new 
concept on a worldwide basis. I think 
we learned, and when I say we, I’m 
talking of this as a National asset, not 
NASA alone, we learned how to 
operate the world network in real 
time and keep it up. And I think we 
learned a lot in how to manage 
development programs of this kind 
and to manage operations of this 
kind.18 
 
Christopher C. Kraft, senior flight controller, 
agreed: Mercury “changed quite a few 
concepts about space, added greatly to our 
knowledge of the universe around us, and 
demonstrated that Man has a proper role in 
exploring it. There are many unknowns that 
lie ahead, but we are reassured because we are 
confident in overcoming them by using Man’s 
capabilities to the fullest.”19 
 
 
The Military’s Continued Interest 
in Human Spaceflight 
 
The DOD, while certainly an important 
supporting organization in Mercury, remained 
committed to achieving an independent human 
spaceflight capability. “If we concede that 
man can go into space for peaceful missions,” 
stated a USAF white paper in 1961, “we must 
admit that man can go into this same 
environment for military purposes. It is the 
Air Force view that many will be required to 
go into space to perform tasks that will be 
important to our national security.”20 From 
this position flowed a series of decisions 
aimed at creating what the DOD called the 
Manned Military Space Program (MMSP). 
Several immediate programs resulted and the 
Air Force noted: “Fully coordinated, 
cooperative and where appropriate, joint effort 
between the Air Force and the NASA is 
required in order that the content and 
objectives of the MMSP are properly defined 
                                                 
18Walter C. Williams, Deputy Director, NASA Manned 
Spacecraft Center, “Project Review,” 3 October 1963, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection. 
19Christopher C. Kraft, “A Review of Knowledge Acquired 
from the First Manned Satellite Program,” NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA 
Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
20United States Air Force, “White Paper on the Air Force 
Manned Military Space Program,” Military Records Center, 
National Archives and Records Administration. 
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within the framework of the total national 
space program.”21 
                                                
 
Accordingly, several programs were aimed 
towards realizing a human military space 
program. The first was a cooperative program 
with NASA to fly the X-15 research aircraft. 
Several flights reached above 50 nautical 
miles in altitude (about 93 kilometers), the 
USAF recognized point at which space began. 
The highest military flight was by pilot Robert 
White at 314,750 feet (59 miles or 96 
kilometers). The Air Force awarded four of its 
pilots in the program—William Knight, 
Michael Adams, Joe Engle, and Robert 
Rushworth—astronaut wings. This upset 
NASA officials, and for 40 years, NASA did 
not recognize any of its X-15 pilots as 
astronauts, although NASA pilot Joe Walker 
had exceeded 62 miles (the official definition 
of where space begins at 100 kilometers). In 
2005, NASA recognized all the NASA pilots 
– Walker, John McKay, Bill Dana – who had 
exceeded the 50 mile altitude as astronauts, 
and the USAF had always recognized theirs.22 
 
In addition, USAF pursued the X-20 Dyna-
Soar, a military space plane to be launched 
atop a newly developed space launch vehicle. 
The Air Force believed that the X-20 would 
provide long range bombardment and 
reconnaissance capability by flying at the edge 
of space and skipping off the Earth’s 
atmosphere to reach targets anywhere in the 
world. Begun on 15 October 1957, although 
the program may be traced directly to the 
Bomi (skip-glide space bomber project) and 
Robo glider (manned hypersonic bomber) 
programs of the early 1950s; the Air Force 
intended to use the Titan IIIC to launch its 
                                                 
21Ibid. 
22Dennis R. Jenkins, Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: A 
Concise History of the X-15 Research Airplane (Monographs 
in Aerospace History, NASA SP-2000-4518, 2000), pp. 61, 
67, 117. 
space plane.23 This winged, recoverable 
spacecraft did not possess as large a payload 
as NASA’s capsule-type spacecraft and was 
always troubled by the absence of a clearly 
defined military mission. Several problems 
were apparent. First, the difficulty of defining 
the military mission separate from that of 
NASA proved a challenge. At some level, 
there were many possibilities and it was 
difficult to separate them from those of 
NASA. Second, the technical capabilities of 
Dyna-soar made determining on a specific 
mission out of the many envisioned very 
difficult. 
 
Accordingly, in September 1961 Defense 
Secretary Robert S. McNamara questioned 
whether Dyna-Soar represented the best 
expenditure of funds. This resulted in 
numerous studies 
of the program, but 
in 1963 McNamara 
cancelled the 
program in favor 





This military space station, known as Gemini-
B, would be launched into orbit aboard a Titan 
IIIM vehicle that used seven-segment solids 
and was human-rated that went by the name of 
Blue Gemini. As an example of the 
seriousness with which the Air Force pursued 
the MOL program, the third Titan IIIC test 
flight boosted a prototype aerodynamic 
mockup of the MOL laboratory into orbit. It 
was as close as MOL would come to reality. 
The new military space station plan ran into 





not on its merits, 
but on the image 
it projected. 
 
23As the weight and complexity of Dyna-Soar grew, it quickly 
surpassed the capabilities of the Titan II and was switched to 
the Titan III. Just before the program was canceled it looked 
like weight growth had outclassed even the Titan IIIC and 
plans were being made to use Saturn IBs or other boosters. 
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in June 1969 the Secretary of Defense, Melvin 
R. Laird, informed Congress that MOL would 
be canceled.24 
 
Military space policy analyst Paul Stares 
summarized the fallout from the loss of the X-
20 and MOL programs upon the Air Force 
during the 1960s: 
With the cancellation of the Dyna-
soar and MOL, many believed in the 
Air Force that they had made their 
“pitch” and failed. This in turn 
reduced the incentives to try again 
and reinforced the bias towards the 
traditional mission of the Air Force, 
namely flying. As a result, the Air 
Force’s space activities remained a 
poor relation to tactical and strategic 
airpower in its organizational 
hierarchy and inevitably in its 
funding priorities. This undoubtedly 
influenced the Air Force’s negative 
attitude towards the various ASAT 
modernization proposals put forward 
by Air Defense Command and others 
in the early 1970s. The provision of 
satellite survivability measures also 
suffered because the Air Force was 
reluctant to propose initiatives that 
would require the use of its own 
budget to defend the space assets of 
other services and agencies.25 
 
                                                 
                                                
24Roy F. Houchin III, “Air Force-Office of the Secretary of 
Defense Rivalry: The Pressure of Political Affairs in the Dyna-
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20 Program,” Quest: The Magazine of Spaceflight 3 (Winter 
1994): 5-11; Terry Smith, “The Dyna-Soar X-20: A Historical 
Overview,” Quest: The Magazine of Spaceflight 3 (Winter 
1994): 13-18; Roy F. Houchin III, “Interagency Rivalry: 
NASA, the Air Force, and MOL,” Quest: The Magazine of 
Spaceflight 4 (Winter 1995): 40-45; Donald Pealer, “Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), Part 1,” Quest: The Magazine of 
Spaceflight 4 (Fall 1995): 4-17; Donald Pealer, “Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), Part 2,” Quest: The Magazine of 
Spaceflight 4 (Winter 1995): 28-37; and Donald Pealer, 
“Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), Part 3,” Quest: The 
Magazine of Spaceflight 5, No. 2 (1996): 16-23. 
25Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-
1984 (Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 242. 
Even so, the next major effort involved 
persuading NASA to alter its Space Shuttle 
concept and to include a military mission in its 
planning scenarios in the 1970s.26 
 
 
The Department of Defense 
and NASA’s Space Shuttle 
 
After Apollo, the human element of the 
United States civil space program went into a 
holding pattern as nearly a decade passed. 
During that time, the space program moved 
from its earlier heroic age to one that may be 
characterized as a “routinization” of activities, 
perspectives, and processes; it was an 
institutionalizing of critical elements from a 
remarkably fertile heroic time into something 
much more mundane not at all unlike that 
analyzed by longshoreman philosopher Eric 
Hoffer in The True Believer.27 
 
During the 1970s, the Space Shuttle became 
the “sine qua non” of NASA, intended as it 
was to make spaceflight routine, safe, and 
relatively inexpensive. Although NASA 
considered a variety of configurations, some 
quite exotic, it settled on a stage-and-one-half 
partially reusable vehicle with an approved 
development price of $5.15 billion. On 5 
January 1972, President Nixon announced the 
decision to build a Space Shuttle. He did so 
for both political reasons and for national 
prestige purposes. Politically, it would help a 
lagging aerospace industry in key states he 
wanted to carry in the next election, especially 
 
26Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation to Struggle: The History of 
Civilian-Military Relations in Space,” in John M. Logsdon, 
gen. ed., Exploring the Uniontown: Selected Documents in the 
History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II, External 
Relationships (NASA SP-4407, 1996), pp. 233-70. 
27Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of 
Mass Movements (Harper & Row, 1951), pp. 3-23, 137-55. 
See also, Max Weber, “The Pure Types of Legitimate 
Authority,” in Max Weber on Charisma and Institution 
Building: Selected Papers, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), p. 46. 
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in California, Texas, and Florida.28 Supporters 
– especially Caspar W. Weinberger, who later 
became Reagan’s defense secretary – argued 
that building the shuttle would reaffirm 
America’s superpower status and help restore 
confidence, at home and abroad, in America’s 
technological genius and will to succeed. 
 
This was purely an issue of national prestige. 
As Weinberger wrote in August 1971, not 
approving the shuttle “would be confirming in 
some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining 
credence at home and abroad: that our best 
years are behind us, that we are turning 
inward, reducing our defense commitments, 
and voluntarily starting to give up our 
superpower status, and our desire to maintain 
world superiority.” Weinberger appealed 
directly to the prestige argument by 
concluding, “America should be able to afford 
something besides increased welfare, 
programs to repair our cities, or Appalachian 
relief and the like.” In a handwritten scrawl on 
Weinberger’s memo, Richard Nixon indicated 
“I agree with Cap.”29 
 
The prestige factor belies a critical 
component. United States leaders supported 
the Space Shuttle not on its merits, but on the 
image it projected. That included NASA, 
                                                 
                                                
28George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, 
Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting with the President on 
January 5, 1972,” 12 January 1972, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA 
Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The John Erlichman 
interview by John M. Logsdon, 6 May 1983, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, emphasizes the political 
nature of the decision. This aspect of the issue was also 
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Kizis, 19 April 1971, both in Record Group 51, Series 69.1, 
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29Caspar W. Weinberger, Memorandum for the President, via 
George Shultz, “Future of NASA,” 12 August 1971, White 
House, Richard M. Nixon, President, 1968-1971, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, 
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
whose leaders viewed it central to the 
agency’s long-term welfare, but also some key 
figures in the DOD who recognized the Space 
Shuttle as a means of finally reaching the goal 
of military personnel going into space for 
military purposes. That military mission, as it 
came to coalesce around the new Space 
Shuttle in the 1970s, took as its raison d’être 
the deployment of reconnaissance and other 
national security payloads into low-Earth orbit 
(LEO). As such, the DOD and the intelligence 
community insisted that the shuttle’s orbiter 
be designed so that it had a cross-range 
maneuvering capability to meet requirements 
for lift-off and landing at the same location 
after only one orbit. This would enable great 
flexibility in deploying those space assets into 
orbit, while masking their trajectories from the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, the payload bay of 
the Space Shuttle, so often viewed as 
excessive for most mission requirements, 
needed its 15 (4.6 meters) x 60 (18.3 meters) 
feet dimensions to satisfy DOD and 
intelligence community planners that it would 
accommodate national security payloads. 
Without those design modifications to support 
the military space program, the DOD would 
have probably withheld monetary and political 
support from the project. In essence, NASA 
embraced a military mission for the Space 
Shuttle program as a means of building a 
coalition in support of an approval that might 
not have been approved otherwise. In return, 
military astronauts would fly on classified 
missions in LEO. Most of those missions were 
for the purpose of deploying reconnaissance 
satellites but what else might have been 




30Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation to Struggle: The History of 
Civilian-Military Relations in Space,” in John M. Logsdon, 
gen. ed., Exploring the Uniontown: Selected Documents in the 
History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II, External 
Relationships (NASA SP-4407, 1996), p. 264; Alfred C. 
Draper, Melvin L. Buck, and William H. Goesch, “A Delta 
Shuttle Orbiter,” Astronautics & Aeronautics 9 (January 1971): 
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It might be easy to underestimate the national 
security implications of the Space Shuttle 
decision and the desire of some in the DOD to 
gain a military astronaut foothold that 
facilitated it. But, this goal seems to be critical 
to DOD support. 
Caspar Weinberger 
was the key to the 
movement of the 
Space Shuttle 
through the White 
House, and he 
believed the shuttle 
had obvious military 
uses and profound 
implications for 
national security. “I 
thought we could get 
substantial return” 
with the program, he 
said in a 1977 
interview, “both 
from the point of view of national defense, 
and from the point of view [of] scientific 
advancement which would have a direct 
beneficial effect.”31 He and others also 
impressed on the president the shuttle’s 
potential for military missions. John 
Erlichman, Nixon’s senior advisor for 
domestic affairs, even thought it might be 
useful to capture enemy satellites, a mission 
that would require military astronauts in effect 
“lassoing” those satellites during extra-
vehicular activities (EVAs) and bringing them 
into the shuttle payload bay for return to 
                                                 
 
                                                
26-35; Charles W. Mathews, “The Space Shuttle and its Uses,” 
Aeronautical Journal 76 (January 1972): 19-25; John M. 
Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure,” 
Science 232 (30 May 1986): 1099-1105; Scott Pace, 
“Engineering Design and Political Choice: The Space Shuttle, 
1969-1972,” M.S. Thesis, MIT, May 1982; and Harry A. Scott, 
“Space Shuttle: A Case Study in Design,” Astronautics & 
Aeronautics 17 (June 1979): 54-58; 
31Caspar W. Weinberger interview by John M. Logsdon, 23 
August 1977, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA 
History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
Earth.32 The Soviet Union, which built the 
Buran in the 1980s and flew it without a crew 
only one time, pursued a shuttle project as a 
counterbalance to the United States program 
solely because they were convinced that the 
United States shuttle was developed for 
military purposes. As Russian space watcher 
James Oberg concluded: “They had actually 
studied the shuttle plans and figured it was 
designed for an out-of-plane bombing run 
over high-value Soviet targets. Brezhnev 
believed that and in 1976 ordered $10 billion 
of expenditures. They had the Buran flying 
within ten years and discovered they couldn’t 
do anything with it.”33 




as a means of 
finally reaching 








After a decade of development, on 12 April 
1981, the Space Shuttle Columbia took-off for 
the first orbital test mission. It was successful 
and after only the fourth flight in 1982, 
President Ronald Reagan declared the system 
“operational.” In keeping with plans 
developed in the Carter administration of the 
latter 1970s, the Space Shuttle would 
thereafter carry all U.S. government payloads; 
military, scientific, and even commercial 
satellites could all be deployed from its 
payload bay.34 To prepare for this, in 1979, 
Air Force Secretary Hans Mark created the 
Manned Spaceflight Engineer program to 
“Develop expertise in manned space flight and 
apply it to Department of Defense space 
 
32Jacob E. Smart, NASA Assistant Administrator for DOD and 
Interagency Affairs, to James C. Fletcher, NASA 
Administrator, “Security Implications in National Space 
Program,” 1 December 1971, with attachments, James C. 
Fletcher Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, 
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT; James C. Fletcher, 
NASA Administrator, to George M. Low, NASA Deputy 
Administrator, “Conversation with Al Haig,” 2 December 1971, 
NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History 
Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
33James Oberg, “Toward a Theory of Space Power: Defining 
Principles for U.S. Space Policy,” p. 5, 20 May 2003, copy of 
paper in possession of author. 
34The standard work on the shuttle and its operational history 
is Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National 
Space Transportation System, the First 100 Missions (Dennis R. 
Jenkins, 2001, 3rd Edition), 
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missions.” In all, between 1979 and 1986 this 
organization trained 32 Navy and Air Force 
officers as military astronauts.35 
 
Even so, the shuttle soon proved 
disappointing. By January 1986 there had 
been only 24 shuttle flights, although in the 
1970s NASA had projected more flights than 
that for every year. Critical analyses agreed 
that the shuttle had proven to be neither cheap 
nor reliable, both primary selling points, and 
that NASA should never have used those 
arguments in building a political consensus for 
the program. The space shuttle’s much-touted 
capabilities had not been realized. It made far 
fewer flights and conducted far fewer 
scientific experiments than NASA had 
publicly predicted.36 Its national security 
possibilities, however, remained intact. The 
DOD flew missions as needed to deploy its 
assets and conduct other activities in Earth 
orbit with military astronauts. 
 
Through the middle part of the 1980s, the 
DOD remained committed to supporting it for 
military purposes. The Air Force paid for the 
construction of the Discovery orbiter, and 
began building Space Launch Complex (SLC) 
6 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, in 
1979 (having been approved in 1974) for the 
launch of polar orbital flights. Furthermore, it 
negotiated with NASA an annual launch rate 
of 40 missions from the Kennedy Space 
Center with 20 from Vandenberg. This proved 
a ridiculous number of launches, but it pointed 
up the optimism of human spaceflight 
program as envisioned at the dawn of the 
Space Shuttle program.37 
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Any plans the DOD might have harbored for 
human spaceflight were dashed with the loss 
of Challenger during launch on 28 January 
1986.38 One of the results of this was the 
removal from the shuttle of all commercial 
and national security payloads and the 
reinvigoration of the expendable launch 
vehicle production lines. It became another 
instance of the DOD seeking a military human 
mission that eventually went awry. 
 
This quest for military astronauts did not end 
there. In 1986, the DOD established a formal 
Military Man in Space (MMIS) Program to 
oversee efforts to ensure that a human military 
presence remained in space. They then 
undertook several experiments aimed at 
demonstrating the utility of humans in orbit in 
observation. As only two examples of military 
astronaut activity, Terra View took place on a 
shuttle flight where military astronauts 
observed the ground and reported observations 
of military interest. Additionally, in Terra 
Scout, Astronaut LTC Jim Voss and Payload 
Specialist CW3 Tom Hennen, aboard STS-44 
in November 1991, used the Spaceborne 
Direct View Optical System (SPADVOS) to 
view terrestrial targets.39 Since the beginning 
of the Space Shuttle flight program, the DOD 
has flown a myriad of payloads on the vehicle. 
 
Also, in the 1980s, DOD began work, along 
with NASA, on a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) 
vehicle for military purposes. If there is a 
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39“Army Space Reference Text,” chapter 9, 
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“holy grail” of spaceflight it is the desire for 
reusable SSTO technology, essentially a 
vehicle that can take-off, fly into orbit, 
perform its mission, and return to Earth 
landing like an airplane. This is an 
exceptionally difficult flight regime with a 
myriad of challenges relating to propulsion, 
materials, aerodynamics, guidance, and 
control. Fueled by the realization the Space 
Shuttle could not deliver on its early 
expectations, DOD leaders pressed for the 
development of a hypersonic space plane. 
With the beginning of the administration of 
Ronald Reagan, and its associated military 
buildup, Tony DuPont, head of DuPont 
Aerospace, offered an unsolicited proposal to 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) to design a hypersonic 
vehicle powered by a hybrid integrated engine 
of scramjets and rockets. DARPA program 
manager Bob Williams liked the idea, and 
funded it as a “black” program code-named 
“Copper Canyon” between 1983 and 1985. 
The Reagan administration later unveiled it as 
the National Aerospace Plane (NASP), 
designated the X-30. Reagan called it “a new 
Orient Express that could, by the end of the 
next decade, take-off from Dulles Airport and 
accelerate up to twenty-five times the speed of 
sound, attaining low earth orbit or flying to 
Tokyo within two hours.”40 
 
The NASP program initially proposed to build 
two research craft, at least one of which 
should achieve orbit by flying in a single stage 
through the atmosphere at speeds up to Mach 
25. The X-30 would use a multicycle engine 
that shifted from jet to ramjet and to scramjet 
speeds as the vehicle ascended burning liquid 
hydrogen fuel with oxygen scooped and 
                                                 
                                                
40Ronald Reagan, “State of the Union Address,” 4 February 
1986, see http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat= 
current_event&code=bush_admin&year=1986 (accessed 29 
December 2009). 
frozen from the atmosphere.41 After billions 
spent, NASP never progressed to flight stage. 
It finally ended in 1994, trapped as it was in 
bureaucratic politics and seemingly endless 
technological difficulties.42 
 
Yet, elements of the DOD remain committed 
to this mission to the present. Throughout the 
1990s, a succession of studies argued for the 
potential of military personnel in space. One 
1992 study affirmed: 
It is absolutely essential for the well 
being of today’s space forces as well 
as the future space forces of 2025, 
that DOD develop manned advanced 
technology space systems in lieu of or 
in addition to unmanned systems to 
effectively utilize military man’s 
compelling and aggressive 
warfighting abilities to accomplish 
the critical wartime mission elements 
of space control and force 
application. National space policy, 
military space doctrine and common 
sense all dictate they should do so if 
space superiority during future, 
inevitable conflict with enemy space 
forces is the paramount objective. 
Deploying military man in space will 
provide that space superiority and he 
will finally become the “center of 
gravity” of the U.S. space program.43 
 
Another analysis found 37 reasons why 
military personnel in space would be required 
 
41Larry Schweikart, “Command Innovation: Lessons from the 
National Aerospace Plane Program,” in Roger D. Launius, 
ed., Innovation and the Development of Flight (Texas A&M 
University Press, 1999), pp. 299-322. 
42Carl H. Builder, “The NASP as a Time Machine,” RAND 
Internal Note, August 1989, copy in possession of author; 
Roger Handberg and Joan Johnson-Freese, “NASP as an 
American Orphan: Bureaucratic Politics and the Development 
of Hypersonic Flight,” Spaceflight 33 (April 1991): 134-37; 
Larry E. Schweikart, “Hypersonic Hopes: Planning for NASP,” 
Air Power History 41 (Spring 1994): 36-48; and Larry E. 
Schweikart, “Managing a Revolutionary Technology, American 
Style: The National Aerospace Plane,” Essays in Business and 
Economic History 12 (1994): 118-32. 
43Daniel L. Hansen, “Exploration of the Utility of Military 
Man in Space in the Year 2025,” NASA report 1992STIN, 
9318267H, March 1992. 
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in the future, ranging from problem-solving 
and decision-making, to manipulation of 
sensors and other systems. It concluded that 
“A military space plane could play a key role 
in helping the United States Air Force 
transform itself from an air force into an 
aerospace force.”44 Yet another study found: 
“Our National Security Strategy must take full 
advantage of the full political, economic, and 
military power of this nation to be successful. 
That means soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen 
able to operate in 
every region of the 
world critical to 
national security, 
whether it is on 
land, at sea, in the 
air, or in space. A 
strategy built on 
anything less is 
incomplete and 
shortsighted.”45 The 
rationale for a 
military astronaut 
rests largely on the human flexibility of 
offering judgment, experience, and decision-
making capabilities not present with 
machines. “There is no way that a price tag 
can be placed on such characteristics as 
flexibility or serendipity
 
because the essence 
of these attributes is the ability to capitalize on 
the unanticipated or unknown,” concluded one 
study.46 According to some reports, DOD 
                                                 
                                                
44Maj. David M. Tobin, “Man’s Place in Space-Plane Flight 
Operations: Cockpit, Cargo Bay, or Control Room?” 
Airpower Journal 13 (Fall 1999): 50-65, quote from p. 62. 
45Lt. Col. Joseph A. Carretto Jr., “Military Man in Space: 
Essential to National Strategy,” Executive Research Project, 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense 
University, NDU-ICAF-95-S3, April 1995, p. 47. 
46Air Force Space Command study, “The Utility of Military 
Crews in Space,” 1985, quoted in Theodore Wierzbanowski, 
“Manned vs. Unmanned: The Implications to NASP,” AIAA-
90-5265 paper, presented at AIAA Second International 
Aerospace Planes Conference, 1990, Orlando, FL, p. 10. 
developed a space plane named “Blackstar” 
and began flying missions as early as 1990.47 
Notwithstanding these speculations, it is 
obvious the decision made initially by 
Eisenhower to split the civil and military 
space programs and to assign the human 
mission to the civil side remains difficult for 
some in the DOD to accept. It represents one 
instance, among many, in which a continuum 
between cooperation and competition has 
taken place in the interrelationships between 
the civil, military, and national reconnaissance 
space programs. 
A military space 
plane could play 











Is There a Military Human Spaceflight 
Mission on the Horizon? 
 
There has been both cooperation and 
competition between the civil and military 
space programs over the years relative to the 
role of humans in space. In a succession of 
recent studies ranging from the Air Force 
Science Board’s “New World Vista” in 1995 
to the Rumsfeld commission’s 2001 analysis 
of national security space issues, the DOD 
persistently sought to find a role for humans in 
space.48 While this has waned somewhat, there 
remains sporadic expressions of interest from 
military officials in favor of the development 
of systems for military human missions in 
space.49 Indeed, as robotic technologies have 
improved, the trend has been away from 
placing humans in harm’s way in favor of 
other options. The rise of unmanned aerial 
 
47William B. Scott, “USAF’s Top Secret Two-Stage-to-Orbit 
Manned ‘Blackstar’ System,” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 5 March 2006, http://www.aviationnow.com/ 
avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id=news/030606p1.xml 
(accessed 19 February 2010). 
48United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, New 
World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century 
(USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1995); and Donald H. 
Rumsfeld, et al., Report of the Commission to Assess United 
States National Security Space Management and 
Organization (Government Printing Office, 2001). 
49See, for example, John Tirpak, “In Search of Spaceplanes,” 
Air Force Magazine, December 2003. 
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vehicles (UAV) piloted from the remote sites 
in the 1990s was driven by the desire to limit 
crew exposure to harm, while increasing loiter 
time over target areas. The success of UAVs 
in carrying out missions that had formerly 
required flight crews has emboldened DOD 
executives to advance this type of technology 
for all future weapons systems.50 In such an 
environment, whatever desires that still exist 
in favor of piloted military space vehicles 
have less possibility of achieving this goal 
than even a few years earlier. At a sublime 
level, human military pilots appear to be a 
twentieth century and 
not a twenty-first 
century priority. 
 




are overall quite 
controversial even as 
they are sometimes 
passionately held – 
mostly resting on 
arguments of national 
prestige, rather than 
practical applications 
– and there does not 
seem to be much 
possibility of this 
changing in the near-
term.51 Of course, one could make the 
observation that since the end of the Cold War 
many of the historic policy options, of which 
the assignment of the United States human 
                                                 
                                                
50Michael J. Hirschberg, “To Boldly Go Where No 
Unmanned Aircraft Has Gone Before: A Half-Century of 
DARPA’s Contributions to Unmanned Aircraft,” AIAA 2010-
158, 48th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting Including the 
New Horizons Forum and Aerospace Exposition, Orlando, 
Florida, 4-7 January 2010. 
51Roger D. Launius, “Compelling Rationales for Spaceflight? 
History and the Search for Relevance,” in Steven J. Dick and 
Roger D. Launius, eds., Critical Issues in the History of 
Spaceflight (NASA SP-2006-4702, 2006), pp. 37-70. 
spaceflight mission to NASA is one, needs to 
be revisited. Reassigning that mission, or a 
portion of it, to the DOD might become a 
possibility should the space agency suffer 
another disaster on the order of the Challenger 
and Columbia shuttle accidents, or if enemies 
pursued a human presence in space, although 
this is unlikely in terms of policy options. 
 
More likely, is a scenario in which military 
astronauts will enter space in a manner similar 
to what soldiers excelled at throughout the 
first century-and-a-half of the United States 
republic: exploring, extending, and protecting 
the frontier. The United States Army explored 
the American West, kept order on the frontier, 
and opened the region to colonization. The 
frontier army pushed the line of occupation far 
beyond the settlements that would have 
resulted otherwise. It raised crops, herded 
cattle, cut timber, quarried stone, built 
sawmills, and performed the manifold duties 
of pioneers in addition to its peacekeeping 
mission. It also restrained lawless traders, 
pursued fugitives, ejected squatters, 
maintained order, and served as the primary 
interface with the Native Americans. In this 
latter role, it was more benevolent than 
remembered in popular conception. This was 
largely peaceful work, with the military 
catalyzing the processes of territorial 
expansion and national development. The 
military outposts on the frontier also served as 
cash markets for early settlers and as centers 
of exploration, community building, and 
cultural development. In the past, the military 
accomplished these tasks in the American 
West; in the future, it might well do so in 
space.52 This is a far different approach to 
“military men in space” than has been argued 
for thus far, but once there is a true space 
frontier the military will be required to be 
…the military 
may create a 









may serve as 
the 
peacekeepers 
and the law 
enforcers.
 
52For an outstanding explanation of this process, see Francis 
Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United State 
Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (Macmillan, 1969). 
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there just as in the past. How far into the 
future this might take place is an open 
question, but it will undoubtedly happen if the 
United States continues to pursue human 
space exploration and development. 
 
This would amount to a significant a role for 
the United States military in space as any 
other that might be envisioned. In the 
nineteenth century, it conducted exploration, 
as with the Lewis and Clark Expedition, and 
its civil engineering efforts, led by the United 
States Corps of Topographical Engineers and 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
proved remarkably significant in opening the 
West.53 In the twenty-first century, the military 
may create a Space Corps of Engineers. Its 
forces may expand to every location where 
humanity establishes a presence, especially on 
the Moon. It may serve as the peacekeepers 
and the law enforcers. It may preserve 
American interests against any who might 
seek to subvert them. Withal, the military 
presence may well help to open a frontier 
beyond Earth in the same way that it did on 
the North American continent earlier. But 
before those possibilities emerge, there 
remains only a modest likelihood of the need 





At the time when the United States is 
reconsidering its next steps in the human 
exploration and development of space, it bears 
considering this possibility for the future of 
military astronauts. What will take place in the 
near-term is very much a matter of yet to be 
resolved. Federal entities will certainly play a 
key role. Will they, however, continue to 
 
                                                
53This story is magnificently told in the Pulitzer Prize-winning 
book by William H. Goetzman, Exploration & Empire: The 
Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American 
West (Random House, 1966). 
dominate or are there heightened prospects for 
commercial activities first in LEO and 
ultimately beyond? If it is the latter, then the 
prospects for military human space missions 
expand exponentially as a means of keeping 
order in this new regime. 
 
This may become the new future for space 
exploration if Congress accepts the Obama 
Administration’s approach. If it does, the false 
starts of the past could be replaced by what is 
envisioned as “A new era of Innovation and 
Discovery.” This new direction and change is 
more than just semantics. It proposes a major 
shift in the way in which the United States 
government approaches human spaceflight. 
Simply put, it represents a paradigm shift in 
space exploration. In this new approach, 
NASA will return to its roots as a research and 
development organization to develop the 
transformational technologies, while private 
industry will operate the systems built. 
Turning LEO over to commercial entities, as 
in the classic 1968 feature film 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, could allow the withdrawal of 
government operators out of this arena, 
allowing them to concentrate on regulatory, 
military, and oversight roles. In this 
environment, there is an important place for 
the peacekeeping function of a frontier, a 
natural mission for the DOD requiring a 
human spaceflight capability.54 
 
 
54I made this case in Roger D. Launius and G. Michael Green, 
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Space Situational Awareness 
Workshop 
 
The goal of the Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA) Workshop is to bring together 
stakeholders interested in space situational 
awareness. This includes practitioners, users 
of data, representatives of industry and the 
military, the scientific community, 
international organizations, and the satellite-
tracking community. These stakeholders 
discuss how needs are changing with SSA, 
what improvements in SSA capabilities can be 
achieved in the near-term to medium-term, 
and how various stakeholder communities 
might better interact to draw on each other’s 
strengths. 
 
The first workshop was held in 2006. It was 
co-sponsored by the World Security Institute’s 
Center for Defense Information. A workshop 
report can be found at: http://www.cdi.org/ 
PDFs/SSAConference_screen.pdf. 
 
The second workshop was hosted by Inmarsat 
in 2007 and was co-sponsored by the World 
Security Institute’s Center for Defense 
Information and the Secure World 
Foundation. A summary of the discussions 
that took place at the workshop held in 2007 
was published in Space and Defense 2:1 
(2008) – “Improving Our Vision II: Building 
Transparency and Cooperation Workshop on 
Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing.”1 
 
The third workshop was held in 2009. This 
workshop was hosted by Intelsat and was co-
 
1For copies of Space and Defense, see http://web.mac.com/ 
rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_ 
Studies/Journal.html (accessed May 2010). 
sponsored by the World Security Institute’s 
Center for Defense Information, the Secure 
World Foundation, and the George C. 
Marshall Institute. A summary of the 2009 
workshop was published in Space and 
Defense 3:2 (2009) – “Space Situational 
Awareness Workshop.” 
 
Areas of focus at the 2009 workshop included: 
• National and international perspectives on 
SSA. 
• Challenges of the space environment. 
• Governance issues related to safe and 
responsible behavior in the space 
environment. 
• State of SSA data sharing and the United 
States Commercial and Foreign Entities 
(CFE) Program. 
• Concepts and capabilities for improved 
SSA data sharing. 
• New opportunities in SSA. 
 
 
Summer Space Seminar 
 
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies organizes the Summer Space Seminar 
to advance two principal goals: (1) to foster an 
education and interest in the interdisciplinary 
areas of space with the intent to develop space 
professionals; and (2) to develop a network of 
relations across civil, commercial, and 
military space professionals that will likely 
emerge from the participants. The first 
Summer Space Seminar was held in 2007. 
 
This seminar exposes participants to the 
breadth and depth of space activities in the 
civil, commercial, and military areas. The 
relationships among these areas are explored 
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across a number of perspectives – participants 
are exposed to the technology and science of 
space activities, followed by discussions on 
the political, legal, economic, and social 
aspects that influence the development and 
application of the various civil, commercial, 
and military space activities. The emphasis is 
on exchanges among the participants. 
 
The Summer Space Seminar is directed 
toward bringing together a broad group of 
future space professionals to lay a foundation 
for a future space policy community in the 
military, civilian government, and private 
sectors. Participants in the program include 
students from the United States Air Force 
Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Military 
Academy, George Washington University, 
and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 
 
The seminar serves as a useful forum for 
further professional development given that 
several of the participants worked, or are 
currently employed, as space professionals. 
During the seminar, a great deal of learning 
and socialization takes place among the 
participants to meet the goal to inform and to 




Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop 
 
In 2006, the Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies held its first Asia, Space, and 
Strategy Workshop. This effort brought 
together U.S., Canadian, and European experts 
and policy makers from the military, civilian 
government, universities, think-tanks, and 
private sectors to discuss the implications of 
current and future Chinese space policy and to 
investigate areas of possible Sino-U.S. 
cooperation in space. Beginning in 2007, an 
invitation was extended to include Chinese 
academics in the discussions. Chinese 
participation has increased each year since 
then, with four attendees from China at the 
2009 workshop in Vancouver, Canada. 
 
The fourth workshop of 2009 was broadened 
to include other space powers in the Asia-
Pacific region. For the first time in the 
workshop series, representatives from 
Australia and Japan took part. The workshop 
focused on common interests that spacefaring 
countries of the Pacific Basin have in the 
creation of a stable, predictable, and mutually 
beneficial environment in space. 
 
Workshop topics in 2009 ranged from: 
economic and political goals for the use of 
space; improving the safety and stability of the 
space environment; deterrence and defense 
concepts; and arms control and verification. 
Implications of the 2009 workshop were 
published in a series of articles in a special 
issue of Space and Defense 2:3 (2009) on 
China, Space, and Strategy. 
 
 
National Space Forum  
 
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies organized and held its fourth annual 
National Space Forum from 1-2 September 
2009 in Washington, DC. Panels at the Forum 
discussed security issues and space. 
 
Specific topics of discussion included: 
• An assessment of security challenges and 
threats in the space domain. 
• The role of space deterrence in national 
policy. 
• The potential for new approaches to arms 
control and verification. 
• The improvement of international 
cooperation with allies in Asia and 
Europe. 
• The role that China plays in space. 
• The implementation of national space 
policy in the Obama Administration. 
Space and Defense, Summer 2010 81 
 
 
The Forum concluded with discussions on 
how to integrate often competing interests into 
a more cohesive policy and, more importantly, 
to improve the chances that such a policy can 
be effectively implemented. Forum panels 
represented a number of points of view from 
security, civil, and commercial space. 
Proceedings of the National Space Forum 




Transatlantic Space Cooperation 
Workshop 
 
In 2008, the Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies established the Transatlantic 
Space Cooperation Workshop. This workshop 
series brings together a community of scholars 
and experts from the United States and 
Europe, including the European Union (EU), 
European Space Agency (ESA), and NATO, 
to share lessons learned, debate, and network 
on joint priorities in civil, security, and 
commercial space. 
 
The first workshop was held in Brussels, 
Belgium in June 2008. Participants in this 
workshop examined U.S., European, and EU 
security space priorities and considered 
NATO’s space role. Discussions began with 
an opening panel where senior U.S., EU, and 
NATO officials briefed participants on current 
security space priorities before participants 
explored issues more in-depth. The goal of the 
workshop was to educate senior leadership 
from the United States, EU, and NATO on 
philosophies and strategies for collective 
space security and deterrence in the 21st 
Century. The workshop was successful in 
initiating dialogue on harmonizing 
transatlantic security space strategies. 
 
The second workshop was held in Berlin, 
Germany during September 2009. The 2009 
workshop fostered dialogue regarding the 
potential for greater cooperation across the 
Atlantic to make the most efficient use of 
capabilities where possible across civil, 
security, and commercial space. A summary 
of the 2009 workshop was published in Space 
and Defense 3:2 (Winter 2009). 
 
Issues discussed at the 2009 workshop 
included: 
• Developments over the past year in 
transatlantic space cooperation. 
• Joint priorities in protection of critical 
space infrastructure. 
• Transatlantic cooperation on Earth 
observations for security and stability. 
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